Urca Gestão de Recursos

Urca Gestão de Recursos (CNPJ 31.818.879/0001-07) is the fund management arm of Urca Capital Partners, an investment banking boutique founded in 2009 by Leonardo Nascimento — an engineer from the Military Engineering Institute, former UBS Pactual/BTG, and former Bain & Company. For about twelve years, it operated as an M&A advisory with a focus on education (it signed the sale of the Sistema Elite network for R$ 90 Mi to Gera Venture Capital in 2012), shifting starting in 2015 to real estate credit and pulverized receivables. Today it has two listed FIIs on B3 — URPR11 (2020) and XPCM11 (assumed in Aug/2025) — within its stated ambition to build a full-service investment bank. For the FII investor, however, the current picture is of a firm with a REGULAR rating (5.0/10) and two funds in a difficult situation.

Track record and governance

Urca's DNA is in investment banking and structuring, not retail wealth management — which explains both the technical competence in setting up credit operations and the fragility in the collection and turnaround phase. The team is credentialed: besides Leonardo Nascimento, the managing partners of URPR11 are Caio Braz Santos (former partner at Click S.A., where he managed a payroll-deducted loan portfolio of ~R$ 4 bi, former HSBC) and Alexander Ruszkay, backed by a heavyweight advisory board — Celso Barros (former head of Morgan Stanley Brazil), Alfred Dangoor (former head of DCM at Bradesco BBI), and Clara Costellini (PhD in Economics from FGV). Formal governance is in order: administration at Vórtx DTVM (URPR11) and Oslo Capital DTVM (XPCM11), with a management fee of 0.95% p.a. + 20% on what exceeds IPCA+7% in URPR11. The most positive event of the period is the operational transparency of XPCM11's audited financial statements from Dec/25, which show real cost cuts. On the other hand, the stance of not passing on interest from defaulting debtors in URPR11 — technically defensible — depressed the share price and exposed that the original credit thesis underestimated execution risk.

Strategy and funds under management

The two funds look opposites, but share the same scar: they are high-return theses that depend on execution, and execution has failed or has not yet proven itself.

• URPR11 (Urca Prime Renda — pulverized paper): AUM of ~R$ 1.2 bi and ~88,816 unitholders, a portfolio of ~25 CRIs/CRAs (R$ 441 Mi) plus fund shares, backed by allotments, timeshare, and residential assets with rates of IPCA+12% to 16%. The thesis worked from 2020 to 2023 (average DPS of ~R$ 1.30/share), but in 2024-2026 several debtors entered distress (D'Paula, Maravista, Ilha do Sol, Barbosa, Riacho Doce). Management cut the DPS to ~R$ 0.29, retained cash for construction contributions, and is renegotiating assets — dropping -9.55% in the year 2026 and trading at a P/B of just 0.22.
• XPCM11 (XP Corporate Macaé — single-asset brick-and-mortar): turnaround of a single Triple A corporate slab in Macaé/RJ, an oil-dependent city, with vacancy stuck above 51%, zeroed dividends for over two years, and NAV/share plummeting 24.6% in 2025 alone (R$ 27.22 → R$ 20.54). In 8 months under Urca there has been clear operational improvement (expenses from 8.0% → 0.92% of AUM, positive operating cash flow, new leases at better prices), but stabilization still depends on approving a primary offering and ~R$ 5 Mi in capex.

What unites them is the nature of execution-risk bought cheap: both trade at a fraction of their net asset value (P/B 0.22 and 0.40) because the market prices in that Urca will have to operate — collect, renegotiate, lease — to unlock value, rather than merely manage passive income. The quality dispersion between the two is low: there is no healthy "anchor" fund to offset the troubled one. It is a portfolio entirely concentrated in special situations, with no stabilized income fund to serve as a reputational ballast.

Strengths and points of attention

• First-line technical team and relationship network, with origins in investment banking and real experience in credit structuring and billion-dollar portfolios.
• Correct long-term conservative stance in URPR11 (preserving principal instead of distributing interest from a troubled debtor) and proven audit-confirmed cost-cutting in XPCM11.
• Alignment of incentives via a performance fee only above IPCA+7% in URPR11.

• Original credit thesis underestimated construction/default risk: URPR11's IRR since IPO is negative (~-2.8% p.a.), and the high DY of 14.84% reflects a depressed price, not health.
• Short and narrow track record in the brick-and-mortar segment — only ~9 months in XPCM11, with no proof of a full turnaround cycle.
• Portfolio without quality diversification: two funds, both in distress, both dependent on execution not yet confirmed.
• Dependency on unitholder approvals and fundraising (XPCM11 primary offering) that are outside the manager's control.

Which investor it makes sense for

Urca is a manager for the special situations investor, who understands and tolerates credit and execution risk, knows how to read management reports, and accepts high volatility in exchange for asymmetry. Those seeking predictable income and preserved capital should not position themselves based on past income: URPR11's 14.84% DY is a statistical mirage on a fallen share price, and XPCM11 does not distribute. For those closely monitoring, what to watch is objective — in URPR11, the resolution of stressed CRIs (D'Paula, Maravista, Ilha do Sol, Barbosa, Riacho Doce) and the normalization of DPS; in XPCM11, the approval of the offering and the R$ 5 Mi capex and the consistent drop in vacancy below 25%. Until these catalysts materialize, Urca remains a technically capable house, but not yet validated as a retail FII manager — competent at structuring, facing a fire test when it comes to execution. Analytical coverage, with no buy recommendation.