Braskem has already disbursed billions of reais in compensation agreements for Maceió's tragedy. Then why did the BRKM5 action collapse almost 15% in the intraday and closed the post on June 12 with a fall of 9,23%, the R$ 8,46, being the biggest low in Ibovespa that day? The answer separates the investor who understands what happened from what only read the headline: Criminal prosecution is not the same as civil indemnity. . The money Braskem paid the residents solved the civilian side. What changed in 12/06/2026 is that the Federal Court of Alagoas accepted the complaint of the Federal Public Prosecutor and made the company — along with 13 individuals — defendant in criminal proceedings. . This changes the nature of the risk the shareholder carries.
Turning defendant means the judge recognized that there is sufficient evidence of crime for the prosecution to proceed. It is not conviction — it is the formal beginning of the criminal phase. And here's the point that the market put out: the criminal phase opens up a risk front that wasn't on the balance sheet, it wasn't provided, and there's no deadline set to end.
Civil versus criminal: the difference that moves the price
For the investor who doesn't follow right, it's worth breaking down. There are two spheres running parallel on Maceió's disaster, and they have completely different consequences for BRKM5's thesis.
In the civil sphere, what is discussed is money: indemnify those who have lost home, trade, quality of life. Braskem closed billion-dollar deals, created relocation and compensation programs, and provided a large part of that liability in the balance sheet. As uncomfortable as the value is, he is, in theory, known and measurable. . The market has known this for years and is already within price.
In the criminal sphere, what is discussed is criminal responsibility: someone committed crime, acted with intent or assumption of risk, and must answer for it. Here the coin changes. Physical persons — former directors of Braskem and public agents of IMA-AL (Institute of the Environment of Alagoas) — come to answer criminally, with risk of punishment. Braskem as a legal entity may be subject to additional criminal fines, restrictions on environmental and operational licenses, and severe reputational exposure.
That's the last point that hurts the thesis. One of the pillars of Braskem's recovery speech was: "We've already faced Maceió, we've paid, now it's looking forward". The prosecution denies this narrative. It says, in the language of the state, that it was not an unfortunate geological accident — it was criminal conduct that may have been sustained by misleading documents. This reopens a wound that the market had partially healed.
The complaint received by the 1st Federal Court of Alagoas (Judge Sérgio Silva Feitosa) imputes four criminal fronts:
- Qualified environmental pollution — degradation that has affected human health and forced the displacement of tens of thousands of people.
- Preparation of false or misleading environmental studies — 26 episodes. This is the most serious point: the charge is that lying reports have been submitted to the authorities to maintain the extraction of moaning salt even in the face of risk signs. If proven, it mischaracterizes "accident" and configures "doll".
- Irregular extraction of mineral resources — exploitation of moaning salt outside the permitted parameters.
- Qualified damage to public property.
The judge received the complaint. partially and recognized the prescription of older conducts — that is, part of the case was extinguished by the course of time. But the core has followed. They became defendants to Braskem, 13 former directors and 4 IMA-AL agents.
Everything accumulates: today's financial context
The prosecution doesn't come at a comfortable time. It adds up to a stack of pressures that have already eroded the thesis of BRKM5:
Petrochemical margins on the floor. The global petrochemical industry is experiencing a bad cycle: spreads (the difference between the price of petrochemical products and the cost of naphtha/raw material) are in historical minimums. Excess of global capacity, mainly Asian, flattened the profitability of the entire sector. Braskem, as a producer of petrochemical commodities, feels this directly in the generation of cash.
Control transition. In June 2026, control of the company passed to Shine I, via OPA — a subject that we have already covered in our own article here in Rico to the Few. The new controller inherits exactly this package: compressed margins, Maceió's liability and now a criminal action underway. For those who are minority shareholders, the reading is double: on the one hand, new control can bring discipline and breath; on the other hand, no one buys an asset like this without weighing the passive that comes along.
Debt with salaries on the horizon. Braskem carries a significant debt, with salaries to be administered in the coming years. Low margin + heavy debt + open legal risk is the combination that scares most creditor and shareholder at the same time, because it pressures the company's financing cost.
Is Maceió Passive growing back? Part of it is already provided in the civil sphere. But criminal action can generate a liability. new or additional: criminal fines, possible new repair obligations, and the widespread — but real — cost of a process that maintains the name of the company associated with the largest urban environmental crime in the history of Brazil. This type of contingency is difficult to provide precisely because it has no value and no time limit.
What to expect now, in procedural terms
With the complaint received, the next legal steps are the citation of the defendants (formal notification to present defense) and, in specific cases, hearing for a proposal for conditional suspension of the case — a legal instrument that may suspend the proceedings under conditions. None of this is fast. Large criminal proceedings drag on for years, with resources in various instances. For the shareholder, the practical meaning is: the legal risk of Maceió no longer has a date of validity next. . He becomes a long-term companion of the thesis.
R$ 8,46, BRKM5 already cashes out a lot of bad — weak margins, debt, and Maceió's stigma. Whoever buys here is betting that the worst is already in the price and that the transition of control brings reorganization. It could work. But the prosecution adds a variable that has no definable fair price: there is no way to calculate the present value of a criminal conviction that may or may not come in years from now.
For the average physical person investor, this means that BRKM5 is not a quiet portfolio position. It is a role for those with long horizons, stomach for extreme volatility (remember: -15% in a single peg) and understands that it is in a bet of turnaround, not an investment in predictability. This is not the time to "buy panic" just because you fell -- buying panic without understanding what's on the table is like picking up a knife falling in the dark. If you can't explain clearly what the difference is between the civil and criminal spheres of this case, you probably shouldn't be exposed to it.
What changed was not the size of the tragedy — that was already known. Changed the Legal nature the risk: from civilian (money, provisionable) to criminal (pain, fines, reputation, no term). Add this to petrochemical margins in minimal, relevant debt and control exchange, and you understand why the market reacted with -9%. BRKM5 remains a possible recovery story, but with one more risk you can't pretend it doesn't exist.
