Caio Megale (XP) Warns: Brazil's Growth Is Slowing—and Without Fiscal Adjustment, Inflation Will Do the Job
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Caio Megale (XP) Warns: Brazil's Growth Is Slowing—and Without Fiscal Adjustment, Inflation Will Do the Job

XP's chief economist explains why economic slack has run out and why the next administration will inherit an imbalance without the tailwinds of the past four years.

XP projects the economy will finish 2026 with growth close to 1%—down from the 3% to 3.5% pace that sustained tax revenues since 2022. Caio Megale, XP's chief economist, explains that this is not a short-term slowdown: it marks the end of the three safety valves that allowed Brazil to grow without stoking inflation. Without them, any additional expansion pushes prices higher—and if fiscal adjustment does not follow, inflation will end up doing the work.

What Megale Is Warning About—and Why Now?

Megale's diagnosis, presented on episode 199 of InfoMoney's Outliers podcast, is precise: recent growth was possible because the economy had spare capacity. There were idle workers to hire, parked machinery to switch on, and households with room to take on credit. These three conditions coexisted in recent years, allowing GDP to advance without generating additional inflation. Now all three have run out at the same time.

unemployment at historic lows + productive capacity at its limit + households more indebted = further growth pressures prices

Unemployment sits at the lowest level in the historical series, and Megale points out that "labor costs are rising." Industrial idle capacity has been exhausted. Households that sustained consumption through credit have reached higher levels of indebtedness. Supply shocks—such as a depreciated exchange rate, oil prices, and weather-related food problems—have a more persistent inflationary effect when the economy is already operating at its limit, because there is no cushion to absorb them without passing costs on to prices. This is what economists call a positive output gap: demand has surpassed the economy's supply capacity.

This diagnosis has a direct consequence for monetary policy: the central bank cannot cut interest rates aggressively without fueling inflation. And the cost of keeping the Selic rate elevated is precisely slower growth—a self-reinforcing cycle as long as the fiscal imbalance persists.

The Debt the Fiscal Framework Failed to Stabilize

The second side of the problem is fiscal. The fiscal framework approved in 2023 softened the trajectory of public debt, but it did not stabilize it. According to National Treasury projections, gross government debt is expected to end 2026 at 83.7% of GDP—compared to 71.7% at the end of 2022. That is an increase of 12 percentage points in four years, even with primary results close to balance.

The reason is arithmetic: Brazil paid more than R$ 1 trillion in interest over the past twelve months, equivalent to 7.9% of GDP. A primary surplus close to zero cannot handle an interest bill of that size. The Treasury projects that debt will only begin to recede after 2032, peaking at 88.6% of GDP that year.

Gross Debt-to-GDP — End of 202271.7%

Level inherited at the start of the current administration, already high compared to emerging market peers.

Gross Debt-to-GDP — 2026 Projection (Treasury)83.7%

An increase of 12 points in four years even with the fiscal framework in effect.

Interest Paid — Past 12 Months>R$ 1 trillion

Equivalent to 7.9% of GDP—the bill that makes balance impossible through a zero primary surplus alone.

Megale acknowledges that the framework fulfills its promise of preventing spending from growing without matching revenue—but notes that near-balance results do not account for court-ordered debt payments (precatórios) and financial operations, let alone interest costs. To stabilize the debt, the next administration will need a more robust primary surplus, not just a neutral one. The structural problem is that mandatory spending has risen alongside tax revenues: if revenues lose steam with GDP deceleration, these commitments do not automatically recede. The negotiations that led to the R$ 80 billion agreement between the government and Congress are a step in that direction, but Megale points out that the adjustment would need to be even more intense to bend the debt trajectory.

If the Government Won't Adjust, Inflation Will Do the Job

This is Megale's most direct warning—and the most relevant for fixed-income investors:

"Ultimately, when you have a fiscal imbalance, the inflationary risk is always lurking. If you cannot pay the bills by adjusting spending and revenue, inflation ends up doing that job."Caio Megale, XP Chief Economist, Episode 199 of Outliers InfoMoney

The mechanism runs as follows: loose fiscal policy → pressured exchange rate → imported inflation → higher Selic rate for longer → slower growth → lower tax revenue → self-perpetuating imbalance. It is not an inevitable spiral, but it is the default path when adjustment fails to materialize. Copom is monitoring this dynamic closely. At its November 4 meeting, the rate-setting committee interrupted a streak of five consecutive cuts and held the Selic rate at 13.75% per year—surprising parts of the market that expected another reduction. The committee's inflation projection rose to 5.6% for 2026, and the central bank signaled no commitment to a timeline for resuming rate cuts.

The Senate's approval of the fiscal adjustment baseline text was a positive signal to the market, but Copom is monitoring actual execution before resuming the cutting cycle. For investors looking to understand how inflation erodes real returns even with high nominal rates, the real inflation calculator demonstrates the impact month by month.

What Changes for Investors

GDP deceleration, rising debt, and an elevated Selic rate for longer distribute the impact unevenly across asset classes:

  • Tesouro IPCA+, CRIs, CRAs, and tax-incentive debentures: Persistent inflation risk and high real interest rates favor bonds that pay inflation plus a fixed rate (IPCA+), especially across 3- to 7-year maturities. With the Selic rate parked at 13.75% and projected inflation at 5.6%, the implied real yield still offers attractive compensation.
  • Short-term fixed-rate bonds (1 to 2 years): With Copom showing no signal of cuts on the immediate horizon, short-term fixed-rate bank certificates (CDBs, LCIs, and LCAs) still lock in an elevated yield for a useful period—allowing investors to reassess their positioning when the cutting cycle restarts.
  • Brick-and-mortar FIIs (shopping malls, office buildings, logistics warehouses): High interest rates are the primary competitor to fund dividend yields. Pressed valuations are likely to persist until the Selic rate recedes consistently—and Megale does not see that happening in the near horizon without fiscal adjustment.
  • Domestic-market equities: Weaker GDP weighs on the revenues of retailers, homebuilders, and consumer credit companies. The slowdown from 3–3.5% to ~1% is not neutral for earnings—and a high cost of capital compresses valuation multiples.

Megale's optimistic scenario—in which a reform-minded administration starting in 2027 allows the Selic rate to recede to 9%—depends on fiscal adjustments that stabilize the debt. The analysis of what happens to public debt if the adjustment fails details how this mechanism works in the Brazilian context and which asset classes win or lose in each scenario.

1

Quarterly GDP (IBGE) — XP projects growth of ~1% by the end of 2026, down from 3% to 3.5% in recent years. A sharper deceleration than that pressures domestic corporate earnings; a milder slowdown suggests slack was not exhausted as quickly as Megale estimates.

2

Monthly Primary Result (National Treasury) — The R$ 80 billion agreement must be confirmed through execution. A consistent positive primary result reduces pressure on debt and paves the way for a resumption of the Selic cutting cycle.

3

Monthly IPCA (IBGE) — Copom raised its 2026 inflation projection to 5.6% against a 3% target. Readings above 4.5% (the ceiling of the tolerance band) for two consecutive months increase the probability of another rate hike rather than a cut—the worst-case scenario for Brazilian real estate funds (FIIs) and equities.

Megale's diagnosis (XP) is that Brazil has entered a phase of reduced room for non-inflationary growth. The three safety valves that sustained GDP over the past four years have run out simultaneously, and public debt has reached 83.7% of GDP without being stabilized by the fiscal framework. For investors, the environment suggests maintaining positions in inflation-indexed fixed income, exercising caution with assets dependent on lower interest rates in the short term, and monitoring the monthly primary result as the primary indicator of when rate cuts can resume.