If you checked SCAR3 on your brokerage app and were startled by the stock price, take a deep breath: the share hasn't been wiped out or delisted from the B3 exchange. The 52% drop over the past 12 months has a straightforward explanation—the company returned roughly R$ 12.50 per share in hard cash during that same period.
What Happened to SCAR3?
SCAR3 shares remain active and continue to trade normally on the B3 at R$ 10.95. The decline in unit value wasn't caused by operational destruction, but rather by capital return: over the past 12 months, São Carlos distributed dividends and executed two capital reductions, returning a significant portion of cash that was previously tied up inside the company directly to shareholders.
The math is simple. Between December 2025 and June 2026, São Carlos distributed R$ 7.1008 per share in dividends (ex-dividend date Dec 3, 2025), plus an R$ 0.90 per share capital reduction in March and an R$ 4.50 per share capital reduction in June—totaling nearly R$ 12.50 per share. An investor holding the stock at around R$ 22.90 a year ago received that R$ 12.50 in cash; adding today's market price of R$ 10.95 to the payouts already collected yields R$ 23.45—virtually back to the starting point. The "52% drop" is merely a snapshot of the share price excluding the distributed cash.
Returning capital is great for those who receive it, but it brings up an obvious question: after distributing over R$ 700 million and slimming down its balance sheet, what is actually left inside São Carlos? The third-quarter 2026 results help answer that.
What 3Q26 Revealed About What Remains
São Carlos intentionally downsized. Over the past 12 months, the company sold R$ 1.62 billion in real estate—R$ 750.9 million in the first nine months of 2026 alone, at an average cap rate of 8.0%—recycled its capital, and moved into a net cash position. What remains is a portfolio of 34 proprietary properties (28 convenience centers under the Best Center brand and 6 corporate office buildings), representing 139.3 thousand square meters of GLA valued at R$ 907.2 million, alongside a younger segment: real estate asset management and advisory services.
In 3Q26 — up from R$ 0.9M in 3Q25
Up 158% vs. 3Q25; 29% of recurring revenue
Lowest historical level for the portfolio
Investors reviewing accounting statements will see a consolidated net loss of R$ 33.9 million—marking the biggest potential trap when analyzing this company. That red ink is a result of CPC 36 (the Brazilian accounting standard equivalent to IFRS 10), which forces São Carlos to consolidate the financial statements of the real estate funds (FIIs) it manages as if they were subsidiaries. It is consolidation noise, not operational value destruction. The metric that matters at this stage is management earnings, or FFO—which came in positive. No financial analyst currently values the company using GAAP numbers.
On the balance sheet side, the company ended September with R$ 826.6 million in cash and cash equivalents against R$ 679.7 million in gross debt, creating a net cash position of R$ 163.6 million (which includes receivables from property sales). Leasing operations, which back everything up, remained solid: Best Center tenants generated R$ 100.1 million in sales during the quarter, an 8.9% year-over-year increase, while same-store lease rates grew 6.1%. These and other stock metrics can be tracked on the stock page at Rico aos Poucos, featuring updated price quotes and filings.
Debt That Disappeared After the Quarter Closed
There is a key detail that does not appear in the quarterly numbers because it took place after the quarter closed. In October, São Carlos gave notice of an optional early redemption of its CRI 50 debt securities; settlement took place on November 11, 2026, totaling R$ 363.9 million. Because the third quarter closed on September 30, this move is not reflected in the figures discussed above—yet it significantly alters the company's financial profile.
With the CRI 50 settled, gross debt falls from R$ 679.7 million to approximately R$ 315.8 million—a 53% drop in leverage in a matter of weeks. Cash balances decline by a matching amount, from R$ 826.6 million to roughly R$ 462.7 million. A point that often causes confusion: this does not change net asset value. Paying off debt using cash is a value-neutral transaction for NAV, which stays at R$ 28.90 per share. The company did not become richer or poorer—it became much lighter, with a far less leveraged balance sheet.
The 62% Discount to NAV — Real or Illusion?
São Carlos reports a NAV of R$ 1.6603 billion, or R$ 28.90 per share, derived from combining appraised property values, cash, and the net equity of consolidated funds. With the stock trading at R$ 10.95, the market is pricing the firm at just over one-third of its self-reported value. Wide valuation gaps are not unusual for real estate companies undergoing a business model transition, nor do they close automatically: it depends on whether the market believes recurring advisory revenue will grow fast enough to support overall asset valuations. For external context, BTG Pactual maintains a target price of R$ 29 per share—an equity research valuation, not an investment recommendation from this publication. It is worth comparing these results with others across the real estate sector in 3Q26, such as Direcional, which posted high earnings despite weak cash generation, to see how accounting profit and economic value do not always move in tandem.
Services revenue becomes the primary earnings driver; NAV is preserved and the discount gradually narrows.
NAV erodes if properties are sold at a discount while asset management fails to scale at the required pace.
Quarterly services revenue — monitor whether it remains above R$ 3.6 million per quarter; this revenue line needs to expand to offset lost rental income as properties are sold
Next capital return — with ~R$ 462.7 million in cash and ~R$ 315.8 million in debt post-CRI 50, there is room for another capital reduction or extraordinary dividend; balance sheet capacity exists, but execution remains management's choice
CPC 36 and accounting noise — as long as FIIs remain consolidated, GAAP figures will look weaker than underlying operations; FFO is the relevant performance metric, not net accounting losses
The current picture shows a significantly deleveraged company backed by solid cash, a lean portfolio, and a fast-growing fund management division—trading at just over one-third of management's estimated value for its underlying assets. The question the market has yet to answer is not what happened to SCAR3, but how long this valuation gap between stock price and NAV will persist. For further comparison with real estate peers navigating transitional figures, see 3Q26 results for Cyrela, which saw net income drop 21% even as revenue rose 12%.