The question that every reader asks when looking at the chart of the SOJA3 It is straightforward: if Boa Safra Sementes is the market leader and sells more each harvest, why did the stock fall about 67% from the maximum of 2023, from more than R$ 18 to less than R$ 6? The answer is also straightforward — it’s straightforward. Selling more stopped to mean earning more.. In 2025 the company achieved ZQXQ record revenue of ZQXXQ million ZQXQ million ZQXX1ZQX billion (+42%) and record volume of 215 thousand big bags (+34%), but the profit attributed to the controllers (the part of the result that actually belongs to the shareholder of ZQXXXX RXX) ZXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
What broke was not the demand: it was the profitability. Adjusted margin EBITDA — how much is left of revenue before interest, taxes and depreciation, measuring pure efficiency of operation — fell from 10% to 5.9%. And, below the operational line, the interest on debt exploded 254% (R$ 132 million in 2025) after the company issued about R$ 1 billion in CRAs (ZQX% cost of Receivables in the Agribusiness. Action fell because profit fell — and fell much faster than revenue went up.
What is Boa Safra, explained from zero?
Before planting soybeans, the farmer needs to buy the seed. The The The The The The The The Boa Safra is the largest independent seller of these seeds in Brazil: of every 10 sacks of certified soybean seed sold in the country, one is its — a record market share of 10%. The company does not plant to harvest grain. She contracts about 320 thousand hectares of partner producers for 320 Multiply by Multiply the seed, benefits this material in the units themselves (capacity of 280 thousand big bags per year) and distributes to 996 distributors spread throughout Brazil. Founded by the Colpo family in Formosa (GO), IPO made B3 in April of 2021, in the New Market.
There is one feature of this business that changes everything when it comes to reading the results: a. seasonality is brutal brutality seasonality is brutality. About 89% of revenue comes out in the second half, because the seed is delivered near the planting (September to December). The first semester is stock formation — the company burns cash, net debt goes to the peak and the quarterly EBITDA may even be negative. That's normal.
Never annualize a first quarter of Boa Safra. The net debt jumped from R$ 151 million in December from 2025 to R$ 848 million in March from 2026 — it is not a sign of deterioration, it is the seasonal cycle of buying grain to form stock. What is valid is the closing of the year and the comparison with the same quarter of the previous year.
The anatomy of the fall: three blows at the same time
The series of results tells the whole story. Revenue grows, but profitability collapses — and every row in the table below hides a cause.
| Periododo | Revenue net. (R$ mi) | Brutto margin bruta margin | Margin EBITDA margin aj. | Profit controller (R$ mi) | Big bags (mil) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2023 | 2.079 | 14,8% | — | 301,5 | 164 |
| 2024 | 1.841 | 13,1% | 10,0% | 93,5 | 161 |
| 2025 | 2.622 | 10,3% | 5,9% | 20,0 | 215 |
| 1T26 (trim.) | 132 | 21% | n/s (seasonal) | 3.7 (ex--)SNAG11) | — |
| 12m to sea/26XM/26M | 2.591 | — | 5,1% | 15.2 (ex-SNAG11) | — |
The first blow was made. The Price Price. The entire sector produced too much seed — a structural excess of about 30% — and, with a surplus of supply, the selling price fell. Add to that the most expensive grain to purchase and a quality discard above normal (15% vs. 10% historical, for irregular weather), and the gross margin sank from 14.8% to 10.3%. The EBITDA per big bag, which measures how much the company earns per unit sold, plummeted from about R$ 1,900 (2023) to R$ 1,100 (2025).
The second golpe came. under the operational line below the operational line.: R$ 132 million interest (+254%) on debt of approximately R$ 1 billion in CRAs to CDI+3%. That amount equals almost 7 times the profit of the controller of the year — expensive debt, contracted to finance growth, today eats almost everything that the operation generates.
The third blow was struck. the customer the customer. The Brazilian countryside is experiencing the worst credit crisis of the historical series: 1,990 judicial recovery in agriculture in 2025 (+56), rural credit default rising from 1.2% to 3.3%. Decapitalized producer does two things that hurt Boa Safra at the same time: postpones the purchase and resorts to the purchase. Seeds saved saved seeds — the seed kept from the previous harvest itself, replanted without paying for the certificate. Today 27% of the country's soybean area already uses non-certified seed. It is the permanent competitive business ceiling.
Beware of the consolidated trap. The consolidated profit of 2025 appears in R$ 101 millions in some sources — but that is an accounting illusion. About R$ 81 millions of this total belonged to minority partners of the SNAG11 fund, already sold by the company at the beginning of 2026. The number that matters to the shareholder of SOJA3 is the profit attributed to the controllers: R$ 20.0 millions. Always use that.
Why is there still a buying thesis?
Because the market pays for the company, the company pays for the market. Less than her wealth is worth on paper.. The P/VP (Price on Wealth Value — how much the share costs in relation to net worth per share) is in 0.63x, with equity of R$ 9.59 per share. Translating: the market estimates the entire Good Safra at R$ 853 millions, a leading operation that invoiced R$ 2.6 billions and has already cleared the SNAG11 balance sheet.
The turning levers are visible: a. Order book broke record of R$ 1.5 billion billion R$ 1.5 billion in the 1TZQXX1ZQX — something unusual for a first quarter and that gives rare visibility for second half deliveries. The soybean in Chicago has risen again (ZQX0ZQQ QQXX $ 12.26 for bushel), Selic has begun to fall (14.25%, with projection of 12.5% to the end of 2026 — every cut of 1 is worth up to R$ 10 revalue point) freeX to R$ ZQX to R$ ZXXXXXX.
There is also a structural catalyst in the background: the PL 1702/19X, which instituts a royalty on saved seed. If you move forward in Congress, it changes the economy of the sector — every real charged on the pirated seed pushes area back to the formal market, exactly where Boa Safra is leading. But it depends on Congress, with no set deadline.
How much is it worth, after all? O valuation with premises at the table table.
SOJA3 is the classic case where each multiple tells a different story. By today’s depressed profit, stock is stock. Face Face (P/L of about 35 times). For the heritage, this is it. muy barata muy barata (0.63x). The output is to estimate a profit from a profit. Half cycle cycle half cycle cycle — neither the 2023 peak nor the 2025 valley — and cross three independent methods.
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|---|---|---|
| P/VP × standardized profitability | R$ ZQXX0ZQQXX | R$ 9.59/share equity, ROE normalizing in 7-9%, P/VP fair of 0.75-ZQX6ZXXx% |
| Normalized earnings × P/LXX | R$ ZQXX0ZQQXX | Net margin of 4% on R$ 2.6 bi = ~R$ 105 profit, to P/LXX of 9xx |
| EV/EBITDA standardized standardized | R$ ZQXX0ZQQXX | EBITDA of ~R$ 220 mi (margin 8.5%) × 6x minus average net debt |
| Reference: consensus of houses. | R$ 6.50 to R$ ZQX1ZZQXXX | Citi R$ 6.50 · Bradesco R$ 9 · Itaú R$ 10 · XP R$ 11.80 · BTG R$ 12 (sanity check only) |
The three own methods converge to a range of R$ 6.20 to R$ 7.40, with a central point in R$ 6.20. R$ ZQXX0ZQQXX — potential of +17% over the current R$ 5.97, insufficient to compensate for the risk without signs of confirmation of the margin. The full fair price range ranges from R$ 5.00 (floor) to R$ 10.00 (top). At R$ 5.97, the market is almost in the pessimistic scenario; purchases below R$ 5.50 embed real security margin even in the base scenario, while above R$ 7.00 the investor is paying for the recovery before it exists.
Three scenarios, three observable triggers.
| Scenario scenery | Price-target target price | Probability Probability | What needs to happen happens. |
|---|---|---|---|
| Optimistic — the turning point of the cycle | R$ ZQXX0ZQQXX | ~25% | Margin EBITDA returning to 8-10% in 2S26, soy above US$ 12.50, Selic to 12%, PL 1702 advanced/19XX |
| Base — recuperação lenta — recuperação lenta | R$ ZQXX0ZQQXX | ~50% | Wallet converted with price still pressed, partial margin of 7-8%, seasonal normal seasonal deleveraging. |
| Pessimist — openness is crisis. | R$ ZQXX0ZQQXX | ~25% | Rural credit worsening, excess seeds persisting, covenants bursting, Selic stopping from falling. |
In the pessimistic scenario, it is worth a warning that rarely appears: the discount heritage heritage. Stop being flat on the floor.. The estate of a sower is made up of stocks and receivables of farmers under stress — in a settlement, this is worth less than the balance sheet says. Small caps cyclic usually pierce the rational floor in moments of panic.
Dividends: It is not income stock.
Do not count on relevant dividends from SOJA3. The company has no formal policy of revenues and directs profit to the "Expansion Reserve" — April AGO April 2026 retained R$ 19 millions of a profit of R$ 20 millions. The JCP of R$ 40 million paid in December of 2025 (JCP is the Interest on Own Capital, a way of remunerating the shareholder with tax advantage to the company) in practice exceeded the profit of the year — a nod that consumed reserves and does not repeat without recovery of the result. There is even a contractual clause that blocks distribution in case of default of the group. The return of this action, if it comes, will come from the price, not from income.
The thesis test: November of 2026X November of 2026X
All the above discussion resolves itself into an observable variable. The fire proof is the result of the fire proof. 3XZQQXX1ZQX, released in November of 2026XQQXX, when about 44% of the revenue of the year goes through the result. The trigger is objective::
EBITDA adjusted margin of 3XT26 ≥ 8% confirms the recovery thesis. 6% below denies the negation — would signal that the problem is structural, not cyclical, and the action would lose the value argument.
In addition to the margin, it is worth monitoring: the net debt QQQ in September and December (the seasonal pattern tells it to plummet in the 2 semester — if it does not plummet, it is red alert), the default of the farm and the PDD of the company (which has already jumped from R$ ZQX2ZZX to R$ ZX5XXX from the healthy price.
In one sentence: SOJA3 is a bet that the agro cycle has turned. before before before before before before before before before before before before before before before before before before before before The numbers prove — cheap in equity, expensive in current profit, for small position, patient pocket and eye on November result. Who already has position finds in the record portfolio and in the macro turning reasons to hold. Who does not have can wait for the margin confirmation on 3ZZQQXX1ZQX, paying perhaps 15-20% more expensive in exchange of much less risk.
Verdict: EM ANALYSIS — note 5.5/10. A Boa Safra is a legitimate and leading business, but it goes through a leveraged turnaround in the midst of a rural credit crisis. Fair price estimated at R$ 7.00 (range R$ 5.00 to R$ 10.00). This is not an investment recommendation; the decision is yours.
This text summarizes the complete analysis. The detailed dossier — fundamentals, risks, governance, scenarios and evaluation — is on the page. /acones/soja3/ (Analysis bar). There is also the report in ZQX0ZQQX report in PDFX, produced by the website with the help of artificial intelligence — it is not the official document of Boa Safra Seeds S.A.
