VALE3

Vale S.A. (VALE3)

Vale is Brazil's largest mining company and the world's second-largest iron ore producer, sitting on the highest-grade asset among the majors: Carajás, in the state of Pará. It runs three integrated mine-railroad-port systems in Brazil, produces pellets in Brazil and Oman and, through Vale Base Metals, mines nickel in Canada and Pará and copper at Salobo, Sossego and in Canada. In 2025 it posted R$ 213.6 billion in revenue and produced 327.4 Mt of iron ore. It is listed on B3's Novo Mercado with a single share class, VALE3 — the VALE5 preferred shares were converted into common stock back in December 2017 — and on the NYSE through the VALE ADR.

Sector: Extração Mineral · Share price: R$ 72.24 (close on Jul 20, 2026) · Dividend yield (12m): 7.58% · 52-week range: R$ 0.00 – 91.62

Full analysis of VALE3 (produced by this site with AI, Jul 22, 2026)

Rating: 6.5/10 · Verdict: HOLD · Estimated fair price: R$ 77.00 (range R$ 60.00–95.00)

VALE3 is Brazil's largest miner and the world's second-largest iron ore producer, owner of an asset that cannot be replicated: Carajás, the highest-grade ore among the major producers. Q2 2026, reported on July 21, 2026, was the best second quarter for iron ore since 2018 — 84.3 Mt of production (+0.8% year over year), 79.7 Mt of sales (+3.1%), a realized price of US$ 95.0/t (+11.6% year over year) and records in both copper and nickel.

But the share price isn't made of production — it's made of ore prices, the exchange rate and confidence in governance, and all three are working against it right now. Iron ore hovers around US$ 100/t in a structural surplus, with Simandou coming on stream; the real at R$ 5.08 pushes the C1 cash cost to the top of guidance (Vale has already warned as much); and the company elects the chair of its Board of Directors today, July 22, 2026, at a meeting that has turned into a public brawl involving Previ, the Bank of Brazil employees' pension fund, the Board itself, minority shareholders and CVM, Brazil's securities regulator. Rating 6.5/10 — HOLD: fair value estimated at R$ 77.00 (range R$ 60-95), upside of +6.6% plus an expected dividend of ~5.7%. A decent return — but one that in the base case doesn't beat the Selic, Brazil's policy rate, at 14.25% — which calls for a better entry price, not for hurry.

Overview

Vale digs iron ore out of the ground in Brazil and ships it mostly to China, which turns it into steel. It also produces copper and nickel. It is the country's largest mining company and one of the largest in the world — almost 11% of the entire Ibovespa, Brazil's benchmark index, is Vale.

First, an important correction: a lot of people still search for "Vale 4" or "Vale 5". Those shares have not existed since December 2017, when Vale scrapped its preferred shares, converted every holder into common shares and joined the Novo Mercado, B3's top corporate governance tier. Today there is a single ticker: VALE3. Anyone holding VALE5 automatically became a VALE3 shareholder. Abroad, on the New York Stock Exchange, the very same stock trades as an ADR under the ticker VALE.

So how is the company doing? The operation is doing well — the quarter just reported was the best April-June for iron ore since 2018. What worries is everything else: the iron ore price is in a tug-of-war near US$ 100 a tonne, with a giant new mine in Africa (Simandou) starting to pour extra ore into the market; a cheap dollar (R$ 5.08) hurts, because Vale is paid in dollars but pays its costs in reais; and there is an open fight over who runs the Board of Directors, with the Bank of Brazil employees' pension fund on one side, part of the Board on the other, and the matter already on the desk of CVM, Brazil's securities regulator.

At R$ 72, the stock offers roughly 5.7% in expected dividends over the next 12 months and, by our math, about 7% of room to fair value. Add them up and you get something around 12% — less than what risk-free government paper in Brazil pays (the Selic policy rate is at 14.25%). That's why the verdict is hold, not rush to buy: if you already own it, keeping it and collecting the dividends makes sense; if you don't, you lose little by waiting either for a lower price or for a clear signal from ore prices and governance.

Investment thesis

The VALE3 thesis is a world-class asset with a price ceiling imposed from outside. On the good side: Carajás cannot be replicated, the operation is delivering (best Q2 for iron ore since 2018), the cost base is among the most competitive in the world whenever the currency cooperates, and the company returns cash by written policy — a minimum of 30% of EBITDA less sustaining capex, in two installments a year.

On the bad side: three simultaneous ceilings. (1) Iron ore in surplus, with consensus around US$ 95/t for 2026 and a downward bias, now with Simandou (Guinea, 65% Fe) adding to global supply. (2) A strong real at R$ 5.08, which pushes C1 to the top of guidance — Vale itself flagged in its Q1 2026 release that costs are trending toward the upper end of the US$ 20-21.5/t (C1) and US$ 52-56/t (all-in) ranges. (3) Governance in an open dispute, with the Board being decided at a shareholder meeting under scrutiny from CVM, Brazil's securities regulator.

The investor here is not buying growth — they are buying a ~5.7% annual dividend stream from a cyclical company, in a country where the Selic policy rate sits at 14.25%. It is a good company at a moment when idle cash earns almost the same with no risk.

Strengths

  • Carajás: the world's best iron ore, at scale. The Northern System produces ore at ~65% iron grade with low alumina — steelmakers pay a premium for it because they burn less energy and emit less carbon. In Q2 2026, S11D set a second-quarter record at 23.4 Mt. It is an asset no Australian competitor has and one that would take decades and tens of billions to replicate.
  • The operation is genuinely delivering — this isn't rhetoric. Q2 2026 was the best second quarter for iron ore since 2018 (84.3 Mt), the best for copper since 2017 (98.4 kt) and the best for nickel since 2020 (42.0 kt). Every 2025 guidance target was met or beaten. Capanema and VGR1 are ramping up and Serra Sul +20 starts in the second half. Operational execution is the strongest argument current management has.
  • A cash machine with a written distribution policy. The remuneration policy mandates a minimum of 30% of adjusted EBITDA less sustaining capex, in two installments (September and March), with interest on equity (JCP) in December. It doesn't depend on management's mood. Over the last 12 months that came to R$ 5.48/share — 7.58% on the current price — and 2025 recurring free cash flow was US$ 4.76 bn.
  • A balance sheet that can ride out the cycle. Net debt of US$ 13.6 bn and expanded net debt (including all Brumadinho and Samarco provisions) of US$ 17.8 bn, against pro forma EBITDA of ~US$ 16 bn/year — roughly 1x. Shareholders' equity of R$ 195.9 bn and cash of R$ 26.5 bn in Q1 2026. The company can cross a bad ore cycle with no solvency risk.
  • Base metals as real optionality. Copper and nickel already account for ~28% of EBITDA and the target is one third. The realized copper price jumped 56.5% year over year in Q2 2026 (US$ 14,062/t) and the all-in nickel cost fell 48% year over year. Saudi partner Manara came in back in 2023 at an implied valuation of US$ 26 bn for the division, and an eventual IPO would unlock value the market doesn't pay for today.
  • A true corporation, with 96% free float. There is no controlling shareholder: the largest holder is Previ, the Bank of Brazil employees' pension fund, with 7.02%, followed by BlackRock (6.71%), Mitsui (6.45%) and Capital World (5.13%). There are 762,000 individual shareholders in the base. Novo Mercado listing, PwC as auditor since 2019, a permanent Fiscal Council elected by minority shareholders. On paper, it is one of the best governance structures on the exchange — which makes the current crisis all the more frustrating.

Weaknesses

  • Zero control over the price of its own product. Vale is a price taker. The benchmark index shifted from 62% to 61% Fe in 2026 and hovers around US$ 99-100/t, with market consensus at ~US$ 95/t for the year and a downward bias. Chinese steel demand sets the price — and China's steel output fell 3% in the first half of 2026, a second consecutive year below 1 billion tonnes.
  • Costs rising while competitors' costs don't. C1 hit US$ 23.6/t in Q1 2026 (+12% year over year) because of the strong real, and the company signaled the year should close at the TOP of guidance (US$ 20-21.5/t for C1, US$ 52-56/t all-in). For comparison: Fortescue operates at US$ 17.5-18.5/t and BHP at US$ 18-19.5/t. The Australians don't suffer from the real — Vale is structurally the most expensive of that quartet.
  • Governance hijacked by a public dispute. On June 11, 2026, Previ (7.02%) demanded a shareholder meeting to remove the Board chair, Daniel Stieler. The Board recommended rejecting it. Stieler resigned on July 6. An interim chair was elected on July 14. And today, July 22, shareholders choose between two board members — with CVM, Brazil's securities regulator, having issued an official letter on July 20 after two minority shareholders questioned the very legality of the vote. This is pure institutional noise, and noise drives foreign capital away.
  • The Mariana and Brumadinho liabilities keep consuming cash for decades. In 2026 alone, Vale's contribution to the Mariana reparation is R$ 6.2 billion, plus US$ 0.9 bn for Brumadinho and US$ 0.7 bn for dam de-characterization — something around US$ 2.7 billion, more than half of 2025 recurring free cash flow. The schedule runs through 2043. And the London trial against BHP, Samarco's partner, could still enlarge the bill indirectly.
  • Reported earnings are volatile and full of traps. A US$ 3.5 bn impairment on Canadian nickel in Q4 2025, Samarco provisions revised every quarter, provisional pricing adjustments in copper and nickel. The published result is rarely the economic result — an investor looking only at the P/E on a financial website will conclude Vale is expensive at 20x earnings, when on a recurring basis it trades near 8x.
  • Simandou changes the quality-premium game. The Guinean mine delivers ore at ~65% Fe, precisely the band where Carajás is premium. The first shipment left in November 2025 and 2026 estimates range from 16 to 20 Mt, heading toward 120 Mt/year sometime in the 2030s. The ramp-up appears to be slipping (RBC pushed its estimate from 30 to 48 months), which helps in the short run — but the structural direction is only one: more competition in the one band where Vale has an edge.

Risks

  • Political interference in the company. This is risk number one today and the least priceable. A state-owned bank's pension fund forced a shareholder meeting to change the Board's leadership; members of Congress are talking about a formal inquiry (CPI) into government interference; and minority shareholders have taken the matter to the securities regulator. The problem isn't which name wins today — it's the precedent that the composition of the board of Brazil's largest miner is once again a subject for Brasília. That bears directly on dividend policy, capex discipline and the multiple foreign investors are willing to pay.
  • Iron ore in structural surplus. Chinese steel output falling (-3% in H1 2026), inventories at Chinese ports around 160 Mt (a more-than-three-year high) and new African supply arriving. The ~US$ 95/t consensus for 2026 already embeds that; the risk is the scenario in which the price breaks below US$ 85/t. Each US$ 10/t off the realized price strips, roughly, more than US$ 3 billion from Vale's annual EBITDA.
  • FX: a strong real compressing margins. At R$ 5.08, the real is at its most unfavorable level for Vale in years. The company itself discloses the sensitivity: every R$ 0.10 move shifts C1 by US$ 0.25/t. A real at R$ 4.80 would add roughly US$ 0.70/t to costs — across 320 Mt, that's real money. And unlike the ore price, this is a risk that runs in the opposite direction from what most Brazilian investors are rooting for.
  • Dam liabilities beyond what is provisioned. The English courts have already found BHP liable in the Mariana case and denied its appeal. The damages quantification phase is still to come, and since Samarco is a 50/50 joint venture between Vale and BHP, there is a path for the bill to splash back. The provisioned balance for Brumadinho and de-characterization stood at US$ 4.0 bn in December 2025 — new numbers may yet appear.
  • Rail concessions and the regulatory agenda. Renegotiating the concessions for the Carajás Railroad and the Vitória-Minas Railroad — the railways without which Vale ships nothing — involves a multibillion-real concession fee to the federal government and new investments, and the final text still depends on sign-off from TCU, Brazil's federal audit court. Owning its own railways is Vale's single biggest competitive advantage; any bad outcome there reshapes the cost structure for decades.
  • A smaller dividend than the rear-view mirror suggests. The 7.58% trailing 12-month yield embeds a bigger distribution than what lies ahead. With expanded net debt at US$ 17.8 bn, R$ 6.2 bn of Mariana payments in 2026 alone and capex of US$ 5.4-5.7 bn, there is no comfortable room for an extraordinary dividend this year. And since January 1, 2026, a 10% withholding tax applies to dividends above R$ 50,000 per month paid by the same company to the same individual — which cuts the net take for anyone holding a large position.

Scenarios

Otimista: Ore holds, the real weakens and governance calms down

The company delivers US$ 18 bn of EBITDA, the dividend climbs back toward R$ 5.50-6.00 per share and the market accepts paying 5.8x EV/EBITDA (the multiple of the Australian peers), closing the country-risk and political-risk discount. Indicative price: R$ 95.00.

Base: Sideways, collecting the dividend

The stock oscillates between R$ 68 and R$ 85, tracking the ore index and the exchange rate, and shareholder returns come almost entirely from the ~5.7% dividend. This is the scenario in which VALE3 ties with fixed income and the investor discovers they took on volatility for free. Indicative price: R$ 77.00.

Pessimista: The surplus materializes with the State inside the house

EBITDA falls to the US$ 12-13 bn range, the dividend shrinks to R$ 3.00-3.50 per share (a ~4.5% yield on today's price) and the multiple compresses alongside earnings — the double penalty typical of a cyclical in a bad cycle. The stock revisits the R$ 55 area, where it traded in mid-2025. Indicative price: R$ 55.00.

Valuation

Before the methods, one trap has to be defused: the 20.6x P/E shown on financial websites is worthless as a thermometer. It divides the price by a trailing 12-month profit contaminated by the US$ 3.8 bn Q4 2025 loss (the nickel impairment). On a recurring basis — the US$ 7.8 bn pro forma profit in 2025, or the R$ 10.0 bn from Q1 2026 alone — VALE3 trades near 8x earnings and 5.1x EV/EBITDA. It isn't an expensive stock. But it isn't scraping the bottom either: in 2024 and 2025 it traded below R$ 55 on similar multiples.

Cross-checking four methods, we arrive at a range of R$ 75 to R$ 78, with a midpoint of R$ 77.00 — upside of +6.6% over R$ 72.24, plus an expected dividend of ~5.7%. Sell-side consensus on the ADR sits around US$ 17.26 (equivalent to ~R$ 88 per share), with a high of US$ 21 and a low of US$ 14.80 — the widest dispersion of the year, a sign that nobody has conviction. Our number sits deliberately below consensus because we incorporate two factors sell-side models treat as noise: the exchange rate at R$ 5.08 (which the market insists on modeling above R$ 5.50) and the governance discount, which has become real again.

  • EV/EBITDA on normalized EBITDA: R$ 77.00 — 2026 pro forma EBITDA estimated at US$ 16.0 bn (Q1 2026 delivered US$ 3.9 bn, with a seasonally stronger second half) × a 5.3x target multiple — below the 5.5-5.9x of peers BHP and Rio Tinto, to reflect country and political risk. EV of US$ 84.8 bn less expanded net debt of US$ 17.8 bn = equity of US$ 67.0 bn, converted at R$ 5.078 and divided by 4.439 billion shares.
  • P/E on recurring earnings: R$ 76.00 — Mid-cycle normalized pro forma profit of US$ 7.8 bn (equal to what was delivered in 2025, itself already a normalized-price year) = R$ 39.6 bn, or R$ 8.92 per share, multiplied by 8.5x — a typical multiple for a diversified miner in a neutral cycle. Below the 10-12x the market paid in years of rising prices.
  • Required dividend yield: R$ 75.00 — Expected payout of R$ 4.15 per share over the next 12 months (policy minimum of 30%, no extraordinary) against a required yield of 5.5%. The required yield is low relative to the 14.25% Selic because it embeds expected appreciation of the real asset and FX protection — if the investor demands 6.5%, fair value falls to R$ 64.
  • P/BV × asset quality: R$ 78.00 — Book value of R$ 43.07 per share (controlling shareholders' equity of R$ 191.2 bn in Q1 2026 ÷ 4.439 billion shares) × 1.8x. Vale has traded between 1.2x and 2.5x book over the past decade; 1.8x is the middle of the range and reflects a recurring ROE near 20% on book equity.
  • Reference: sell-side consensus (ADR): R$ 87.60 — Average target of US$ 17.26 for the VALE ADR in New York (13 buy recommendations, none to sell), converted at the R$ 5.078 PTAX rate. Analyst range: US$ 14.80 to US$ 21.00. Morgan Stanley downgraded to neutral on July 8, 2026 with a US$ 16.50 target. Used only as a sanity check — not included in the average.

Timing

Where we are in the cycle: halfway, and that is precisely what makes the decision hard. The stock has come down from R$ 91.62 (its February 2026 high) to R$ 72.24 — a 21% decline — yet it is still 38% above its 52-week low (R$ 52.37) and up more than 30% over 12 months. This is neither the bottom of pessimism nor euphoria: it is a repricing in progress.

Three clocks are ticking at once. The institutional one strikes today, July 22, at the meeting that decides the Board. The operational one strikes on July 30, with the Q2 2026 financial results — and attention shouldn't go to production (which we already know was excellent) but to cost: will C1 confirm the top of guidance? The cycle clock strikes month by month, in the ore index and in Chinese port inventories.

What to do: for those who already own it, there is no operational reason to sell — the company is delivering and paying dividends. For those who don't, today's asymmetry is lukewarm: 6.6% to fair value plus a 5.7% dividend, against a risk-free Selic of 14.25%. The objective trigger to add is a price below R$ 65, or confirmation that costs did not blow through guidance — not the headline out of the shareholder meeting.

Management — who runs the company

Management rating: 6.0/10

There is a clean separation here between two things that usually get conflated: the executive team is delivering; the Board of Directors is at war.

Executive management deserves a high grade. Gustavo Pimenta, CEO since October 2024, met every 2025 guidance target, delivered the best second quarter for iron ore since 2018, cut costs for two consecutive years (C1 of US$ 21.3/t in 2025, -2% year over year) and held capital discipline — capex contained at US$ 5.4-5.7 bn, the Thompson strategic review closed with Vale keeping only 18.9%, and not a single vanity acquisition. The statutory executive board was slimmed from 9 to 6 members between 2023 and 2026.

The Board is the problem. On June 11, 2026, Previ — the Bank of Brazil employees' pension fund, holder of 7.02% — used its legal right as a shareholder to call a meeting to remove Board chair Daniel Stieler. The Board recommended, by majority, rejecting the removal, citing "notable progress in governance." Stieler resigned on July 6, emptying the vote of its purpose. On July 14 the Board elected Wilfred Bruijn as interim chair, with Bruijn himself and Sousa Oliveira abstaining, and with a formal written vote attached by vice-chair Marcelo Gasparino. And today, July 22, 2026, the Extraordinary General Meeting (EGM) chooses between two board members to chair the body: Manuel Lino Silva de Sousa Oliveira, backed by Previ, and Marcelo Gasparino, the current vice-chair. On July 20, CVM, Brazil's securities regulator, issued Official Letter No. 196/2026 at the request of two minority shareholders (Geração L. Par and Banco Clássico) who question the validity of the election itself — since the agenda items were conditioned on a removal that the resignation rendered moot.

What this means in practice: strategy probably doesn't change — both candidates are career board members who support current management. What changes is the price investors charge for institutional risk. A corporation with 96% free float that decides its leadership under a letter from the securities regulator, with Congress talking about a formal inquiry, is not the same company that made the transition to the Novo Mercado in 2017.

  • Gustavo Duarte Pimenta — Chief Executive Officer (CEO). An economist. He was Vale's own CFO from 2021; before that, VP of Strategy and M&A at Citigroup and global CFO at AES. A finance and capital-allocation profile, not a mining one. His hallmark so far is disciplined continuity: guidance delivered, costs cut and a refusal to grow through acquisitions.
  • Marcelo Feriozzi Bacci — Executive VP of Finance and Investor Relations (CFO and IRO). A business administrator, he came from Suzano, where he was CFO for nearly a decade and is credited with the financial discipline of the Fibria merger. He signs every company communication to the market, including those of the current shareholder crisis.
  • Wilfred Theodoor Bruijn — Chair of the Board of Directors (interim, independent). A mathematician and independent board member. He was elected as a bridge solution after Stieler's resignation, by majority and with his own abstention — a sign of formal care in an environment where every vote is being read under a magnifying glass.
  • Marcelo Gasparino da Silva — Vice-Chair of the Board of Directors (independent) · candidate for the chair. A lawyer and one of the best-known professional board members in the Brazilian market, with a record of defending minority shareholders at several companies. He filed a formal statement and vote attached to the minutes of July 14, 2026 regarding the election of the interim chair.
  • Manuel Lino Silva de Sousa Oliveira — Independent board member · candidate for the chair, backed by Previ. An economist and independent board member. He abstained and disconnected from the July 14, 2026 meeting when the chairmanship was deliberated, under the company's conflict-of-interest policy — the correct procedure in a process in which he is an interested party.
  • Board of Directors (13 members) — The body as a whole — 8 declared independent. Besides those named above: Anelise Quintão Lara, Franklin Lee Feder, Heloísa Belotti Bedicks, Rachel de Oliveira Maia and Reinaldo Duarte Castanheira Filho (independent); André Viana Madeira, Fernando Jorge Buso Gomes, Márcio Antônio Chiumento and Shunji Komai (non-independent). Total board compensation in 2026: R$ 23.8 million. The statutory executive board, with 6 members, costs R$ 151.5 million.

Verifiable deliveries from executive management: every 2025 guidance target met or beaten; the highest iron ore and copper output since 2018; C1 cash cost falling for two consecutive years (US$ 21.3/t in 2025); no dam at emergency level 3 — an 80% reduction in emergency structures since 2020; ramp-ups at Capanema, VGR1, VBME and Onça Puma delivered; Serra Sul +20 at 86% physical progress and on schedule to start in H2 2026; the Thompson strategic review closed without burning cash.

Failures and points of attention: the US$ 3.5 billion impairment on the Canadian nickel assets in Q4 2025 is the accounting acknowledgment that the base metals thesis was bought too expensively — Vale paid for Canadian assets (a legacy of the 2006 Inco acquisition) that today are worth less on the books. The C1 cost started rising again in 2026 (+12% year over year in Q1 2026) and the company has already warned the year will close at the top of guidance. And board governance, once sold as an exemplary case of the transition to a true corporation, fell into open crisis in under 60 days.

Governance, control and liquidity

On paper, it is one of the best structures on the Brazilian exchange. Vale is listed on the Novo Mercado, with a single share class (100% common, full tag-along rights), 96.01% free float and no controlling shareholder — the largest holder has 7.02%. The base includes 762,000 individuals, 14,000 corporate entities and 1,547 institutional investors. The auditor is PwC, in place since 2019; the Fiscal Council is permanent and elected by minority shareholders (chaired by Raphael Manhães Martins); and 8 of the Board's 13 members are declared independent. The federal government retains only the golden share — 12 special-class preferred shares with veto power restricted to changes of headquarters, corporate purpose and company name.

In practice, 2026 exposed the other side of an ownerless corporation: when there is no controlling shareholder, whoever holds 7% and has determination can call a meeting, force out the Board chair and contest the succession. That is exactly what Previ did. The result is that the mechanism meant to be the greatest strength of Vale's governance — dispersed ownership — became the doorway for a dispute that now involves the Board, two groups of minority shareholders, the securities regulator and Congress. Dispersed governance is not immune to politics; it merely changes the address where the pressure arrives.

  • Control: No controlling shareholder — a corporation with 96.01% free float
  • Largest shareholders: Previ 7.02% · BlackRock 6.71% · Mitsui 6.45% · Capital World 5.13%
  • Golden share: Federal government: 12 special-class preferred shares (restricted veto)
  • Listing: Novo Mercado (B3) · ~4.44 bn common shares · ADR on the NYSE (VALE)
  • Average daily liquidity: ~R$ 1.36 billion/day — the most liquid stock on B3
  • Board of Directors: 13 members, 8 independent · chairmanship contested at the EGM of July 22, 2026
  • Fiscal Council: Permanent, elected by minority common shareholders
  • Audit: PricewaterhouseCoopers since 2019
  • Buyback: Program for up to 120 mn shares (~3%) approved in Feb/2025 · US$ 74 mn executed in Q1 2026

Conclusion

Vale is one of the best operating companies on the Brazilian exchange going through one of the worst institutional moments in its recent history. The contrast is glaring: on the very same July 21 that it reported the best second quarter for iron ore since 2018 — 84.3 Mt produced, 79.7 Mt sold, a realized price 11.6% higher than a year earlier, records in copper and nickel — the company also published the letter in which the securities regulator demands explanations about the meeting that decides, today, who chairs its Board of Directors.
For the investor, the math is cold. At R$ 72.24, VALE3 trades at roughly 8 times recurring earnings and 5.1 times EBITDA — it isn't expensive. Our cross-checked valuation points to a fair value of R$ 77.00 (range R$ 60 to R$ 95), which gives 6.6% of room, plus an expected dividend of approximately 5.7%. Total expected return around 12% — below the 14.25% Selic, which carries no ore risk, no currency risk and no shareholder-meeting risk. That is why the verdict is HOLD, not a call to rush in: not because the company is bad, but because today's price already pays for a scenario that still has to be confirmed.
And there is one correction worth repeating, because it is the most common question from people looking up Vale: there is no VALE4 and no VALE5. The preferred shares were converted into common shares in December 2017, when the company migrated to the Novo Mercado. There is a single share, VALE3 — and the VALE ADR in New York is the very same instrument.

Analysis produced by Rico aos Poucos with AI assistance, based on public filings (CVM), market data and news. Not investment advice.

Company details (CVM registry)

  • CNPJ (tax ID): 33.592.510/0001-54
  • CVM code: 4170
  • Sector: Extração Mineral
  • CVM category: Category A
  • Headquarters: RIO DE JANEIRO / RJ
  • Investor Relations Officer: Marcelo Feriozzi Bacci
  • Auditor: PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS AUDITORES INDEPENDENTES LTDA.
  • CVM registration: Jan 2, 1970
  • Status: ACTIVE

Dividends by year

  • 2025: R$ 7.6190 across 3 payment(s)
  • 2024: R$ 5.3529 across 3 payment(s)
  • 2023: R$ 6.0778 across 3 payment(s)
  • 2022: R$ 7.5833 across 3 payment(s)
  • 2021: R$ 14.6486 across 3 payment(s)
  • 2020: R$ 2.4075 across 1 payment(s)
  • 2019: R$ 1.4144 across 1 payment(s)
  • 2018: R$ 1.9689 across 2 payment(s)
  • 2017: R$ 1.3255 across 2 payment(s)
  • 2016: R$ 0.1663 across 1 payment(s)

Recent filings (CVM)

Data content (price, dividends and filings) plus in-house AI-assisted analysis; not investment advice. Sources: B3/Yahoo Finance and CVM (Brazilian SEC).