Recommendation: SELL · Rating 3.1/10
HBRH11 — which now trades under the ticker VVMR11 (V2 Multi Renda FII) — is no longer an income thesis and has turned into a divestment vehicle. At an Extraordinary General Meeting on 03/09/2026, unitholders approved a Bylaws amendment that obligates the fund to amortize capital whenever cash exceeds R$ 2 million, and directed management to sell all properties and FII shares in the portfolio. In practice, this is a gradual liquidation.
The consequences have already materialized: the fund zeroed its dividend since Dec/2025 (communicated the absence of a distribution in May/2026 as well) and began returning cash via amortization — R$ 4.60/unit in Feb/2026 and R$ 1.07/unit in Apr/2026. Net assets dropped from R$ 253.0M (Jan/26) to R$ 240.4M (Mar/26) and BV/unit from R$ 89.60 to R$ 85.16 — a decline reflecting capital return rather than value destruction, but one that completely changes the nature of the asset. Add to this a physical vacancy of 33.12% (Barra Private 100% vacant, Neolink Office 89% vacant), near-zero liquidity (turnover of 0.04% in the month, volume of R$ 92k/month, unit price stuck at R$ 85), and only 522 unitholders. Recommendation: this is not an asset for generating income nor for entry — current holders should monitor amortizations; outsiders have nothing to buy here. Rating 3.0/10.
There is currently no positive investment thesis for HBRH11/VVMR11. The fund is in a liquidation process approved at a unitholder meeting: it sells properties and FIIs, zeroed its dividend, and returns capital via amortization. Anyone buying units today at R$ 85 is, at best, betting that the sum of future amortizations + residual value will exceed the price paid — a liquidation arbitrage bet, not an income bet.
The cons are structural: 33% vacancy (Barra Private 100% vacant, Neolink 89% vacant) makes selling the Rio properties uncertain and likely subject to discounts; near-zero liquidity (unit stuck at R$ 85, turnover 0.04%) prevents building or unwinding positions; negative retained earnings and no recurring income. For current unitholders, the decision is to follow the amortization schedule and asset sales prices. For outsiders, there is no reason to enter.
Our current reading of HBRH11 is SELL, with a score of 3.1/10. This score comes neither from the manager nor the administrator: it is Rico aos Poucos' editorial assessment, built from the documents the fund files with the CVM. Below is what supports it — and what argues against it.
24th out of 34 in the bucket. Fund in wind-down: the Mar/2026 unitholder meeting ordered the sale of all assets and capital amortization. Dividend zeroed since Dec/2025, 33% vacancy concentrated in 2 properties, and unit price stuck at R$ 85 with near-zero liquidity.
Safety in a REIT is not yes or no — it is how much risk you accept. HBRH11 has a alto risk profile. What that means in practice:
| Component | Level |
|---|---|
| Concentração | 4.5 |
| Price volatility | 3.0 |
| Dividend volatility | 5.0 |
| Liquidez | 5.0 |
| Underlying asset risk (properties) | 4.0 |
| Financial/governance risk | 4.0 |
The fund is being liquidated in stages. The accounting 'fair value' of the properties (R$ 231M) may not be realized upon sale, particularly for Barra Private (100% vacant) and Neolink (89% vacant) in Rio de Janeiro.
With volume of R$ 92k/month and the unit price stuck at R$ 85, exiting any material position is unfeasible without moving the price. Anyone who enters becomes locked into the principal repayment schedule.
There is no longer a monthly distribution. Cash flow to the unitholder is sporadic (principal repayments), uncertain in amount and timing, and dependent on asset sales.
A highly concentrated base of 522 unitholders easily approved the liquidation. Schedule and selling price decisions remain in the hands of a few—minority holders have little influence.
| Scenario | Description |
|---|---|
| favoravel | Management sells the 5 properties close to accounting fair value (R$ 231M) alongside REIT and fixed-income cash, returning close to book value per unit (~R$ 84-85) to unitholders via principal repayments over 12-24 months. Buyers at R$ 85 break even. |
| favoravel | The Ânima property (atypical lease, 100% occupied, 40% of revenue) attracts a strategic buyer and sells above fair value, offsetting discounts on vacant properties. Exit NAV exceeds R$ 85. |
| desfavoravel | Barra Private (100% vacant) and Neolink (89% vacant) will only sell at a significant discount to fair value, and the repayment schedule creates pressure. The sum of returns falls below R$ 85—today's buyer loses money. |
| desfavoravel | Vacant properties take time to sell; the fund remains illiquid for years, draining management fees over a shrinking net asset value. Principal repayments are small and spaced out; unitholders are trapped without income. |
HBRH11 — which now trades under the ticker VVMR11 (V2 Multi Renda FII) — closed March 2026 with net assets of R$ 240.4 million, 522 unitholders, 5 corporate offices (28,104 sqm of GLA) in São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, and physical vacancy of 33.12%. However, the central data point is none of these: at an Extraordinary General Meeting on 03/09/2026, unitholders approved Bylaw amendments requiring the fund to repay capital whenever cash exceeds R$ 2 million and instructed management to sell all properties and REIT units in the portfolio. The fund has effectively entered an orderly liquidation.
The consequences are already evident. Income dividends have been zeroed since Dec/2025 and remain at R$ 0.00 (the administrator itself announced on 05/29/2026 that there would be no distribution in May). What unitholders receive now are principal repayments—returns of their own capital—of R$ 4.60/unit (ref. Feb, paid 04/09) and R$ 1.07/unit (ref. Apr, paid 05/15), which reduce the book value per unit from R$ 89.60 (Jan/26) to R$ 85.16 (Mar/26) and onward. The REIT portfolio has already shrunk from R$ 19.6M to R$ 7.5M in a single month, realizing a R$ 1.29M mark-to-market loss. Retained earnings are negative (-R$ 20.6M), and liquidity is almost nonexistent: volume of R$ 92k/month, turnover of 0.04%, and units stuck at R$ 85.
Looking forward, investor returns will be determined not by the 'unit price' but by the liquidation NAV: how much the sum of future principal repayments plus residual value will yield compared to the R$ 85 paid today. The bright spots are the atypical Ânima property (Trilogy/SBC, 100% occupied, 40% of revenue), which tends to have a strong selling price, and the fact that debt was settled at a discount in Jan/2026. The downside, and most likely outcome, is the discount on the sale of the two vacant Rio properties (Barra Private 100% vacant and Neolink 89% vacant) under schedule pressure, compounded by management fees draining a shrinking asset base. For existing unitholders, the decision is to monitor the sales pace and repayments; for outsiders, there is no investment thesis—buying at R$ 85 means gambling, without liquidity, against an estimated liquidation fair value of ~R$ 80. Rating 3.0/10.
Current recommendation: SELL. Rating 3.1/10. HBRH11 — which now trades under the ticker VVMR11 (V2 Multi Renda FII) — is no longer an income thesis and has turned into a divestment vehicle . At an Extraordinary General Meeting on 03/09/2026 , unitholders approved a Bylaws amendment that obligates the fund to amortize…
Our current read on HBRH11 is “SELL”. Rating 3.1/10. Assess it against your risk profile and the points of attention listed above.
The main points of attention for V2 Multi Renda FII include: Fund in wind-down — Mar/2026 unitholder meeting ordered selling everything and amortizing; Dividend zeroed since Dec/2025 — amortization only; Physical vacancy of 33.12% concentrated in 2 properties; Near-zero liquidity — unit price stuck at R$ 85.
HBRH11 is suitable for: Investors in special situations who know how to price FII liquidation (exit NAV vs price) and accept near-zero liquidity Unitholders already positioned who will follow the amortization schedule through to the wind-down