JPP Capital Gestão de Recursos

JPP Capital Gestão de Recursos (CNPJ 13.516.035/0001-20) is a private credit and real estate fund manager from São Paulo based in Vila Olímpia, which started operations in 2012 and carries in its DNA the heritage of Grupo JPP — founded in 1939 by the Pinheiro family, former controllers of Banco BMC, sold to Bradesco in 2007. Authorized by CVM since Declaratory Act No. 11,763 (06/20/2011), the firm puts together teams with "at least 20 years of career" per specialty and focuses on development, subdivision, and structured credit CRIs. In the listed FII segment, it appears with two paper funds — OUJP11 and JPPA11 — totaling an estimated AUM of ~R$ 420 million (OUJP11 ~R$ 329 M and JPPA11 ~R$ 91 M), in addition to unlisted mandates (FII JPP Capital development, Positano FIC FIM, and Somma Real Estate FIC FIM). It is, therefore, a smaller-scale manager, without the brand recognition of Kinea or BTG, but with genuinely active credit management. Consolidated rating: 6.5 — Reasonable.

Track record and governance

The governance structure of both FIIs is homogeneous: administration by Finaxis CTVM (CNPJ 03.317.692/0001-94) and JPP Capital management — in the case of OUJP11, in co-management with Fator ORE Asset, linked to Banco Fator. The operational history shows a real capacity to manage stress: in OUJP11, the default event of the Carvalho Hosken CRI in 2024 (R$ 1.2 million provision) was resolved by Jun/2025 without definitive loss. The firm also applies a proprietary rating to ~80% of the assets, replacing external agencies — a virtue of analytical depth, but which reduces independent validation. The point that muddies the reading of the long track record lies in JPPA11: the fund has already had three names (VX XIV → JPP Allocation Mogno → JPP Capital Recebíveis Imobiliários), making it difficult to rebuild its historical series. In the field of corporate events, JPP has been leading a consolidation movement since Sep/2025: JPPA11 and VRTM11 proposed to acquire 50% each of OUJP11's assets with the dissolution of the fund; in Oct/2025 VRTM11 (Fator Verità) revoked its proposal, and JPP maintained its own without liquidation. On 06/01/2026 it confirmed the resume of the operation with an updated proposal (05/29/26), still pending formal approval from unitholders.

Strategy and funds under management

Seen together, OUJP11 and JPPA11 are variations of the same hybrid paper thesis, with complementary profiles. OUJP11 is the veteran (since 2016, co-managed): ~32 CRIs, 65% IPCA+10.1% and 34% CDI+5%, LTV 50%, duration 2.6 years, DY 15.2% and P/VP 0.85. JPPA11 is smaller and solo: 28 CRIs (72% IPCA+10.8%, 25% CDI+5.5%, 3% IGPM+8.9%), LTV 47.9%, duration 2.7 years, DY 16.7% and P/VP 0.85. Both charge 1.05% p.a. for administration/management and 20% performance fee over IMA-B+0.5%. Active management is the guiding thread of both: in OUJP11, 11 new operations in 2024-26 at high rates (IPCA+10–12.68%, CDI+5–6%) and sale of the Trisul CRI at a 15.79% p.a. TIR; in JPPA11, acquisition of the MAGO CRI (Mar/26), Laken CRI (Oct/25), and prepayment of the Socicam Ilhéus CRI at a 19.53% TIR. Dividend consistency is the manager's best asset: in OUJP11 the DPS rose from R$ 0.82–0.91 (2024) to R$ 1.10 (Mar/26) and R$ 1.50 (06/15/26); in JPPA11, from R$ 1.06 (Jan/Feb) to R$ 1.20 (Apr) and R$ 1.35 (May). There is quality dispersion — a grade of 7.0 for OUJP11 against 6.0 for JPPA11 —, reflecting the larger size, co-management, and more mature credit of the former. The M&A operation, if approved, could triple JPPA11 by absorbing assets from OUJP11 (and potentially from RBHG11), gaining scale and liquidity.

Strengths and points of attention

• Proven active credit management: aggressive recycling at high real rates (IPCA+10–12.68%) and divestments with a 15–19% p.a. TIR.
• Resilience to real stress: the Carvalho Hosken CRI was resolved without definitive loss, practical evidence of workout capacity.
• Growing and consistent dividends in both funds, with payout and cash reserves (R$ 1.55/share in OUJP11; R$ 0.44/share in JPPA11) that soften indexer volatility.
• Detailed communication in management reports and homogeneous governance under Finaxis CTVM.

• Small scale and low brand recognition (~R$ 420 M in listed FIIs), which limits liquidity and origination power compared to Kinea/BTG.
• 20% performance fee over IMA-B+0.5% — an easy benchmark to beat in a high Selic rate environment, making it more expensive for the investor.
• Unconcluded M&A: the OUJP11 operation remains pending unitholder approval and has already lost a partner (VRTM11).
• Concentration and cyclicity: 50% of OUJP11's portfolio in SP, 62% of JPPA11 in development/subdivision, and pockets of high LTV (OAD 25K CRI with 100% LTV).
• Cloudy track record due to JPPA11's three name changes and the use of a proprietary rating in ~80% of the assets, with less external validation.

Which investor makes sense for

JPP Capital's coverage is primarily of interest to the income investor focused on high DY: both funds deliver a 15–17% DY on the market share price, with growing dividends and a P/VP ~0.85 offering a margin. For the event-driven profile, JPPA11 carries the additional M&A thesis — potential for scaling and discount closing if the OUJP11 operation prospers, but it is a bet with uncertain timing and approval. Meanwhile, the conservative investor should weigh the manager's reduced scale, the cyclicity of the development portfolio, the high LTV pockets, and the performance fee over a loose benchmark. What to monitor going forward: the formal outcome of the OUJP11 M&A (proposal dated 05/29/26), the evolution of default in CRIs with LTV >76%, the sustainability of the payout via cash reserves, and transparency regarding total unidisclosed AUM. This is a competent credit manager, honest in communication and consistent in distribution — yet small and amid a corporate reorganization that still needs to materialize.