What Happened to the ALMI11 Real Estate Fund?
A non-recurring tax gain. According to a material fact disclosed by ALMI11's fund administration (BTG Pactual) on 09/30/2026 (document 1336821), the fund won the right to recover approximately R$ 1.5 million in overcharged IPTU (property tax) and trash collection fees for its sole property, Torre Almirante in Rio de Janeiro.
The refund stems from registry and tax reviews that identified discrepancies in the municipal government's calculation base in previous years. The amount equates to a potential impact of R$ 13.49 per unit. The funds will not enter the cash flow all at once: the amounts are being returned gradually according to regulatory proceedings and will be passed on to unitholders through income distributions, beginning with the September 2026 competencies and extending throughout the second half of the year as cash becomes available.
How Much Will ALMI11 Pay in Dividends From This Extra Credit?
The total payout will reach R$ 13.49 per unit, but broken up. Unlike a monthly dividend driven by rental revenue, this amount is a non-recurring event of a fiscal origin. The fund administration confirmed that payments will follow the actual cash inflow, dividing the benefit across monthly distributions starting in September 2026.
To put the impact into perspective, the fund distributed R$ 2.52 per unit in April and May of 2026. This recurring level already represented a sharp drop from the R$ 4.00 to R$ 5.00 per unit paid in the second half of 2025, in addition to reaching a critical low of R$ 0.30 per unit in March 2026 (R$ 0.29635 per unit). The R$ 13.49 per unit amount provides significant breathing room for distributions in the coming months, but it does not alter the rental cash generation capacity of the property.
Note the Non-Recurring Nature: The R$ 13.49 per unit cash influx results exclusively from past tax refunds. Once the tax authority finishes returning the funds over the course of the semester, ALMI11's income distributions will return to relying solely on the rents collected at Torre Almirante.
Does This Extra Money Change the ALMI11 Investment Thesis?
It does not change the structural thesis. Rico aos Poucos maintained a SELL rating (score 3.6) for ALMI11 precisely due to its deep operational risks, and the one-time receipt of R$ 1.5 million in tax credits removes none of the fund's bottlenecks.
The ALMI11 thesis remains fragile for four primary reasons:
- Single-asset risk and minority stake: The fund owns only a 40% co-ownership stake in Torre Almirante, a corporate office building located in downtown Rio de Janeiro. The property's management is not solely up to the FII.
- High vacancy in downtown Rio: Although the vacancy rate receded from 46.8% in April 2026 to 40.44% in May 2026, the property still has more than four-tenths of its area unoccupied.
- Occupancy concentrated on upper floors: The arrival of tenants like Wilson Sons and Siqueira Castro secured the leasing of floors 22 through 36, but an entire block of 17 floors (from the 3rd to the 19th floor) remains completely vacant.
- Illiquidity and unitholder flight: The investor base has shrunk continuously (from 1,910 in October 2025 to 1,843 in May 2026), while trading volume on the exchange hovers at a meager R$ 247,000 per month (about R$ 11,000 to R$ 14,000 per day).
What Is the Operational Situation at Torre Almirante?
The building operates in two distinct realities. On one hand, the upper portion of the building (floors 22 to 36) is mostly occupied, benefiting from recent leases to companies like Wilson Sons and the Siqueira Castro law firm.
On the other hand, the lower portion (floors 3 to 19) accounts for chronic physical vacancy. The Reviver Centro project, an initiative by the Rio de Janeiro city government to revitalize the downtown area, has not yet generated sufficient demand to meaningfully fill the traditional office sector. Without new lease agreements for the lower half of the building, ALMI11's rental revenue remains stalled and vulnerable to operating expense fluctuations and tenant defaults.
| Operational and Financial Indicator | Fund Data | Situation / Context |
|---|---|---|
| Property Ownership Stake | 40.00% | Co-ownership of Torre Almirante (Downtown Rio de Janeiro) |
| Physical Vacancy Rate (May 2026) | 40.44% | Improvement compared to 46.80% recorded in April 2026 |
| Tenantless Block | 17 floors | From the 3rd to the 19th floor completely unoccupied |
| Exchange Price (09/30/2026) | R$ 613.00 | Market unit price |
| Net Asset Value Per Unit | R$ 2,055.80 | Total Net Equity of R$ 229 million |
| Discount to Net Asset Value (P/NAV) | 68.00% | P/NAV of 0.30 reflects downtown Rio risk and illiquidity |
Why Does ALMI11 Trade at a 68% Discount to NAV?
Because the market is pricing in a value trap risk. With the unit price at R$ 613.00 and the net asset value per unit at R$ 2,055.80 (total net equity of R$ 229 million), the 68% discount looks attractive at first glance. However, steep discounts in single-asset FIIs in downtown Rio generally signal problems that are difficult to resolve.
Individual investors face serious difficulties entering or exiting the asset. Average daily trading volume fluctuates between R$ 11,000 and R$ 14,000 (about R$ 247,000 monthly). If a unitholder tries to sell a significant position during a moment of market stress, they will not find buyers without accepting an even deeper discount on the unit price.
Is It Worth Buying ALMI11 to Capture the R$ 13.49 Dividend?
It is not worth it. Buying a real estate fund with weakened fundamentals simply to capture an extraordinary dividend is a risky strategy known in the market as a "dividend trap."
There are two clear reasons to avoid this move:
- Unit price adjustment: On the cut-off date (data-com) when the extraordinary dividend is declared, the payout amount is discounted from the unit price in the open market. Investors do not get free money.
- Illiquidity lock-in: By buying units at R$ 613.00 to receive a portion of the R$ 13.49 per unit over the coming months, investors get stuck in a fund with extremely low liquidity (R$ 247,000 per month) and high vacancy (40.44%), facing difficulties liquidating their invested capital later.
Rico aos Poucos Verdict: SELL (Score 3.6)
The R$ 1.5 million tax credit (R$ 13.49 per unit) is good news for those already in the fund, as it injects extra cash throughout the second half of 2026. However, for those on the sidelines, ALMI11 continues to be an extremely high-risk investment. Our recommendation remains unchanged: current unitholders should use the temporary cash flow improvement to plan a gradual exit; investors who do not hold the fund should stay away.
What Should ALMI11 Investors Monitor Going Forward?
Unitholders should monitor the execution of payouts and the property's occupancy metrics. The checklist for coming quarters includes:
- IPTU payouts (starting Sep 2026): Verify in monthly reports and distribution notices the portion of the tax credit effectively released for distribution.
- Occupancy of the vacant block (3rd to 19th floors): Track whether Cushman & Wakefield manages to sign new leases for the 17 unoccupied floors, bringing vacancy below 40.44%.
- Unitholder base stability: Check whether the consecutive decline in the number of investors (1,843 unitholders in May 2026) halts or if retail investor flight continues.
- Defaults and operating expenses: Ensure that recurring operating income holds above the low of R$ 0.30 per unit recorded in March 2026.
