The unit of the FTCA11 is in limbo: the unit has retreated from R$9,16 to R$8,66 since our last analysis — a fall of 5,5% — and the fund is about to discover, in practice, how much 90 thousand hectares of farm are worth in the west of Bahia. The auction notices of Castilhos Group properties have been finalised and the date is set for June 2026. . That is, this week, or the next. It's the most relevant short-term trigger for a Fiagro who was bleeding slowly.
O FTCA11 is the Fyto Receivables of Agribusiness — Fiagro Real Estate, managed by Fyto Capital (the former NCH Brazil, even CNPJ 15.040.228/0001-82, rebranded in March 2025) and administered by BTG Pactual Financial Services DTVM. The fund carries 28 assets (26 CRAs and 2 CRIs) distributed in 13 segments, with net worth of R$46,97 million and 7.672 unit holders. For those who are new in the name: the ticker has already been NCRA11 and before EQIA11 — three rebrandings in four years. History of volatile identity, which in itself already asks for caution.
Why did the unit fall?
First of all, the easy explanation must be removed: the fall no It's ex-dividend. The revenue of R$0,11/unit for May will only be paid in 24/06/2026 — the unit has not yet discounted anything. The fall of 5,5% is pure market: seller pushing paper down while uncertainty over defaulters does not solve.
The P/VP went from 0,87 to 0,82. Translating: the market now pays R$0,82 for each R$1,00 of equity value. The discount on VP rose from 13% to 18%. The question that matters isn't "is the discount great?"—is "This discount buys how much credit risk?". And here's the whole thesis from the fund.
The VP/unit is R$10,53. But within this VP there is R$2,67 Mi from CRA Castilhos won (precified with 40% disagio) and R$1,21 Mi from CRI Cotribá in stop accrual. Together, the two defaults are worth PL 8,26%. The market, by placing the unit on R$8,66, is saying that these credits are worth even less than the fund marks.
The Castilhos auction: how much it really matters
CRA Castilhos is the biggest hole in the portfolio: 5,69% of the PL, about R$2,67 million balance. The ballast is the Castilhos Group, a rural grain producer with 90 thousand hectares in western Bahia. The paper was issued to CDI+8,50% due in October 2025 — already expired. . The sentence approved a friendly composition and the farms went into consolidation for auction this month.
The guarantees at origin were robust on paper: fiduciary disposal with minimum 120% of the debtor balance on forced sale, agricultural pledge and shareholder endorsement. The fund, conservatively, priced the CRA with 40% defect. Upside math is direct:
| Recovery scenario | Value recovered | Effect on unit |
|---|---|---|
| Current markup (40% defect) | ~R$1,60 Mi | On the VP |
| Recovery > 70% from balance | ~R$1,87 Mi+ | +R$0,10 to +R$0,15/unit |
| Full recovery (probable) | ~R$2,67 Mi | +R$0,20/unit |
If the auction recovers more than 70% from the balance ( It is not a negligible number for a fund whose entire unit costs R$8,66; it is almost half a monthly DPS of extraordinary gain.
The real risk is not in the collateral, it's in the liquidity. Rural land in western Bahia is not São Paulo: the rural real estate market there is shallow, with few qualified buyers and long closing times. For forced sale, agio disappears and disagio appears. The 40% gap of the fund may be conservative (and there is gain) — but it may also be optimistic if the auction is deserted or closes at banana price. The result is binary and no one outside can anticipate.
Cotribá: the default less spoken
While Castilhos steals the spotlight, CRI Cotribá continues to corrode the bottom in silence. They are 2,57% of the PL (?R$1,21 Mi of present value), default since November 2025. The debtor is a cooperative of Rio Grande do Sul, and here there is a decisive legal subtlety: the judicial recovery pleaded by the cooperative was rejected in 2nd instance. . The reason is structural — cooperatives, by law, do not have the legitimacy to apply for RJ. This closes RJ's door to the debtor, which in theory accelerates the execution of guarantees by the creditor.
The guarantees are silos and warehouses valued at R$150 millions, against a balance of R$1,21 Mi — an LTV of 0,28. On paper, there's plenty of collateral left. The problem, again, is time: real guarantee execution in the Brazilian Judiciary is slow, and the fund has already put this credit in stop accrual. . In other words, the DPS that this role generated no longer exists in the current distribution. The upperside here is not an auction scheduled for this month; it is a process that can drag quarters.
The box of R$14 Mi: virtue or weakness?
The fund keeps PL 29% in net cash — about R$14 million. It is Fyto's classic defensive posture: ammo to honor amortizations, absorb new defaults and eventually buy discounted CRAs. But defense has cost. This box does not run at the average portfolio rate (CDI+4,95%); it yields near the pure CDI, pulling the current return down.
With Selic in 14,25% and Focus projecting 11% in 12 months, the stall is even less profitable as the cuts progress. The question that defines the next year of the fund is simple: will the fund manager allocate this cash in new CRAs — assuming more credit risk in a stressed sector — or will she wait and accept the drag in the DPS? There's no comfortable answer. Too much defense penalizes the yeld; too much attack on fragile agro can repeat Castilhos.
Reseller of inputs: 44% of PL in a care zone
The largest segment of the portfolio is the resale of agricultural inputs: 9 assets adding 44% of the PL. Among the largest names adiplentes are Agrophyto (4,6%, CDI+ZQ1ZQX, venc. Dec/2026), Agrobrasil, Agrofarm, Agrotech (all ~4,4% to CDI+5%) and Bevap, sugar-alcohol mining. The GT Foods / Gonçalves & Tortola (bird refrigerator, 4,3%, CDI+ZQ1ZQX) completes the top.
The annoying detail: this exact segment has crossed the largest recent agro storm. In 2024-25, Lavoro, Agrogalaxy and Belagrícola added about R$5 billions in losses for creditors. The 9 names of FTCA11 are different of these — and they are all adjudicating today. But concentrating almost half of the assets in the sector that most broke in the recent agro is, at least, an exposure that requires permanent surveillance. A single new default on this block changes the thesis.
18,18% DY: illusion or opportunity?
The Yield of 18,18% is real — but it is, first of all, price. . It went up from 16,58% to 18,18% not because the bottom distributed more, but because the unit fell. The DPS was stable in R$0,11/month; the denominator shrunk. Yield who rises by falling unit is a sign of market pricing risk, not of generosity from the fund.
And there is a second structural problem: the portfolio is 91% CDI+ (average rate CDI+4,95%) and only 9% IPCA+ (average CDI IPCA+ZX3ZQX). This means that the DPS is almost entirely post-fixed — it goes up and down with the Selic. Today, CDI+4,95% yields about 19,2% gross. But Focus projects Selic to 11% in 12 months. When the Selic falls, the nominal DPS drops together:
In other words, the investor who buys today "locking" 18% from yield is actually buying a stream that shrinks over 2026 as Selic cuts materialize. Today's yield is not a guaranteed income — it's a photograph of a high Selic moment on a depressed unit.
Scenarios — and what weighs on each
| Scene | Trigger | Quota | Prob. |
|---|---|---|---|
| Castilian recovery + Cotribá > 70% | Strong auction + execution guarantee | R$10–11 (P/VP 0,95+) | 30% |
| Macro stabilisation | No new defaults, Selic in ordered fall | R$9,50–10 | 35% |
| New default on the resale of inputs | One of the nine names turns default | R$7,50-8 | 25% |
| Generalised deterioration | Desert auction + new default | R$6–7 | 10% |
The key point: 35% probability is in "stabilization" — neither the best nor the worst case. And the two negative scenarios added (35%) have identical weight to the 30% of the recovery scenario. The asymmetry is not clearly favorable; it is balanced on a thread. Who buys R$8,66 is making a bet of biased currency, not an obvious bargain.
Verdict
Recommendation: SALE (Note 3,5/10 in the peer-to-peer comparison — 13th placed on the Paper-General budget).
For those who consider buying now: the discount of 18% on the VP seems attractive, but it exists for a concrete reason — 8,26% of the PL is default, 44% of the PL is in a sector that has just lived the biggest agro crisis, and the post-fixed DPS will shrink with Selic. The P/VP of 0,82 is not a bargain; it is the fair price of a real risk. There's no obvious security margin.
For those who already have unit: The short-term trigger is the Castilhos auction, scheduled for this month. It makes sense to wait for the result before any movement — a recovery above 70% can reverse the markup and add R$0,10–ZQ2ZQX/account unit, changing the photograph. Selling in the dark on the eve of the auction is giving up just the only event you can play in favor of. Wait for the number to come out.
The honest summary: the FTCA11 is a small background (R$47 Mi), with a history of three rebrandings, two active defaults and uncomfortable concentration in the sector that most broke in agro. The 29% defensive box protects, but penalizes the return. It's not garbage — it's a fragile Fiagro being traded at the price of fragile Fiagro. The June auction will tell if the market overstepped pessimism or if it was prophetic.
