It is worth keeping the HTMX11 If the profitability was below the CDI? Yes, but with the thesis adjusted. The return of 12 months (10,7%) really lost to the CDI (12,4%) and to the IFIX (15,8%) — whoever invested only by current income would have earned more in fixed income. Only that account ignores the central part of the thesis of this fund: the unit negotiates R$ 132,50 against an equity value of R$ 149,17, i.e., with Discount 11%. . HTMX11 is not a smooth and predictable income FII; it is a hotel fund in a divestment cycle, where the gain comes from the sum of the monthly dividend with the realization of real estate value over time.
So the honest reading is: MANTER for those who already have position and understand that the return here is more lighty (irregular) than linear, and ACUMULAR with parsimony for those who face the cyclical risk of the hotel sector. What you can't do is treat HTMX11 as a Selic Treasury replacement — it's never been that, and the 12 months below the CDI are just the reminder.
What changed in May: goodbye to Blue Tree Faria Lima
The trigger of this reanalysis is a discrete but symbolic landmark. In May 2026, the HTMX11 sold the Last 2 UHs who still kept at Blue Tree Premium Faria Lima — completely shutting down the Blue Tree flag operation within the portfolio. With this, the divestment cycle that the fund has conducted since 2011 reaches the 624 hotel units sold.
It's worth translating the jargon here. One hotel unit (UH) It's actually a hotel room. The HTMX11 has an unusual structure: it does not operate the hotels — who manages is the network (Accor, Blue Tree etc.). What the background has are the rooms, individually, as if they were self-contained properties within the building. This gives the fund manager a rare lever in a brick FII: he can sell room to room when the price of the hotel square meter is attractive, making real estate gain without having to liquidate the entire hotel. This is how the extraordinary fat dividends of the past (R$ 3,94 at Dec/24, R$ 3,25 at Dec/23): sale of UHs converted into distribution.
The closure of Blue Tree is therefore less of a loss and more of the completion of a portfolio cleaning: the fund clears an entire flag and concentrates capital on the assets it considers most profitable. There are 17 active hotels and 724 UHs in operation.
DPS locked on R$ 1,20 — is that good or bad?
The dividend by unit (DPS) is in R$ 1,20 five months ago (jan a mai/26). Those who only know the fame of "Hotel FII is roller coaster" may wonder — and with historical reason: the coefficient of variation of 24 months (CV24m) is 46%, with the DPS oscillating between R$ 0,80 (sea/25) and R$ 3,94 (ten/24). In a series like this, five months equal is a genuine sign of post-emission stabilization, after dilution of the 16th emission (nov/24).
That's the bright side. The uncomfortable side appears when the total return is measured: in the last 12 months the ZQX0ZX yielded 10,7%, below the CDI (12,4%) and right behind the IFIX (15,8%).
What does "lose to CDI" mean? The CDI is the interest on low-risk fixed income (next to Selic). When an IFI yields less than the CDI, the investor would have gained more — with less risk — leaving the money in the Selic Treasury or in a daily liquidity CDB. In 12 months, it was the case of HTMX11. Does that make it a bad bottom? Not automatically. A 12-month return is a short photograph for a fund whose engine is the realization of real estate assets — which happens in leaps, not in monthly instalments. The real point of attention is: if this becomes a rule for several years, the thesis loses meaning.
And there's one component that the past return doesn't capture: discount on the equity value. . Do the check. The unit costs R$ 132,50 and the equity value is R$ 149,17. This is a P/VP of 0,89, or 11% discount. If the unit only converges to the VP — without the equity growing a penny — it emulates about 11% potential return on valuation, added to the current DY of 11,88%. It is this second leg that is missing in the simplistic comparison with the CDI.
Running units: −12,6% in 13 months is alarm?
The unit base fell from 37.760 (May/25) for 33.089 (May/26) — an evasion of 4.671 persons, or −12,6% in 13 months. At first glance, it's like people voting with their feet. But there's more than one force at stake.
First, the mechanical effect of 16th issue (Nov/24): the fund captured R$ 250 million to R$ 150,66 per unit (Age of 8,5% over VP) and nearly doubled the number of units, from 1.504.334 to 2.888.094. Emission with angio usually takes away part of the base that "makes the account" and finds the subscription price expensive — these unit holders tend to leave in the following months. Part of the evasion is therefore post-emission natural rotationDon't panic.
Second, and less comfortable: the return below the ICD discourages exactly who entered seeking predictable income. When the dividend does not follow the fixed income and the unit does not shoot, the income investor migrates.
Is that an alarm? Originally: drop in lower liquidity FIIs rates is normal after emissions and, on its own, it does not condemn the fund. But it is a signal to monitor — if the bleeding continues in the coming quarters without emission to justify, then it becomes a symptom of thesis losing traction.
The elephant in the room: PERSE
No honest analysis of HTMX11 today can ignore PERSE — and yet it hardly appears quantified in the reports.
O PERSE (Emergential Resumption Program of the Event Sector) is a law of 2022 which, in the pandemic, granted to the tourism and events sector — hotels included — exemption from PIS/COFINS and IRPJ/CSLL as a measure of recovery. In practice, the hotel operators paid less tax, more result remained, and part of it reached the fund via rents and transfers.
In April 2025, the IRS announced the end of the benefit. . The hotels came to judgment questioning the extinction, and the discussion continues without definitive outcome. The risk to the unit holder is direct: if the decision is Adverse, the tax burden returns, the margin of hotel operations can compress between 5 and 8 percentage points, less result reaches the bottom, and the DPS can shrink.
| PERSE Scenario | What's happening? | Effect on the unit |
|---|---|---|
| Favourable (Judiciary maintains benefit) | Preserved hotel margin | DPS maintains the current level; thesis intact |
| Intermediate (transition/scheduling) | Load comes back gradually | Compression diluted in time, DPS pressed slowly |
| Adverse (extinction confirmed) | Margin drops 5–8 p.p. | DPS can back down; unit tends to re-enact down |
Why does that go away from the reports? Because the fund manager is "following" — but does not publish a estimate of impact in unit or DPS. . It's the kind of risk that doesn't hurt until it hurts. For the investor, the message is to take the intermediate scenario as a basis and not buy HTMX11 believing that the R$ 1,20 DPS is a perpetual guarantee.
Cluster Morumbi: a bet concentrated in São Paulo corporate
More than half the bottom is in a single neighborhood. O Ibis São Paulo Morumbi (274 rooms) is worth R$ 111,7 million — 26% of net worth. O Novotel São Paulo Morumbi (95 rooms) sums up other R$ 102,3 million, or 24%. With Ibis Budget Morumbi (~3%), the Morumbi cluster reaches ~55% PL In three neighboring hotels.
What does that mean in practice? The three feed on the same demand engine: the surroundings of the stadium of Morumbis and the corporate axis of the south of São Paulo. When there is crowded show, international game or strong event schedule in the region, the RevPAR (receipt per room available — the metric-king of hospitality, which combines average daily and occupancy) rises together in the three. It was part of what sustained the RevPAR of R$ 202 in Jan/26, +6% over the previous year.
The reverse is the double geographical exposure: if something goes wrong in the region — a work that takes away events, a slowdown in business tourism in SP, a problem with the Accor flag (which accounts for 78% from the background rooms) — more than half of the heritage suffers at once. Concentration is what gives the HTMX11 premium assets and well located; it is also what leaves it without a network of protection if the Morumbi axis stumbles.
Verdict and prospects
HTMX11 closes June with note 6,3/10 and verdict MANTER in comparison (and ACUMULAR in absolute, note 6,5). It is a solid background in the structure — 19 years of history, the oldest hotel in Brazil, management BTG Practical + HotelInvest (note 8/10), without leverage (LTV 0%) — but living a moment of only median return.
For those who already have a position: Keeping it makes sense. The 11% discount on VP gives security margin, the DPS stabilised and the UHs sales cycle planned for the 2nd semester of 2026 can bring extraordinary distributions as in previous years.
For those who don't: 0,89 P/VP is opportunity or trap, and the answer depends on PERSE. In the favorable or intermediate scenario, buying below the VP a portfolio of premium hotels without debt is a good entry point. In the adverse scenario, the discount can simply reflect the risk that the market is already pricing — and the "bargain" disappears when the DPS shrinks. The rational input is partial and conscious of the cyclical risk: hospitality is a sector in which the RevPAR can fall 30%+ in a recession.
What to monitor in the coming months:
- PERSE — any relevant judicial decision changes the thesis on time.
- Monthly RevPAR — is the thermometer of the operation; followed falls anticipate pressure in the DPS.
- DPS Jun/26 — if it comes in R$ 1,20, it will be the 6th consecutive month, confirming the stabilization.
- Quota base — if the evasion continues without a new emission, it becomes a sign of a worn-out thesis.
Risk to be monitored — PERSE: the end of the tax benefit of hotels (PIS/COFINS + IRPJ/CSLL), under judicial discussion since apr/25, is the main factor capable of compressing the margin of operations in 5 to 8 percentage points and thus reduce the psd. The fund manager "accompanys", but does not quantify the impact. Do not buy HTMX11 assuming that the monthly R$ 1,20 is guaranteed.
DPS history — last 12 months
| Month | DPS per unit | Remarks |
|---|---|---|
| Jun/25 | ~R$ 1,20 | — |
| Jul/25 | — | data not available |
| Aug/25 | — | data not available |
| Sep/25 | — | data not available |
| Oct/25 | — | data not available |
| Nov/25 | — | data not available |
| Ten/25 | R$ 1,25 | — |
| Jan/26 | R$ 1,00 | shorter period |
| Feb/26 | R$ 1,20 | start of stable sequence |
| Mar/26 | R$ 1,20 | — |
| Apr/26 | R$ 1,20 | — |
| May/26 | R$ 1,20 | 5th month in R$ 1,20; paid 08/06 |
For extremes reference: in the last 24 months, the PSD varied between R$ 0,80 (sea/25) and R$ 3,94 (ten/24, extraordinary room sale), with CV24m of 46% — the photograph of a fund whose dividend breathes at the pace of UH sales, not a fixed rent.
Verdict: HTMX11 is a premium hotel FII with no debt and strong management, but which delivered 12 months of return below the CDI — the reminder that here the gain is cyclical, not linear. The closure of the Blue Tree closes a disinvestment chapter (624 UHs in the cycle), the DPS stabilised in R$ 1,20 and the P/VP of 0,89 provides security margin. Maintainer (note 6,3) for those with a position; ACUMULAR with parsimony (note 6,5) for those who are faced with cyclical risk and PERSE. It is not a fixed income substitute — and anyone who buys it will be frustrated.
