"The INLG11 You're paying me R$0,60 a month, but I see the default has gone up. Should I be worried?" The point of attention is real: a relevant tenant was two months late and pushed the default of 2,1% to 6% between March and May. Isolated, that doesn't justify selling. The bigger picture is another — the unit fell to R$65,10 (P/VP of 0,61, or 39% discount on equity), the dividend has been stable for five months, and the latest shed market data show that the renewal of contracts in 2027 may come much more favourable than the price suggests. The verdict remains keep — but with default under close observation.
What has changed since the last analysis
The previous April analysis described a cheap and operationally healthy background. Two months later, the INLG11 (managed by Inter Asset, of the Inter Bank) follows with its four class A sheds 100% occupied, but there are three relevant moves on the board: the unit retreated further 8%, the discount on the equity deepened, and the default tripled. On the other hand, new market data have left the biggest catalyst of the thesis even more visible.
| Indicator | Apr/26 | Jun/26 | Signal |
|---|---|---|---|
| Quotation | R$ 71,00 | R$ 65,10 | ↓ -8,3% |
| P/VP | 0,67 | 0,61 | ↓ discount deepened |
| Dividend Yield | 10,1% | 11,06% | ↑ (price effect) |
| Dividend/unit | R$ 0,60 | R$ 0,60 | → Stable |
| Failure to comply | 2,1% | 6,0% | ↑ ALERT |
| Vaccination | 0% | 0% | → ok |
Notice the asymmetry: the dividend yeld rose from 10,1% to 11,06%, but no Because the fund paid more. Dividend continues in R$0,60. The Yield went up because the denominator — the unit — fell. It is the paradox of discounted FIIs: the more the market punishes the price, the more "fat" the income seems. What matters is whether this price drop is justified or whether the market has exaggerated.
The default of 6% — how much does it really weigh?
First, the concept, because it's usually confused with vacancy. Vaccination It's empty real estate: no one rented it, no prescription. Failure to comply is the opposite — the shed is occupied, the contract exists, but the tenant did not pay the rent of that period. In the INLG11, the vacancy follows zero (all four leased sheds), but a relevant tenant delayed payments for two months, and that's what played the default for 6%.
How much does that represent in cash? The fund distributes R$0,60 per unit over 4.512.103 units, or about R$2,7 million per month. The gross lease revenue is slightly higher than that (part is consumed by expenses and fees before becoming distribution). Applying 6% on this base, the value in delay is in the range of R$160 to R$180 thousand per month — material, but far from catastrophic. It's about a month's rent from a single contract stuck in the collection line, not a structural hole.
History disarms most of the scare. INLG11 default was already in 8,5% in April 2025, fell consistently until 2,1% in March 2026, and now returned to 6%. That is, the fund has already demonstrated the ability to recover late amounts without losing the tenant or going to eviction. What you see is collect volatility, not portfolio deterioration. The fund manager informs that she is in Advanced trading — which is ambiguous: means that the tenant has cash difficulties (bad), but also that there is no breach of the contract in progress (good).
The honest reading is that this is a point of attention to monitor, not a reason to abandon the position. If the delay turns into a definitive cap and the tenant leaves, then the conversation changes — because it would become vacancy of a concentrated asset. But by the historical pattern and by the intact occupation, the base scenario is regularization in the coming months. It is worth following the management report of June and July: if the default falls back to the 2-3% house, it was noise; if you go up close to 10%, it is a sign of something more serious.
The renewal of 2027 — The True Catalyst
Here's the central reason for holding the bottom. 59,7% of INLG11 rental revenue wins 2027 — something like R$1,7 million per month in contracts that go to the renegotiation table. All are indexed to IPCA, so they already correct inflation; the question is whether, in renewal, rents will be repacked above or below the amount they pay today. And it is at this point that SiiLA's market data (consultation specializing in logistics warehouses) for the 1st quarter of 2026 tell an interesting story.
| Active | Current rental | Market (SiiLA) | Gap |
|---|---|---|---|
| Gaiolli (Cajamar/SP) | R$ 28,13/m2 | R$ 39,83/m2 | +42% upside |
| Rio Campo Grande (RJ) | R$ 17,78/m2 | R$ 26,91/m2 | +51% upside |
| Viana (ES) | R$ 25,53/m2 | R$ 24,00/m2 | -6% above the market |
| Counting (MG) | R$ 31,95/m2 | R$ 30,00/m2 | -6,5% above the market |
What does that mean in practice? Two of the four sheds are rented. right down What the market would pay today. Gaiolli, in Cajamar (the logistics heart of São Paulo), charges R$28,13/m2 in a market that is worth R$39,83/m2 — 42% lag. Rio Campo Grande's asset is even more cool: 51% below the market. In a renewal, these contracts have room to rise significantly. Even if the fund captures only 90% of the market value in Gaiolli (R$35,85/m2), it would be a jump of about 27% in the rental of that shed — a new recipe that drips directly into the dividend.
But we need to season optimism with two caveats. The first: in the Campo Grande River, the region's market vacancy is around 74% — that is, there is a long empty shed competing, which reduces the bargaining power of the fund. The theoretical upside of 51% is hardly complete in this context. The second: Viana (ES) and Contagem (MG) are rented above market, 6% and 6,5% respectively. In renewal, these contracts can be drawn up down. . As Viana alone accounts for 40,8% of the real estate of the fund, a reduction there is not trivial.
The net balance is still positive. Gaiolli and Rio Campo Grande have higher combined weight in revenue and expressive upperside; Viana and Counting present moderate risk of falling. In the base scenario, the sum points to a high the dividend in cycle 2027-2028. In the pessimistic scenario — where the economy cools and systemic vacancy presses the readjustments down — the dividend could retreat to the range of R$0,55. It is a favorable asymmetry: the potential for gain is greater and more likely than that of loss, but the loss exists and needs to be sized by those who enter.
0,61 P/VP — is it really cheap or is the market right?
For the layman: P/VP (price on equity) compares how much the share costs on the stock exchange with how much the equity of the fund is worth per share. A P/VP of 0,61 means you buy R$1,00 of property by paying R$0,61. The VP per unit of INLG11 is R$106,40; the unit negotiates R$65,10. In theory, it is a discount of 39%.
A discount is not, in itself, an opportunity — the market may be putting a real risk at risk. In the case of INLG11, part of the discount is explained by the macroeconomics: with Selic to 14,50% and the third cut expected for June, fixed income still pays a lot, and brick FIIs are priced as a spread on interest. When Selic falls, the opportunity cost of fixed income decreases and the P/VP of real estate funds tends to recover. We are at the beginning of this cycle of fall, which is favorable.
There are also specific risks embedded in the price, and they are legitimate. O cap rate Viana’s apparent — the implied return rate of the rent on the value of the property in the report — is only ~4%, which suggests that the valuation of the asset may be optimistic; a downward reassessment could take about R$13 from the VP by unit. In addition, the concentration of unit holders is high: three legal entities hold 50,4% of the units (one of them with 22,84%), and the output of any one would press the price. Add to this the relationship with LOG CP, a related part that accumulates the roles of consultant, fund manager of leases and original owner — a conflict of interest to be watched — and the leverage approved in March assembly, which allows to give the properties in guarantee.
Even discounting all these factors, the estimated fair price is around R$82,20 — about 26% above the current unit. And there is a structural differential that supports quality: the administration rate of 0,46% per year, without performance rate, is well below the average of the logistic segment (usually between 0,6% and 0,8%). On a brick bottom, every tenth of a fee point that doesn't go to the fund manager remains to the unit over the years.
For whom this fund makes sense
It makes sense to: the moderate-throated investor with a horizon of 24 months or more, who wants pure exposure to class A logistics indexed to IPCA, with low rate, and who sees in the buyback of units to P/VP 0,61 and in the renewal of 2027 catalysts able to close the discount. For this profile, buying R$1,00 shed by R$0,61 with identified triggers is an attractive asymmetry.
It doesn't make sense to: the retired who depends on a predictable and growing dividend — the fund has already cut 21% from the distribution in January and the 2027 window is still uncertain. Nor for those who reject any conflict of interest (LOG CP is a related part), for those who fear the newly approved leverage, or for those who need daily liquidity in large positions: the average daily volume is about R$437 thousand, and a position of R$1 million takes approximately 11 business days to be dismantled without falling the price.
Verdict: KEEP
The risk of default is real but manageable — the background history (from 8,5% to 2,1%) shows ability to regularize delays without losing tenants, and the occupation follows in 100%. The discount of 39% on equity, added to Selic in fall and the renewal upside in 2027 (Gaiolli +42%, Rio Campo Grande +51%), offers security margin for those with long horizons. The share of R$65,10 against an estimated fair price of R$82,20 implies ~ZQX2ZX upside.
Who doesn't have it yet may consider a partial entry, accepting the risk of renewal. Do not buy if: you need increasing dividend in the short term, reject the conflict of interest with LOG CP, or fear the leverage approved in March. And keep the radar on in the next reports: the default of 6% is the number to observe — regularized, thesis intact; worsened, reassessed.
