The main point: o LMAI11 (old) RMAI11) is an IFI of physical real estate — warehouses and atypical rental contracts — and that portfolio is legally and patrimonially separated from the financial sphere of the Master Bank. The Bahamas' decision targets funds offshore And money diverted, not sheds in Campinas. The real risk to the unit holder today It's not Master's investigation: vacancy of almost half the portfolio, o 53% cutting in dividend And the doubt about the new fund manager, Arandu. The thread that connects everything is the past: the fund was born under the brand REAG, which appears at the center of the scandal.
What The Bahamas Justice Decided
In 26 May 2026, the Supreme Court of the Bahamas officially recognized the liquidation process of the Master Bank and authorized the search and administration of the group's assets within the territory of the islands. In practice, what the Central Bank of Brazil was already doing in the country now has legal effect out there: Brazilian liquidation came to be recognized by a foreign court as a legitimate process, with the power to achieve accounts and structures mounted abroad.
The Court recognized the EFB Special Business Schemes Ltda. — the liquidator appointed by the Central Bank — as foreign representative In the Bahamas. It is the kind of chancellor that opens doors: it allows liquidators to ask for information from local banks, freeze assets and investigate where the money went.
The target is... nine entities and funds linked to the group, registered in that fiscal paradise:
| Target Entities in the Bahamas |
|---|
| Liquidity Strategy Fund Ltd. |
| Phoenix Multimarket Fund Ltd. |
| Faex Fund Ltd. |
| PMLS Ltd. |
| Octa Investments Ltd. (it would have bought ~R$ 30 million in works of art) |
| Sunshine Company Ltd. |
| Golden Star Investment Fund Ltd. |
| Artress Ltd |
| Mosaic Financial Ltd. |
According to the authorities, at least US$ 1 billion would have been diverted by banker Daniel Vorcaro and others involved. The Bahamas decision is not isolated: a American court had already taken similar measure in January 2026. . The international siege has been closing for months.
One of the episodes that best illustrates the scheme appeared in the case of Banco de Brasília (BRB): when buying Master-linked wallets, BRB was duped — the Bahamas registered fund I didn't. the American Treasury bonds or the shares they claimed to exist, and the Jersey associated fund. had no resources since 2023. . They were empty shells.
Where does REAG come in — and why does it play the LMAI11
Here's the link that makes this subject matter to the FII investor. LMAI11 wasn't born by that name. Until January 2026 he was called RMAI11, and the "R" came from REAG — the same REAG Investments that appears as a key part in the Master's scandal.
What has been found so far: the REAG was a fund fund manager investigated by suspected money laundering in favor of the Master, with alleged connections to the PCC. By 2023, Vorcaro would have profited over R$ 440 million in 24 hours in operations with funds managed by REAG. The names behind the house — Tanure, Mansur and Square, the so-called "REAG crack" — are investigated alongside Vorcaro. The Central Bank has decreed the liquidation of the Master in 18 November 2025And Vorcaro was arrested in the same month.
It is in this context that brand change gains reading. The old RMAI11 (Multi-Active RAG) Turned around. LMAI11 (Multi-Active Real Estate Lab), and management has moved from REAG Management to Arandu Real Estate Fund Management. . The change of name and fund manager, in January 2026, has the whole appearance of a group separation — remove the real estate vehicle from the toxic mark as the siege closed on the Master.
Fact x suspicion x analysis — do not mix the three:
Fact: The Bahamas Justice recognized the Master's liquidation and released the asset search; the RMAI11 was managed by REAG and changed its name/fund manager in Jan/2026.
Suspects found by the authorities: deviation of at least US$ 1 billion, laundering via REAG funds and connections to the PCC — ongoing investigations without final decision.
Editorial analysis of Rico to the Few: the brand exchange seems to be a reputational shielding maneuver, but there is no public evidence that the real estate from the bottom have been diverted. The unit holder should treat this as a risk of reputation and governance to monitor — not as a confirmed loss.
What does that mean, in fact, for those who have LMAI11
Start with the good news, which is technical and important: a brick FII owns physical properties and Contracts for rent, registered in the name of the fund, with assets segregated by law. The money embezzled in the Bahamas circulated through financial funds offshore — not by logistical sheds in Campinas. An investigator can freeze an account in Caribbean; it does not "take away" a rental distribution center for Assai.
The heritage of the LMAI11 is concrete: R$ 581 million, 95% of assets assessed by Binswanger (independent weight assessor), indexation to IPCA in 95% the contracted revenue and a cash reserve of R$ 29,4 million (sea/26). And negotiates the 0,34 P/VP — a discount of 66% on the equity value. On paper, it's cheap.
The problem is that "high" here is not synonymous with "opportunity." The risks that weigh on the fund are: operational and independent of the scandal:
The most visible asset of this fragility is the Campinas shed, evaluated in R$ 180 million and totally vacant. . It enters the equity calculation — and inflates the "attractive" P/VP — but does not generate a penny of rent. Add to that the fact that rent of atypical contracts with Assai (20 years, via Pedra Alta) and ArcelorMittal (10 years, via Francorchamps) They're not getting to the bottom cashier. as they should, and you understand why the dividend collapsed from R$ 0,58 to R$ 0,27 in half a year. The occupation of only Portfolio 52% closes the diagnosis: half of the property is not working.
In other words, even if the Master scandal never existed, the LMAI11 would already be a problematic fund. The discount of 66% is not a gift — it is the price that the market charges to load high vacancy, dividing shrinking and a base of just 1.094 unit holders, which means Liquidity very low (getting out of position can be difficult without dropping the price).
What the investor must monitor from now on
For those who have the fund or think about entering the discount, the checklist is objective. The focus is not the Master’s headline — it is the operational health of the vehicle and the suitability of the person who now manages it:
| What to monitor | Why does it matter? | Warning signal |
|---|---|---|
| The new fund manager Arandu | He inherited the fund from REAG. Its governance defines the future of LMAI11. | Any connection between Arandu and the REAG/Master investigations. |
| Location of the Campinas Shelter | R$ 180 Mi stops. Solving this is the largest recovery trigger in the dividend. | Months passing without announcement of a new tenant or sale of the asset. |
| Assai Rent Flow / ArcelorMittal | These are long atypical contracts — they should be the fund's stable cash. | Rents that follow without passing to the IFI cashier; disputes with the SPEs Pedra Alta/Francorchamps. |
| DPS Trajectory | 53% is down. Indicates whether deterioration has stopped or continues. | New cut below R$ 0,27/month. |
| On-balance sheet assessments | The P/VP of 0,34 depends on Binswanger's reports. | Reassessment below real estate (the discount may be lower than it seems). |
Rich Verdict to the Few — SELLS: The Bahamas decision is serious for the Master case, but it does not directly affect the properties of the LMAI11, which remain segregated on behalf of the fund. The real risk of the unit is another and is already on the table: vacancy of almost half of the portfolio, a shed of R$ 180 million vacant in Campinas, rents that do not arrive at the cashier and a dividend that dropped 53% in six months. The P/VP of 0,34 attracts the bargain hunter, but it is a discount that reflects real problems — not a pricing error. We add to this the historical REAG and almost zero liquidity (1.094 unit holders) to reach a feeling that we call bitter neutral. . Note 4,0/10 in the comparison (4,5/10 in absolute). It's not the kind of risk we recommend you carry for the discount.
Fonts
The fact data and the suspicions attributed to the authorities reflect the material verified until 10/06/2026 and ongoing investigations, without a final decision. The notes, verdict and reading on the separation of the group are editorial analysis of Rico to the Few and do not constitute an investment recommendation.
