What caused the fall? It wasn't a market panic or a bad report. O RZAG11 dropped from about R$ 9,00 (29/05) to R$ 8,40 (09/06) — a loss of ~6,5% in two weeks, with peak tow leading to the unit of R$ 9,14 to R$ 8,22 (-10%) — because of two specific events added to a macro background. . The first is the judicial recovery of the Formoso/Uniggel Group, which messes with R$ 52,75 million of the portfolio (7,9% of the PL). The second is a controversial 28/05 AGE in which Riza proposed to absorb another fund and rewrite investment policy — a movement that smells of conflict of interest and took away the sleep of the unit 89.291.
The direct conclusion: the credit thesis behind the fund did not change materially. . What changed was the perceived risk by the market. The ownership of Riza, the spread of CDI+4,79% and the fiduciary disposal of land on 18 of the 19 CRAs remain standing. The discount of 16% on the asset value already pricing much of Uniggel's damage. The unprecited risk factor today is AGE — and it is the decision to enter, maintain or reduce it.
The fall was anomalous?
Yes and no. The annualised volatility of RZAG11 in the last 12 months is around 17% — typical of a private credit fiagro. This translates a monthly standard deviation of approximately 4,5%. The fall of -7,4% in 30 days is therefore above a monthly standard deviation: statistically, it's a move that doesn't happen every month. In this sense, it was abnormal.
But "anomalous" is not synonymous with "irrational." The asset history itself already recorded -10% of the unit in June/2026 when the events below emerged. The market is not melting the fund on a whim — it is reciting two real risks that have appeared almost simultaneously. The correct reading is that there was partial exaggeration: the price fell faster than the real deterioration of the foundations, but the direction of the movement has ballast. It is precisely this difference between price and foundation that creates the window of opportunity — as long as the investor knows what he is buying.
Uniggel: the real risk, measured in real by unit
This is the concrete fuse. The Formoso Group, Uniggel's controller, had requested judicial recovery in 18/12/2025. The Court of Palmas (TO) granted injunction of stay period 90 days — the period in which creditors are prevented from executing guarantees. The CRAs linked to Uniggel represent R$ 52,75 million, or 7,9% of net worth of R$ 678,9 million.
Technically, these CRAs are still adiplents — hence the formal default of the fund to follow in 0%. But the fund manager, with prudence, has stopped considering their revenue in the distribution. . That is, the impact on the dividend is already, to a large extent, within the number you see today. The residual risk is not the monthly flow — it is the main. . If the judicial recovery fails and guarantees (fiduciary disposal of land) must be executed, the legal proceedings must be 12 to 36 months And there may be a lack of judgment in recovery.
Translating into unit: the R$ 52,75 million is equivalent to approximately R$ 0,76 per unit of exposure. The current discount of 16% on VP (R$ 9,79 against R$ 8,40 unit) represents about R$ 1,39/unit. In other words, the market already discounts more than the total value of the exhibition Uniggel — is precluding a total loss And there's still a safety margin.. . That's the opposite of complacency.
THE AGE that divides opinions
If Uniggel is the risk that the price has already eaten, AGE of 28/05/2026 is the risk that the price has not fully digested yet — because the vote is pending. Riza has proposed two things that go through the DNA from the bottom:
| Proposal | What Changes | Why does it bother you? |
|---|---|---|
| Absorb LSAG11 | Private issue of ~R$ 103,7 mi without a right of preference to the current unit holders | Dilution imposed, without clear benefit and no chance for the current unit holder to follow |
| Rewriting investment policy | It now accepts CRI, CPR-F, CDCA, FIDC, FIP, FII and rural real estate — and even 100% of PL in assets originated by the Riza group itself | Concentrates the mandate on the originator, setting up a conflict of structural interests |
There are two scenarios, and they are asymmetric:
If AGE is approved as a proposal - it's negative. The current unit is diluted without preference, and the fund ceases to be a pure credit Fiagro with clear governance to become a vehicle with open mandate and potential concentration of 100% in house papers. That changes the nature of the investment. Whoever bought a land-guaranteed Fiagro of CRAs did not buy a multimarket credit controlled by the originator. That's the mental stop: AGE approved as proposal → reassess the position, because the mandate of the fund has changed.
If AGE is rejected — can be a catalyst for recovery. It signals that the unit base has a voice, that governance works and removes the greatest source of unprecited uncertainty. In this scenario, the discount of 16% tends to compress, and the unit can reconvert to VP as the market re-enacts the fund back to what it is: a credit fiagro well originated, trading cheap for a punctual scare.
Has the thesis changed? Dissecting wallet, fund manager and spread
Here's the point that separates emotional reaction from analysis. Except for Uniggel and the AGE, the engine of the bottom keeps spinning exactly as it rotated:
- Wallet: 19 CRAs, 100% indexed to CDI+, with medium spread of CDI+4,79% and loading yield of 19,79%. Short duration of 2,1 years — which limits sensitivity to interest and accelerates the turn of capital.
- Inadherence: 0% formally in all the rest of the portfolio. Zero leverage — there is no margin risk or call for capital.
- Concentration: top-3 = 43,9% of PL (Atafona 18,1%, KPS Agricultural 16,0%, Celini 9,7%), with HHI of 0,10. It is concentrated, like any credit fiagro, but sprayed enough for a single default not to overturn the thesis — exactly what Uniggel is proving by representing only 7,9%.
- Manager: Riza Asset Management, 8/10. Landowners' table responsible for 89,7% of CRAs originated internally, AuM of R$ 12+ billions and history of managing credit events well. The origination itself is precisely what gives Riza information and bargaining power in a judicial recovery.
The conclusion is direct: the credit risk-return structure has not deteriorated. What deteriorated was the short-term confidence of the market — an intangible that reverts to facts (Uniggel solving, AGE rejected), not over time. The only vector that effectively compresses the future return is the macro: with Focus pointing Selic to 11% in 12 months, sustainable DPS tends to retreat from the current R$ 0,12/month to the current range of R$ 0,105–0,110/month 2027. . Even so, at the price of R$ 8,40, that would still imply a double-digit DY.
Fair price range
The fair price of a credit Fiagro is a function of three variables: the discount on the VP, the yield that the purchase price holds and how much risk is already priced. For R$ 8,40, the 0,858 P/VP locks a 17,1% DY a.a. (R$ 0,12/month = 1,43% per month, free of IR for PF). The scenarios:
The discount logic: to the R$ 8,40, the market pays 85,8 cents for each real equity and has already slaughtered more than the entire exposure to Uniggel. If judicial recovery goes well and the R$ 52,75 millions are preserved, the VP can rise back to the house of R$ 10,00 and the unit tends to converge — a two-digit potential capital gain added to the yield. The asymmetric risk downwards is the AGE approved as a proposal, which changes the mandate and justifies reassessing the position regardless of the price.
The verdict
The data show an agri-structurally intact credit fund, trading with 16% discount on equity because of an already widely priced 7,9% credit event and an assembly whose outcome is binary. The editorial note remains in 7,0 — ACUMULAR, with the exception that AGE is the variable that can lower the thesis overnight.
Rich to the Few — ACUMULAR (7,0/10)
Input/maintenance/reduction range: below R$ 8,50 is a strong entry zone; between R$ 8,50 and R$ 9,00, accumulate with caution; above R$ 9,00, just keep; above R$ 9,50, reduce. Mental stop: if AGE is approved as proposed by Riza (nonpreferably dilution + open mandate with up to 100% in house assets), reassess the position — the fund ceases to be what you bought.
Positive catalysts: AGE rejection; favorable resolution of Uniggel's judicial recovery (VP towards R$ 10,00+); maintenance of CDI+4,79% spread and default 0% in the rest.
Negative catalysts: AGE's approval as a proposal; failure of judicial recovery and execution with disarray; compression of DPS for R$ 0,105–ZQ1ZQX/month in Selic's fall cycle.
