The short answer, to the unitholder who received the warning and wants to know if there's a hidden bomb: No, you don't. The dividend was kept in R$ 0,72/unit (paid today, 15/06) — no cut. There's no reported fraud, no explosion of default or hidden liability. But the May report is not "all right." It reveals, in three lines that no one reads because they do not come written by the fund manager, that the turbulent moment continues and has a name: cashier really squeezed (immediate liquidity fell by half and a Securitisation of non-previous receivers), Quotas keep coming out. and patrimonial value continues shrinking light. . It is an orderly worsening — consistent with our thesis of "real risk priced, not fraud" — not rupture.
Every 15th, TG Core delivers the Structured Monthly Report (Annex 39-I) to TGAR11. . It's a technical document, full of cells and numbers, without a narrative line. That is precisely why almost no one reads — and that is precisely why he keeps the information that actually shows whether the fund has improved, worsened, or stagnated. The unit reads the management report (which the fund manager writes to sound good) and ignores the structured report (which is the bare accounting). We got the report from May/2026 (competence 05/2026) and we put it side by side with the April/2026, field by field. That's what he says.
May versus April, number by number
The data below came out directly from the two structured reports (IDs 1220582 and 1193742), conferred one by one. It's not an estimate — that's what TG Core told the CVM.
| What the report says | April/2026 | May/2026 | Difference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Number of unit holders | 141.772 | 137.575 | −4.197 (−3,0%) |
| Net equity | R$ 2,586 bi | R$ 2,564 bi | −R$ 21,5 mi (−0,8%) |
| Equity value of share | R$ 109,71 | R$ 108,79 | −R$ 0,91 (−0,8%) |
| Yield to be distributed (= R$ 0,72/unit) | ZQX0ZX mi | ZQX0ZX mi | equal |
| Immediate liquidity (box + public bonds) | ZQX0ZX mi | ZQX0ZX mi | −R$ 7,52 mi (−56%) |
| Obligations to securitise receivers | R$ 0,00 | ZQX0ZX mi | new line |
| Other amounts payable | ZQX0ZX mi | ZQX0ZX mi | −R$ 22,3 mi (−93%) |
| Company shares (allotment SPEs) | ZQX0ZX mi | ZQX0ZX mi | −R$ 32,8 mi (−1,4%) |
| Advance by sale of real estate | ZQX0ZX mi | ZQX0ZX mi | +ZQX0ZX mi (+13%) |
| Total liabilities | ZQX0ZX mi | ZQX0ZX mi | −R$ 5,72 mi (−10%) |
1. The finding that matters: the cashier dried up and the fund manager securitized receipts
This is the point that passes beaten and what more says about the "turbulent moment". A immediate liquidity of the fund fell by half: from R$ 13,36 million in April to R$ 5,84 million in May. For a fund of R$ 2,56 billion worth of equity, that's PL 0,23% — a minimum fraction. The cashier in current account, specifically, is in literal R$ 30 thousand. The bottom is running with the liquidity tank almost at the bottom.
And there comes the real news: now the line has come "Receivable security obligations" with R$ 14,71 million (in April it was zero). In parallel, the line "Other amounts to pay" dropped from R$ 23,99 million to R$ 1,68 million. Reading the two together, the story is clear: the fund manager anticipated cash securitizing sales receipts — instead of waiting for parcels of batch buyers to drip over months, it has turned some of these receivables into cash now — and used that money (plus the consumption of liquidity) to discharge R$ 22 million other bonds.
What is to securitize a receiver, in English: Imagine that you sold a lot and will receive in 60 installments. Securitizing is "sell" this right to receive for a third party, with discount, and pocket the cashier today instead of waiting 5 years. It's a legitimate and common tool in corporate -- but you only resort to it. when you need a box. . The presence of this line, which was zeroed in April, is the most honest sign that liquidity was at the limit.
This. does not compromise this month's dividend (which was already provided) and it's not destructive — is active cash management, not breaking. But it is exactly the kind of information that the management report does not highlight and that the structured delivery tray report: the background is making box "scraping the pot". It's the number one point to monitor in the June report.
2. The bleeding of unit holders continues — and at a strong pace
In May the fund had 137.575 unit holders, against 141.772 in April. They are. 4.197 quotes less in a single month. . And it is not an isolated hiccup: the base has been consistently falling — it was ~152,000 in September 2025. In eight months, the TGAR11 lost about 15,000 unit holders.
This is the mechanical link that explains the fall of the unit "without relevant fact" that We already commented when the fund hit the minimum of R$ 51People leaving play the price down regardless of the balance sheet. The 51% discount on equity is not only "the market pricing risk" — it is also, at the tip, Seller pressure from those who are giving up the paper. . For those who stay, this is a two-edged knife: it hurts in the short term, but it's what creates the discount that can become a prize if history unlocks.
3. Heritage shrinks — light, and just as the theory predicted
The equity value of the unit fell more 0,8%, from R$ 109,71 to R$ 108,79, and the PL retreated R$ 21,5 millions. The bulk of this fall comes from one line: "Company shares" — SPEs that touch allotments — has shrunk ZQX0ZX million. . It's the heart of the bottom being rescheduled down by equity.
And this is where you inform him. confirms our thesis instead of contradicting it. The TGAR11 is in practice a Incorporation/loader listed in FII. . His VP is not the price of land parked in a vault — it's the present value of a portfolio of long receivers (parts 60 to 180 months). So it behaves as a long-term prefixed title: when interest rises, the present value of these flows falls without any asset being destroyed. . The smooth and continuous rescheduling that the report shows is exactly what is expected in a high Selic scenario for longer — it is not a sign of hidden writing-off.
What has NOT changed (and is the good side of the story)
The "income to be distributed" came identical to the previous month (R$ 16.968.937, that divided by the 23.567.968 units gives exact R$ 0,72/unit) — it is the fourth month followed at this level. About the unit of R$ 53,65, this is a Yield dividend of ~1,3% per month, near 16% per year. There is also a sign that sales continue dripping: the advance for sale of real estate has risen R$ 1,8 million and the bills to be paid for sale have risen R$ 0,6 million. And nothing of bad accounting surprise: zero provision for contingencies, zero performance fee to pay, zero real estate charge.
The exception of method that every unitholder needs to understand
The structured report is essentially a balance sheet. . The things that would actually move the thesis to much worse — the distrates (when the buyer gives up, the unit returns to the stock and the profit already accounted for is stalled), the Assessment reports not disclosed and the specific sales destination such as Cipasa/Viel — They don't show up here.. . They come in the management report. So "it's all in the report" only goes for the accounting part. For the accounting part, nothing's broken. Qualitative risk remains the usual — distraction and opacity of valuation — and these only read in the RG.
Verdict: is there anything new? Yeah. Is it a bomb? Oh, no.
The May report is from marginal and controlled worsening, perfectly consistent with what we had been saying: I swear high for longer → weaker sales → reassessments down → units coming out. The background kept the dividend, It's still really cheap. (P/VP 0,49) and You didn't hide any bombs. — but lit a yellow box alert: liquidity in half and a security of receipts that there was not in April to make money.
For you, unitholder: It's "inside what's expected for a trust taking interest," but the cashier squeezed and the unit holders keep coming out. These two are what you need to keep up on. June information — because that is where a possible dividend cut would come if it came. Our reading follows the same of the last analysis: speculative purchase of satellite position (up to ~5% portfolio, 3+ year horizon), with asymmetry improving as the price drops. What the TGAR11 It's not: Safe port of rent. The dividend can retreat to the range of R$ 0,55–0,60 and the unit oscillate further down before any unlock. Whoever comes in needs to be comfortable with that.
This content is educational and analytical, it is not personalized investment recommendation. Do your own analysis before you invest.
