Do I have to sell? There's no reason for a hasty sale. O XPLG11 continues to be one of the largest logistics theses in Brazil, with AAA portfolio, dividing of R$ 0,82/unit locked for 17 months and P/VP of 0,89 that already justifies part of the risk. What changed in the May/2026 Management Report (delivered on 08/06) was the short-term risk profile: Mobly, member of the Toky group, filed a judicial recovery and pulled the default of the 3,9% fund for 5,9% of rental revenue. . This lowers the verdict of ACUMULAR to KEEP — a cautious, not exiting posture.
How much can I lose and Mobly will return the shed? The direct impact, if Mobly simply stops paying, is in the order of R$ 1,35 million per month — about R$ 0,026/unit, or 3,2% of the current dividend. Absorbable. The scenario that really matters is that of return of space: Mobly occupies 58.522 m2 on Cajamar CD (~3,4% from ABL). If it returns, the vacancy jumps from 8,1% to approximately 11,7% and the sustainable DPS retreats to the R$ 0,75–0,78 range. It is not collapse of the thesis — it is margin compression in a fund that already distributes at the edge of the generated.
What changed in the May/2026 RG
The May/2026 Management Report delivered a number that was not on the radar of the previous analysis: default rose from 3,9% for 5,9% from rental revenue. . Most of that leap — 3,1 percentage points — comes from a single name: Mobly, furniture retailer and decoration of the Toky group, which has filed a request for judicial recovery.
The fund remains solid in the aggregate: net worth of R$ 5,41 billions, VP/unit of R$ 105,25, occupation of 91,9%, 31 condominiums in 6 states, 1,72 million m2 of ABL and 94 tenants. It's 344.312 unit. Liquidity is exceptional — daily spin between R$ 5,3 and R$ 7,8 million, annual ADTV at the home of R$ 4 billions. None of that has changed. What changed was the quality of the rent flow in the short term and the probability of a relevant area return.
Mobly in judicial recovery: real or exaggerated risk?
The right question isn't "Is default up?" -- is "What happens to Mobly's 58.522 m2 in Cajamar?". The contract is typical, indexed to IPCA, with maturity in 30/06/2028, and represents about ABL 3,4% from the bottom. There are two sets to separate:
Scenario 1 — Persistent default, Mobly maintains space. In judicial recovery, the company can continue operating and renegotiate the rent. The fund ceases to receive punctually, but does not create new vacancy. The impact is already cited R$ 1,35 million/month (R$ 0,026/unit), diluted in a R$ 0,82. DPS The management can trigger guarantees and still has the cash buffer of NE Logistic FII — which, it should be noted, has fallen from R$ 1,38 to R$ 0,95/unit, i.e. is thinner than it was.
Scenario 2 — Mobly returns the Cajamar area. Here the impact migrates from flow to structure. Vacance rises from 8,1% to ~11,7% and sustainable DPS falls to R$ 0,75–0,78. . Cajamar is a disputed logistic pole, which favors reoccupation — but repositioning 58,000 m2 takes months, and in this interval the dividend of R$ 0,82 is no longer covered by the generated. The 1st semester of 2026 guidance already works on a range of R$ 0,79–ZQ1ZQX/unit, which shows that the management itself sees the narrowing slack.
The other risks that add pressure
Mobly's not the only point of attention in the ID. There's an operational risk window concentrated in the next six months:
- Piracicaba II to R$ 3.900/m2: twice the value of Atibaia/Jundiaí (R$ 1.994/m2), acquired in the 9th issue. The management justifies: Class A+ shed under construction, 75% pre-located, with initial rental premium generating cap rate of 10,6%. The risk is clear — if the asset does not land above R$ 25/m2 in stabilization, the cap rate falls below 8% and the price paid becomes expensive.
- ML Perus (atypical) wins in 13/09/2026: ABL 4,7% with critical renewal in the next three months. It is a contract with the Free Market, first-line tenant, but the non-renewal or renegotiation the smallest would be material.
- LC Immigrants V 100% vacant: the rental premium that supports the result of this asset goes until november/2026. From there, if there is no location, the DPS suffers additional pressure.
- Atypicals have fallen from 49% to 44%: natural dilution after 9th emission (input of Piracicaba II and Atibaia/Jundiaí). Less atypical contracts means less predictability of revenue.
- R$ 10 million subscription in GARE12: cross-addressing between managers (~0,18% PL). Small position, but it is a governance movement that deserves monitoring.
- Debt of R$ 805,6 million (PL 18%): The CRI 499 series 1 is in IPCA+8,76% (R$ 251,5 million, nov/37). Expensive Funding in a Selic to 14,75% environment.
What still works on XPLG11
Lowering to MANTER is not depreciating the thesis. The XPLG11 continues to deliver what makes it one of the largest logistics theses in the country:
- Sprayed AAA portfolio: Leroy Merlin, Free Market (4 CDs), Renner, Magalu, DHL, Fedex, Unilever, Panasonic, IBM, Ambev, Carrefour, B2W, Shopee and Raia Drogasil. First-line tenants on a scale difficult to replicate.
- Dividend stable: R$ 0,82/unit 17 months ago, DY of 10,52% a.a. The predictability of distribution is an asset itself.
- 93% of contracts indexed to IPCA: structural inflationary protection of revenue.
- Elite liquidity: R$ 5,3 to 7,8 million/day, annual ADTV of R$ 4 billions. Getting in and out of position is never a problem.
- XP Vista Management with 9 successful emissions and base of unit 344.312.
The 11% (P/VP 0,89) asset discount provides some protection — but it is modest for a six-month window where Mobly, ML Perus and CL Immigrants V can all press the DPS at the same time.
Verdict — Why Keeping and Not Selling
The XPLG11 has no foundation problem; it has a concentration of risk events in the short term. Mobly in judicial recovery is the trigger of the reanalysis, but it is the sum — Piracicaba II at questioned price, critical renewal of the ML Perus in September, vacancy of the CL Immigrants V and smaller cash buffer — which justifies retreating from ACUMULAR to MANTER. The discount of 11% on P/VP does not compensate, alone, this window. Whoever's got it, hold it. Whoever thinks of coming in, waits for the next chapters.
For those who already have: no reason for hasty sale. The foundations of the AAA portfolio remain solid, the R$ 0,82 DPS has been stuck for 17 months, and the 0,89 P/VP already pricing part of the risk. For those who consider entering: wait resolution of the Mobly situation and the renewal ML Perus (set/2026) before setting up position.
