XPSF11: esthetic payout for 101%, VP retreats and macro presses — the dividend of R$ 0.07 stands?

The XPSF11 is the XP Selection FoF, one. FoF (Fonds Fund) — that is, a real estate fund that invests in shares of other FIIs instead of buying real estate directly. In the case of XPSF11, the mandate is hybrid: about 86% of the equity is in shares of other 44+ FIIs, and the remainder in CRIs purchased directly by management (XP Vista Asset). The May Management Report of 2026 (document CVM 1227247) brought a set of numbers that, read in isolation, frighten — and that, read with context, tell a much more nuanced story.

What happened in May?

Five facts summarize the month: (ZQQQQQ0ZQXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX Total assets closed at R$ 341.0 millions, with 54,067 quotes.

The payout of 101% — the mathematics that nobody shows you

Before the account, the concept. Payout It is the percentage of the result that the fund delivers to the quotation holders. A payout of 100% means "distributed exactly what you won". Above 100% — like the 101% of May — means that the fund distributed it. More and more. of what he generated in the month, completing the difference with the box that he had kept.

Now the numbers. The fund won R$ 0.066 per share and paid R$ 0.07. The deficit is R$ 0.004 per share. With approximately 43.3 millions of units in circulation, this gives:

Eighty-one months is more than a year. Six and a half years old The dividend remains intact even if the result is unchanged. and never ever ever ever again This is an unrealistic scenario, because the result of a FOF fluctuates with the dividends it receives from its own portfolio. In other words: the payout of 101% in May It is not an emergency.. It's a warning sign, not a fire alarm.

Where does this R$ 14 million mattress come from? It's not luck. It accumulates with portfolio recycling — sale of valued FIIs positions, realized capital gain and, more recently, the sale of FIIs positions, realized capital gain and, more recently, the sale of FIIs positions. return of the CRI Econ prepaid in abr/26X prepaid in abr/26X, which released box back to the bottom (assumption that we detail in the May analysis about the paid CRI and tactical reentries. The turning point is not financial — it is operational: the result/unit must return to R$ 0.07 or more for the distribution to stop consuming reserves.

The two new CRIs — good allocation or risky concentration?

Um Um CRI (Certificate of Receivable Real Estate) is, in practice, a debt backed up in real estate — the fund lends money and receives interest, with a real estate as collateral. In May, XPSF11 bought two new ones:

It is worth translating the CDI: it is the rate that marks the fixed income post-fixed, today rotating near 10.4% a.a. "CDI + 1.3%" means the CDI plus 1.3 percentage point (≈ 11.7% a.a.); "CDI × 105%" means 105% of CDI. Notice that, at this level of Selic, the two yields are very close — around 11% to 11.8% per year.

Here lies the first point of analysis: both came. below the historical average rate of the background CRIs, which is CDI + 1.82%. Why did management agree to pay expensive for papers that yield less? The most likely reading is credit quality: RNI is an incorporator of the Rodobens group, listed company, with fiduciary divestiture of the property — more solid debtor and more robust collateral justify a smaller spread. In credit, low rate is usually synonymous with lower risk, not bad business.

The second point is more delicate: 6 of the 8 CRIs direct from the fund have debtors in the residential / incorporation sector. (HBR Pedroso, Embraed, Helbor, Lucio, RNI itself and Brasil Terrenos). The only clear exception of another segment is the JCC Iguatemi, balestered in shopping mall. With Selic higher for longer and IPCA in 5%, the residential sector feels: the capital cost of the incorporators rises, the financing to the buyer increases and sales may slow down. There is mitigation — all CRIs have fiduciary disposal of real estate or units, plus reserve funds, which reduces the probability of loss in case of default. The most important is the Concentration Sectorial Concentration It is real and deserves the radar of the Cotista.

The adverse macro — what changes in fact to the background

The May RG underlined the worsening of the scenario: IPCA expected in 5% (well above the goal of 3%), fiscal deterioration with stimulus package of the order of R$ 215 billion (~1.5% of ZQX%), anticipation of the discussions of the ZQXX% of the ZQXX% of ZQXX% of ZQXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

For a FoF, higher interest for longer is not a single sentence — it hits the wallet in shape. Asymmetrical Asymmetric:

In summary: about 55% of the wallet is in brick (logistics + shopping + office) and ~43% in credit / paper. The adverse macro hurts the brick — and it was precisely this that knocked down the VP by unit at R$ 0.17 in May, with offices pulling back 3.5% and shopping malls 2.6% in the month. But the paper slice works like how it works. Amortizer Amortizer: while the brick depreciates, the post-fixed receivables yield more with the higher CDI, sustaining part of the distributable result. It is the structural advantage of a hybrid FoF over a purely brick FoF in an interest cycle like this.

The double discount thesis — is it still worth it?

O O O P/VP (price over equity value) is the ratio between what you pay on the market and the equity behind each unit. A P/VP of 0.78 means that you disburse about R$ 78 for every R$ 100 of equity — 22% off. With the price quoted at R$ 6.17 against a VP of R$ 7.88, this is exactly the case of XPSF11 today.

But in the XPSF11 the discount is XPSF11 Double-Double, and that's where the charm of the thesis is. As the fund invests in shares of other FIIs, and those FIIs also trade below their equity value (collectively close to 88% of VP), the quoter of XPSF11 buys a portfolio with discount that he/she will also trade below their equity value. It is already there. Discounted. It is discount on discount. In an eventual cycle of falling interest rates, this double compression can reverse in a leveraged way — the estimated potential upside stays in the range of range. 25% to 30%% to 30% Above the unit.

The honest caveat: with IPCA in 5% and Selic higher for longer, this discount closing. It takes longer to materialize more materially.. The upside does not some — it just changes the deadline. Who enters today needs to be comfortable in receiving 13.6% per year of dividends while waiting for the reprecification to happen, without setting the date.

The dividend at the tip of the pencil — is it worth the risk?

For the individual investor, FIIs usually distributes income exempt from income tax. This changes the comparison with fixed income. See the account at the quote of R$ 6.17:

Translating the gross-up: as the quoter does not pay IR on income, the net 13.6% equals something close to 16.1% if you had to pay tax — because in the taxed fixed income part of the income would go to the Lion. Compared to the Selic Treasury, which yields ~10.5% gross and is still taxed, the XPSF11 delivers a premium of approximately 1.9 percentage point over the risk-free asset. This premium is the remuneration that the quoter demands for accepting market risk, unit volatility and the eventual mismatch between result and DPS — exactly the theme this month.

For whom it is — and for whom it is not — for whom it is not

It's for you if: Inexpensive and relevant monthly income search (13.6% a.a.), tolerates seeing the unit fluctuate with the mood of brick FIIs, understands that the payout of 101% is covered by years of cash and wants diversified exposure to 50+ assets with a single purchase.

It is not for you if:: It needs absolute predictability of the dividend in the very short term, it does not tolerate the possibility of the DPS being adjusted if the result/unit does not recover over several months, or it is disturbed by the concentration of direct CRIs in residential sector debtors at a time of high Selic. Anyone who wants to carry cash with pay without market risk has in the Selic Treasury itself a simpler alternative — giving up, of course, the premium and capital upside.

About the author The author

Article author Article author Edin Bauer

Investor and founder of Rich to the Few.

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