BBIG11: the CRI II has been removed — the June DPS is the solution, not the problem.

On the other hand. May analysis of 2026XX, the argument was that "the turn has begun": the April balance sheet showed box rising and CRIs falling, the first concrete sign that promised deleveraging came out of PowerPoint. Two months later, the turning point ceased to be a sign and became a consummate fact. The June Management Report (ID 1245316) and the 02/07/2026 Relevant Fact (ID 1238343) confirm: the CRI II is paid. What was the biggest uncertainty of the was the biggest uncertainty of the BBIG11 — a debt to 103% of CDI eating the result month to month — ceased to exist.

The CRI II was paid — what does that change in the pocket of the unitholder?

To understand why this matters, one must understand the mechanism. The BBIG11 had two emissions from CRI to 103% of CDI. With the Selic still elevated, the CRI II alone drained something between R$ 5.5 Mi and R$ 8 Mi per month in financial expenditure — money that came out of the result before reaching the quoter. It was the hole through which the DPS leaked.

In the 1 semester of 2026 management has left this CRI II fully: R$ 146 Mi R$ 146 Mi in total, being in total, being being R$ 77 Mi only in June. It was exactly this final settlement that generated the R$ 8.76 Mi of financial expenditure that compressed the DPS of the month to R$ 0.02. In other words: the June unitholder paid at once the bill that, maintained the debt, would continue to drip for years.

The recurring effect is what matters. Without CRI II, the monthly financial expense falls on the order of R$ 2 to R$ 3 Mi. This is the box that now remains for distribution — which is why the forward of R$ 0.07 is credible, not fund manager optimism. What is left of the debt is the He's the first Pop! figure that pulls apart.: saldo actualizado de: saldo actualizado de R$ 262.8 Mi R$ 262.8 Mi, also the 103% of CDI, but maturing there in. 2035. Recurring cost of R$ 3 to 4 Mi/month, long term, no urgency. It's passive manageable, not time bomb.

Hygienopolis to 5.65%: more cash, but the bet concentrates on RioSul

In June, the fund completed the sale of 9% of the Higienópolis Patio. BBIG11's share of the asset has fallen from 14.65% for 5.65% for 5.65%. It is a two-edged knife that the unitholder needs to see in full.

The good side: the sale fed the cashier who took out the CRI II and still left installments receivable — R$ 23.67 Mi no 1S/2027X and and y R$ 35.51 Mi no 1S/2028X, both corrected by 100% of CDI. It's contracted money coming in over the next two years, with correction. The side to watch: with Higienópolis shrunk and the Pátio Paulista also in the process of being reduced, the portfolio becomes even more dependent on the one that has been reduced. RioSul RioSul, which goes on to represent the order of 60% to 65% of real estate revenues. Desalavancar is good; but the price is a less diversified portfolio, with more weight in a single asset. The thesis, which was already concentrated, becomes more concentrated.

Reevaluation +1.91%: the discount became even bigger

The Relevant Fact of 02/07/2026 (ID 1238343) brought real estate appraisal with data-base 30/06/2026: high from of 1238343 1,91%, a capital gain of, a capital gain of, R$ 23.8 Mi R$ 23.8 Mi. With this, the estimated asset value rises to about about 10 percent. R$ 9.73/quoted. With the quote negotiated to R$ ZQXX0ZQQXX In 13/07/2026, the P/VP drops for. 0,58 — a discount of 42%, one of the largest in the mall segment.

A discount of this size only means one of two things. Or the market suspects that the valuation of real estate is too optimistic and prices the assets for less than the report says; or there is a relevant margin of safety for those who buy today, betting that the equity value is real and the market has not yet repressed the end of the risk of the CRI1ZQX. The honest answer is that both effects coexist: part of the discount is legitimate skepticism about execution, part is market delay in recognizing deleveraging. It is this gap that defines opportunity — and risk.

RioSul: the warning that cannot be swept under the carpet

Here is the most relevant attention point of the moment. RioSul gerou gerou RioSul gerou gerou R$ 5.45 Revenue Mi June/2026X Revenue Mi June/2026X and today is ~49% of real estate revenue, heading towards 60-65% of the portfolio after all sales. Only May/26 gross revenue declined. 6,7% Forward to May/25 — 25 " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " The sales of the shopkeepers have grown. +16,2% in the same period.

This divergence is what needs explanation. If the shopkeepers sold 16% more but the bottom revenue fell 7%, something decoupled between the performance of the store and the rent coming to BBIG11. It can be seasonal calendar, it can be renegotiation of contracts with temporary discount, it can be change in the mix of shopkeepers. None of these hypotheses is fatal per se — but they all deserve close monitoring, because in a portfolio where RioSul turns 60-65% of revenue, any structural erosion here hits DPS directly. The end of the risk of the CRI II took away a financial threat; RioSul is where the next question lives, and it is operational.

Future bonds: where does cash come from?

The deleveraging is not over — it continues. The fund has fund has R$ 157 My winning not 2S/2026X (obligations of the Paulista and Higienópolis Courts) and more R$ 149 Mi no 1S/2027X (Rio Sul). These are commitments that require active cash management, and that is precisely where sales make sense: the installments receivable from Higienópolis and Paulista, added to the operational generation of the malls, are the source to honor these salaries.

If the plan runs as drawn, the leverage — which was ~47% at the beginning of the semester and is already at ~37% — should fall to order order. ~20% by December/2026X% by December/2026X. The exit of 47% to 20% in one year transforms the risk profile of the fund. It is the outcome of the same story that began to appear in the April balance sheet: less debt, less financial expenditure, more result available to the quoter.

DPS history: view the 0.02 currency in the right context

Five consecutive months at R$ 0.07, a single month at R$ 0.02 with named and non-recurring cause, and declared return at R$ 0.07. The line chart stuns; the book reading, no. The June unit result (R$ 0.026) was higher than the distributed — the fund did not stop generating cash, it redirected cash to kill debt.

For whom it is — and for whom it is not — for whom it is not

It is for whom it is for whom it is. It has the stomach for a leveraged turnaround thesis, accepts high concentration in three AAA malls — increasingly dependent on RioSul — and sees in P/VP 0.58 P/VP a safety margin to load 12 to 24 months until the complete deleveraging. It is satellite position, sizing of 3% to 5% of the FIIs wallet, for those who understand that the DY of ~15% forward embezzle real execution risk.

It is not for whom it is for whom it is. It needs absolute predictability of monthly income, if it scares with a DPS of R$ 0.02 without reading the footnote, or does not tolerate the revenue divergence of RioSul remain without explanation for a few more months. Anyone who wants premium shopping with DPS stable for 24 months has got premium shopping with DPS stable for 24 months. XPML11 and and y HGBS11 — pay less yield, but sleep quietly.

Valuation: the discount embute margin, but the risk is execution.

The model points to fair price from R$ ZQXX0ZQQXX — upside of upside. 38,7% over the current R$ 5.66 — within a range of R$ 6.80 to R$ ZQX1ZZQXXX. The top of the track (R$ 9.10) only materializes in the optimistic scenario: Selic to 11% alleviating the remaining CRI I and the DPS returning to R$ 0.085. The floor (R$ 6.80) would already be a valuation of 20% over today's price.

About the author The author

Article author Article author Edin Bauer

Investor and founder of Rich to the Few.

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