Holders of CACR11 — a Brazilian FII (the local equivalent of a REIT) that lends to residential developers — are asking one thing, and it isn't about a target price: what is actually left inside this fund?
The answer sits in the filings submitted to CVM, Brazil's securities regulator: how much each developer owes, what secures each loan, the real stage of every construction site, how much cash the fund holds, and what has been formally challenged. We have gathered those numbers here. Reading them is up to you.
Where things stand in August 2026
On 31 July, the administrator and the manager disclosed that there would be no distribution for July either — the third consecutive month at zero. Earlier, in a vote that closed on 17 July, unitholders rejected the proposal to waive the fund's obligation to distribute 95% of first-half results. That left CACR11 owing roughly R$ 1.15 per unit, about R$ 5.6 million. Cash available on 30 June was R$ 232,500.
The obligation is therefore around 24 times the available cash — and the loans that could generate it mature between 2027 and 2030.
Why reported book value of R$ 98.87 per unit is not cash
Any quote screen shows the same thing: book value of R$ 98.87 per unit against units trading around R$ 15, an apparent "85% discount". It is worth understanding what that number represents.
In a credit fund, book value is the sum of what borrowers owe — not cash, not buildings. At CACR11 that balance has been growing on its own: because the developers are not paying interest in cash, interest and inflation adjustment are capitalised into outstanding principal. The balance-sheet figure climbs; the bank account does not.
| Reference date | Book value per unit | Cash on hand |
|---|---|---|
| December 2024 | R$ 94.81 | R$ 36.6 million |
| September 2025 | R$ 76.58 | R$ 10.5 million |
| December 2025 | R$ 74.73 | R$ 10.9 million |
| March 2026 | R$ 94.86 | R$ 2.8 million |
| June 2026 | R$ 98.87 | R$ 232,500 |
Reported book value rose 32% in six months while cash fell 98%. R$ 3.98 per unit sits on the balance sheet as accrued interest that never passed through the bank account. Unitholders also rejected the 2025 financial statements, the auditor issued a disclaimer of opinion, and the re-audit by RSM Brasil had not concluded as of July — so the R$ 98.87 figure carries no independent sign-off.
What secures each loan, and the stage it is at
The portfolio totals R$ 511.2 million in outstanding principal as of June — R$ 105.71 per unit — across nine loans, all secured by real estate at very different stages:
| Loan | Outstanding | Reported LTV | Stage reported by the manager (Jun/2026) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Santo André / Reserva Guaiú (Bahia) | R$ 131.6m | 35% | Never launched commercially. 25 luxury homes on 210,000 m² of beachfront land inside an environmental protection area. Matures Dec/2028 |
| Amalfi / Viva Itaparica (Bahia) | R$ 118.4m | 33% | 6.84% built (shoreline retaining works). Development registration filed Mar/2026; construction scheduled to start Q1 2027. Matures Feb/2029 |
| Alto Lindóia (Rio Grande do Sul) | R$ 70.4m | 39% | Phase 1 at 31.42% completion, 74% sold. Receivables of R$ 84.1m with sub-1% delinquency past 90 days; R$ 143.6m of remaining inventory |
| Savoie (Bahia) | R$ 64.1m | 75% | Never launched, 8% sold. Revised plans still awaiting approval from the city of Salvador (traffic impact report pending) |
| Helvetia (São Paulo) | R$ 60.9m | 53% | In default since 22 May 2026 and under foreclosure. 23% sold; work halted since Sep/2025 after the builder stopped being paid |
| Real Park (São Paulo) | R$ 43.4m | 72% | Launch scheduled for Q2 2026 did not happen. Eight units of 351–456 m² in a prime São Paulo district. Reported sales value R$ 60.4m |
| Mallorca (Bahia) | R$ 12.0m | — | 35% sold |
| Monte Cristo (São Paulo) | R$ 10.4m | 65% | Construction complete, mortgage transfers under way, 75% sold. R$ 8.7m inventory and R$ 7.3m receivables — R$ 16.0m of hard collateral |
| Station (São Paulo) | R$ 0.1m | 28% | Effectively repaid after occupancy permit in Apr/2026. 72% sold |
Sorted by stage rather than by portfolio weight, the picture is direct:
- Mature collateral — R$ 80.9 million (16% of the portfolio): Monte Cristo (finished), Alto Lindóia (well advanced, mostly sold, receivables already performing) and Station (repaid). These are the loans where a building exists, units are sold and instalments are being paid.
- Under foreclosure — R$ 60.9 million (12%): Helvetia. The collateral physically exists, but it is an unfinished high-end development with the builder off site since September 2025.
- No commercial launch — R$ 357.5 million (70%): Reserva Guaiú, Amalfi Itaparica, Savoie and Real Park. None has sold units at scale. Until construction leaves the drawing board, the effective collateral is the land.
How the reported LTV is calculated
Loan-to-value tells you whether the collateral covers the debt. It is worth knowing what it is measured against here: projected sales value — what the development would be worth once built and sold — rather than the present value of the land or the work completed.
That matters because the reported sales value of the two largest projects was revised upward without units being sold. Amalfi Itaparica went from roughly R$ 200 million to R$ 600 million; the manager attributes the revision to an improved architectural design with resort characteristics and greater buildable potential, and states that the collateral structure was reinforced as a result. Reserva Guaiú went from R$ 215 million at origination in 2023 to R$ 473 million after a revised commercial strategy and design changes.
Because LTV is debt divided by projected value, revising that value upward lowers the reported LTV without construction having advanced. Anyone reading the report should know what the metric rests on.
Documented facts and open allegations
Documented: the Helvetia loan has been in default since 22 May 2026 and is under foreclosure, with construction halted since September 2025 after the builder stopped being paid; BRL Trust resigned as fiduciary administrator on 7 July 2026 without stating reasons, and the manager says it was informed of the decision without access to the reasoning; unitholders rejected the 2025 financial statements after the auditor issued a disclaimer of opinion; the fund concedes it exceeds regulatory single-borrower concentration limits, with compliance pushed to 2027; and on 29 July the manager disclosed that construction at Amalfi Itaparica only begins in Q1 2027, with 30% of the purchase price paid before handover and 70% at delivery.
Under investigation, no findings issued: a committee of more than 100 unitholders filed complaints with six bodies — the Federal Prosecution Service, the Federal Police, the Central Bank, the securities regulator CVM, the B3 exchange and its self-regulator BSM. The central claim is that projects described in the management reports lack the permits the fund reports. For Reserva Guaiú, unitholders say they verified with the municipality of Santa Cruz Cabrália and Bahia's environmental agency that the project was never filed for approval, that the construction permit cited belongs to a different development and expired in April 2025, and that the environmental licence is only preliminary. Public analysis of the same loan also points to roughly R$ 100 million disbursed before collateral was fully perfected, waivers granted on contractual obligations, and the removal of a holding company originally set to act as guarantor.
The possible paths, and what each one requires
The outcome is not settled. What can be listed precisely is what each path requires:
| Path | What has to happen | Timeline indicated by the filings |
|---|---|---|
| The projects get built | Co-investors enter the developments (a measure cited by the manager), Reserva Guaiú and Itaparica launch commercially, sales resume | Itaparica construction starts Q1 2027; payment schedule puts 70% at handover |
| Collateral is enforced | Projects prove unviable and the fund forecloses on land, works and receivables. Depends on the collateral being perfected and enforceable | Foreclosing on a stalled development typically takes 12 to 36 months |
| The allegations are confirmed | Investigators conclude that permitting or collateral perfection on the Bahia assets does not hold up | No deadline — complaints filed May/2026, no public conclusion as of this writing |
| The fund is wound down | No institution agrees to take over fiduciary administration after BRL Trust's resignation | BRL Trust stays for up to 180 days from 7 July 2026, or until a successor is elected |
What unitholders should be watching
- The assembly electing the new fiduciary administrator. BRL Trust resigned on 7 July 2026 and stays for up to 180 days or until a successor is elected. It is the most consequential open decision, and unitholders vote on it.
- The mandatory distribution of roughly R$ 1.15 per unit. Unitholders rejected the retention of first-half results on 17 July. The fund held R$ 232,500 in cash on 30 June against an obligation of about R$ 5.6 million. As of this writing no payment date had been announced.
- Completion of the 2025 audit by RSM Brasil. On 14 July the manager said the process was still under way. That audit is what will — or will not — put an independent sign-off behind the R$ 98.87 book value.
The CACR11 page is updated with every new regulatory filing — portfolio, distributions, valuation and the full list of red flags.
