Should I sell it? Today's fall does not change the fundamentals of RZAG11 — changes the perception of risk around them. The fund negotiates the P/VP 0,82 (18% discount on a VP/unit in maximum historical), delivery 16,97% DY a.a. with DPS stable for 15 months and has 18 of the 19 CRAs protected by endorsement plus fiduciary disposal of land. The Uniggel risk (8% PL) is real, but guarantees are extra-concursal. The internal recommendation follows ACUMULAR for those who understand that they are buying discounted agro credit, not guaranteed income. Selling R$ 8,21 in panic is crystallizing a discount that the market itself may be exaggerating.
What happened today?
RZAG11 closed the posts of 10/06/2026 R$ 8,21, fall from -2,26% about the R$ 8,40 from the day before. There was no ex-dividend: the fall is entirely market. The volume was R$ 870 thousand, about 55% of the average of 20 days — that is, it was not a panic settlement, but a gradual exit of uncomfortable unit holders with recent events.
The question that circulates among the unit holders is direct. As you wrote Zigran at ClubFII on 06/06: "someone could tell me why the quotation is falling so much, it was 9:14 to 8:50, would it be just because of the vote you're having or something else?". . The answer has two layers: the June AGE and the Uniggel case.
THE AGE that changed everything
In the first week of June 2026, the unit holders approved in the Extraordinary General Assembly a profound change in investment policy. . The fund, which was focused on ARC of agribusiness, can invest in CRI, CPR-F, CDCA, FIAGRO, FII, FIDC, FIP and even rural properties. . In practice, this greatly broadens the discretion of Riza Asset — the fund ceases to be a portfolio of predictable agro CRAs and gains permission to become a multi-active vehicle.
The AGE's sensitive point. The central operation was a Private issue of approximately R$ 103,7 million for LSAG11, integrated by asset delivery and no right of preference for current unit holders. . The package has relevant concentration in CPR of Úbere Agropecuária (Ana Cláudia Borges), about R$ 40,9 million — approximately 39% of the package — a credit the quality of which has been severely questioned at ClubFII.
The unitholder LuizIbanez summarized the concern in 05/06: "Guys, I'm analyzing the AGE of the RZAG11 [...] change of investment policy seems quite relevant. The package has relevant concentration in CPR of Ana Cláudia Borges (Ubere Agropecuária) ~R$ 40,9 mi, ~39% of the package."
It's fair to consider: the LSAG11 asset package is not just a little known producer CPR. It also includes CRAs of BRF, Marfrig, Minerva, Raízen and San Martin — higher credit quality names. The issue is not the whole package, but the portion concentrated on a credit that the market has not yet been able to assess well, added to the lack of preference for those who already own the fund.
Uniggel: the risk that does not disappear
The second layer of the fall is older and heavier. RZAG11 loads about PL 8% in CRAs of Uniggel Group (Formoso Group), which has protocoled judicial recovery in December 2025 with total debt of R$ 1,3 billion:
- R$ 42,75 mi (PL 6,4%) in CRA long, CDI+4,15%, maturity out/2029 — already renegotiated.
- R$ 10,0 mi (PL 1,5%) in short CRA, with fiduciary assignment — also renegotiated.
What distinguishes the position of RZAG11 from a common creditor is the nature of the guarantees: they are extraconcursals — fiduciary disposal of rural real estate plus the endorsement of a physical person. That puts the bottom in a much better row than the chirophant creditor's inside RJ. Riza, conservatively, is not considering this revenue in the distribution until the process is granted. The judicial resolution is still uncertain, and the market warrants risk of partial loss — but partial loss on 8% of the PL, with real guarantee, is not the same as full cap.
What the unitholder is feeling
The feeling in ClubFII oscillates between doubt and apprehension. Guirado, on 03/06, went straight to the collective fear: "Strong fall. Was @TiagoPS right and things will get sour around here?". . It is the classic reaction of those who bought a Fiagro by the 17% dividend and discover, in practice, that it is exposed to the agro credit cycle — with everything that this implies in a year of compressed margin in soybean.
This discomfort is legitimate and helps explain the output volume. But it is important to separate what has actually changed: the investment policy has become broader (governance risk), there has been an emission without preference (dilution risk of discretion) and the Uniggel case continues without outcome (credit risk already known). None of these events changed the DPS, the VP/unit or the average quality of the guarantees of the current portfolio.
The Numbers That Matter
Behind the numbers, the background profile: R$ 678,9 mi PL, 19 CRAs, indexing 100% CDI+ with average CDI+4,79% spread, QQX3ZQX years duration and Yield loading 19,79%. Origination is 89,7% owner of Riza — direct relationship with producers, not buying paper on the secondary market.
Four honest points of attention. 1) Uniggel in RJ (7,9% PL). 2) Concentration of the three largest debtors in PL 43,9% (Atafone 18,1%, KPS 16,0%, Celini 9,7%). 3) Being 100% CDI, the background is sensitive to Selic’s fall — Focus projects Selic to 11% in 12 months, which would lead to the gross return of ~19,8% currently near 16,3%. 4) Pressured agro cycle, with margin compression in soybean.
Conclusion: real risk vs. market noise
O real risk it is on three fronts: the discretion expanded by the new policy, the concentrated CPR of Úbere in the package of the LSAG11 and the outcome of the RJ of Uniggel. These points deserve follow-up and justify requiring a higher discount to enter. O noise is the unit falling 2,26% in low volume, without the R$ 0,12 DPS (stable 15 months ago) or the VP/unit in maximum historical have moved.
The 0,82 P/VP creates real security margin for a new entrant: you buy R$ 1,00 of equity by R$ 0,82, in a fund where 18 of the 19 credits have more land as collateral. For the mid-profile unit holder who believes that Fiagro credit is a risk asset — not a fixed-income substitute — internal reading follows ACUMULAR (Note 7,0/10), with the exception of monitoring how Riza will use the new term of office.
Verdict: ACUMULATE with caution. The R$ 8,21 (P/VP 0,82, DY 16,97%), the RZAG11 offers 18% discount on the maximum historical VP, solid extra-concursal guarantees and stable DPS. The risks — Uniggel in RJ, CPR Úbere and extended mandate — are real and ask for follow-up, but do not constitute deterioration of foundation. Those who are already unitholder have no reason to sell in panic; those who evaluate enter find a point of risk/return favorable to graded positions.
Sources: investordefiis.com — "RZAG11 communicates exposure to group CRA in judicial recovery" (Dec/2025); The AgriBiz — "With billionaire debt, Uniggel asks for judicial recovery" (Dec/2025); The Magazine — "VGIA11 and RZAG11 expose the biggest error of the FIAGRO investor in 2026" (jun/2026); ClubFII — unit commentaries on the AGE of Jun/2026. See also the RZAG11 full page.
