Background: The Background That Came Back From the Dead
O ALMI11 owns 40% of the Almirante Tower Building, a corporate slab building with 34 floors of offices in downtown Rio de Janeiro. Between 2017 and 2024, the fund remained 7 consecutive years without distributing a penny — victims of the crisis in the Carioca offices, the rampant vacancy and expenditure exceeding revenue. In June 2024, dividends returned. Since then, it's been 18 uninterrupted months of payments. But the Quarterly Report of 4Q25, released by the CVM in February 2026, brought a number that changes the equation: default of 42,3% on rent due. . The question is straight: Is the fund that just resurrected sick again?
Current photo: December/2025
18 Months Paying Dividends — What Now?
After long fasting, the ALMI11 accumulates 18 consecutive months of distributions since July 2024. In the last 12 months (feb/25 to Jan/26), the average remained in R$ 3,83/unit/month, totaling R$ 45,90/unit/year — a yield dividend of 6,8% on the quotation of R$ 675. It's not a bad yield, but it's far from compensating for the level of risk involved.
The last confirmed payment was from R$ 4,53/unit for January 2026, paid in 06/02/2026. In December 2025, the income was around R$ 5,04/unit — one of the best months of the recent period, derived from the DY reported in the CVM Monthly Report.
But volatility is glaring. The track wobbled from R$ 1,99 (sea/25) to R$ 5,26 (jun/25) — a variation of 164% between floor and ceiling within a period of only 3 months. There's no predictability. The monthly result of the fund (DRE) shows property revenue jumping from R$ 387 one thousand (out/25) to R$ 579 one thousand (nov/25), a direct reflection of irregularity in rent receipts.
♪ The upside ♪
WeWork, which was a defaulter in early 2024, settled all delays in September/2024 and remains an active tenant. The dividends, although volatile, have already added 18 uninterrupted months — the largest sequence of distributions of the fund since 2016. The rate of administration is low (0,383% a.a.), well below the average of corporate slab FIIs as HGRE11 (1,00%) and BTLG11 (0,70%). At least in costs, the fund is efficient.
42% default: the fact that no one has seen in monthly reports
The 4Q25 Quarterly Report, based on 31/12/2025 and delivered to the CVM in 12/02/2026, brought a revelation that monthly management reports did not show: a default of the property reached 42,35%, considering delays of more than 90 days. This figure considers the revenue due for the area actually occupied — i.e. the 53% that are leased, almost half of which are not paid up to date.
To put in perspective: the fund closed December with R$ 3,53 million in rent receivable accounts — money that should have entered the cash register and not entered. That's almost equal to R$ 31,78/unit in outstanding revenue, more than 8 months of average dividends. It is a relevant volume for a fund with PL of R$ 229 million.
For an IFI that depends on a single property, which has just left 7 years without paying anything and whose vacancy already consumes 47% of the locable area, a default of 42% on what remains is a maximum alarm signal. If part of these default tenants decides to return the rooms, the vacancy can jump to levels that make any distribution impossible — repeating the 2017 scenario.
The non-closed account
With 46,8% of vacancy (almost half empty) and 42,3% default over the leased area (almost half of what you should pay unpaid), ALMI11 receives regular revenue from a very small fraction of its contracts. If defaults are not reversed in the coming quarters, the sustainability of dividends is directly compromised — and the ghost of the seven-year-olds without pay goes back around the fund.
Recent developments: numbers have worsened
| Metric | Oct/2025 | Dec/2025 | Trend |
|---|---|---|---|
| VP/Cota | R$ 2.103 | R$ 2.062 | ↓ −1,9% |
| Net Heritage | R$ 234 Mi | R$ 229 Mi | ↓ −ZQX0ZX Mi |
| Quotators | 1.910 | 1.886 | ↓ −24 |
| Vaccination | 46,34% | 46,80% | ↑ +0,46 p.p. |
| Non-compliance (90+ days) | — | 42,35% | New Data |
| Quotation | R$ 640 | R$ 675 | ↑ +5,5% |
| Monthly Liquidity | R$ 247 thousand | R$ 309 thousand | ↑ +25% |
The table reveals a dangerous divergence: while the quotation rose 5,5% and liquidity has improved marginally, the foundations have worsened in almost all dimensions — VP in fall, rising vacancy, melting heritage and explosive default. It is the type of scenario in which the market price may be temporarily detached from the underlying reality.
16 empty floors: the vacancy that hasn't moved in 2 years
The Almirante Tower occupation picture is perhaps the most revealing image of the challenge of this fund. The 3 to 18 floors are completely empty — there are 16 whole floors, from the third to the eighteenth floor, without a single tenant. The occupation is concentrated on the upper floors (19 to 36) and on the ground floor, where are the 13 active tenants: WeWork, Caixa Econômica Federal, Marsh Insurance Broker, DSV Air Sea, Kuehne+Nagel, Gaia Silva Gaede, MDS Broker, among others.
Vacance marginally rose from 46,34% (November) to 46,80% (December), confirming the stagnation trend. For more than two years the occupation has not progressed. The BTG Practical, as administrator, maintains the discourse that "continues to manage the property, in constant contact with brokers to work the vacancy", but the concrete results are zero — no new floor has been leased.
In 4Q25, the adjustment to the fair value of the property was negative in R$ 4,73 million, taking down the net worth of R$ 239 million to R$ 229 million. The accounting assessment of the property (fraction of 40%) fell to R$ 217 million. . The report is saying that the asset is worth less — and every quarter is worth a little less.
Contracts: who pays, for how long?
The leases are indexed half by half: 50% to IGPM and 50% to IPCA, which offers good protection against inflation — when the tenant actually pays. In terms of maturity, the Quarterly Report brings the following overview:
| Maturity Period | % of Revenue | Risk |
|---|---|---|
| Up to 3 months (wins 1Q26) | 18,2% | High |
| 6 to 15 months | 24,3% | Medium-High |
| 27 to 36 months | 9,5% | Moderate |
| Over 36 months | 48,0% | Protected |
The concentration of 48% of contracts over 3 years is positive for long-term predictability. However, 18,2% win in up to 3 months — these contracts need to be renewed now, in the first quarter of 2026, in a scenario of record default. If they're not renewed, the vacancy jumps. And 24,3% win between 6 and 15 months, maintaining pressure over 2026.
The background holds R$ 10,5 million in box and fixed income applications (4,6% of the PL), a reserve that may seem reasonable, but which runs out in a few months if the default of 42% turns into effective vacation. In the semester Jul-Dec/2025, the fund distributed 101,8% of the financial result — paid more than it generated, consuming reserves. That's unsustainable in the medium term.
P/VP of 0,33: the discount that seduces — and traps
Negotiating R$ 675 against a VP of R$ 2.062/unit, ALMI11 presents Discount 67% about the equity value. In theory, each R$ 1 invested buys R$ 3 equity. It's the kind of number that attracts bargain hunters and feeds round theses.
But this reading ignores what's behind the VP. The property is valued accountingly in R$ 217 million (the fraction of 40% of the building). With 46,8% of vacancy, 42% of default, location in the RJ Center in long-term structural crisis and passive management without active repositioning strategy, the real market value is almost certainly lower than the accounting value. The P/VP of 0,33 is not a discount — it is the market pricing risks that the assessment report may be underestimating.
The liquidity trap
In November/2025, they were negotiated only 510 units for the whole month, totaling R$ 309 thousand (~R$ 14 thousand/day). Who buys 10 units from R$ 675 (R$ 6.750) can take weeks to undo the position without impacting the price. For larger positions, the exit is virtually impossible without accepting severe disarray. It's the kind of investment you get into -- but you don't know when, or at what price, you're gonna get out.
? Verdict
The ALMI11 did something remarkable by resuming dividends after 7 years in the dark, and 18 consecutive months of payments is a real milestone. But the 4Q25 numbers reveal that recovery is much more fragile than it seemed. Failure of 42,3% Corrode the recipe, vacancy of stagnant 47% 2 years ago prevents growth, equity in fall of R$ 10 millions in 2 months and liquidity of ZQX1ZX thousand/day transform the fund into a speculative bet of very high risk. . 6,8%'s DY may look attractive, but it doesn't compensate for the real risk of the fund zeroing dividends — and of you being stuck without being able to sell.
For those who make sense: speculators with 5+ years horizon betting on the revitalization of the RJ Center, willing to accept extreme illiquidity and strong volatility in yields · Who should avoid: any investor seeking predictable income, minimum liquidity or asset diversification — i.e. the vast majority of FIIs unit holders
