President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva said on Sunday in Manila that Brazil wants to stop selling critical minerals and rare earths in raw form and begin exporting chips and batteries. For investors, the statement will not change any company’s cash flow tomorrow. The policy it highlights was already signed into law in September, and rare earth projects in the country are almost entirely held by companies listed outside the B3.
What Did Lula Say About Exporting Technology?
Lula stated that Brazil wants to export knowledge rather than raw materials. He made the remarks to the press in Manila, Philippines, on Sunday (15), arguing that Brazil should no longer be an "eternally developing" nation. Citing critical minerals and rare earths, Lula said he does not want to see Brazil sell only raw materials, but rather produce batteries and chips. His central message was that "Brazil no longer wants to be an exporter of raw materials, of commodities."
The remarks followed the opening of the 49th ASEAN Summit and included an invitation. According to the Planalto, the president called on "everyone, without distinction, all countries in the world that want to participate with us in the exploration, processing, and industrialization" of these minerals. In the same address, he again criticized U.S. tariffs. Before anything else, however, the primary question for investors is whether the government announced any new measures.
Is It a New Policy or Just Rhetoric?
It is rhetoric regarding an existing rule. Law 15,506/26, which establishes the National Policy for Critical and Strategic Minerals, was signed on September 16. The text provides up to R$ 7 billion in government incentives for projects that process and transform these minerals. Of that total, R$ 2 billion from the federal government will go to the Mineral Activity Guarantee Fund (FGAM), and another R$ 5 billion will go specifically toward beneficiation and transformation within Brazil.
In Manila, the target of the conversation shifted. Lula brought this policy to Asian buyers and, in practice, made it clear that Brazil will not negotiate rare earths exclusively with the United States. According to ICL Notícias, the Trump administration insisted during negotiations on securing near-exclusive access to Brazilian rare earths. The "without distinction" invitation serves as a response to that push. The real question is who is actually investing capital in the country right now, and the answer runs counter to the political rhetoric.
Who Already Invests in Rare Earths in Brazil, and Can You Access Them via the B3?
Through the B3, practically speaking, you cannot. The potential is substantial: when the law was signed, the minister noted that Brazil leads in niobium reserves and ranks second in rare earths and graphite. However, the capital exploring this potential has come from abroad. According to a study published by BPMoney, at least 18 foreign companies hold rare earth mining rights in Brazil, backed by more than $3.5 billion in investments. The three largest projects include:
| Project | Location | Owner and Exchange | Investment | Stage |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Serra Verde | Minaçu (GO) | USA Rare Earth, Nasdaq | More than $1 billion | Commercial production |
| Aclara | Nova Roma (GO) | Aclara, Toronto Stock Exchange | $781 million (projected) | Development |
| Meteoric | Southern Minas Gerais | Acquired by Lynas | R$ 3.5 billion (acquisition) | Exploration |
By our math, Serra Verde and Aclara alone account for about $1.78 billion, nearly half of the mapped total. Yet neither company performs the value-added stage that Lula described. USA Rare Earth completed the acquisition of 100% of Serra Verde on September 3, 2026, and the mine produces mixed rare earth carbonate, which is only an initial processing stage. Aclara plans to use facilities in the United States to process a portion of the minerals extracted in Brazil. In practice, magnets, chips, and batteries are still made abroad—precisely what the president says he wants to change.
For individual retail investors, direct access remains abroad. According to BTG Pactual, Serra Verde was the only major operational rare earth asset in Brazil and had no listed shares. Today, it is part of a company traded on the Nasdaq. Because the demand driving this sector is tied to artificial intelligence chips, it follows the tech cycle, which has also caused tech stocks to swing sharply. It remains to be seen whether the other half of the speech—commercial diversification—is backed by the numbers.
Is Trading the U.S. for Other Partners Working?
The data confirms this in part. Lula stated that instead of "complaining," Brazil sought out other partners, noting a drop in exports to the U.S. and rising sales to China, Vietnam, Indonesia, and Germany.
The decline in sales to the U.S. is visible in the figures. Brazilian exports to the country totaled $17.4 billion in the first half of 2026, down 13% from the same period in 2025. Tariff policy helps explain the shift: according to Icomex/FGV, the tariff rate reached 50% in August 2025, dropped to 15% in February 2026, and received an additional 25% hike in July 2026.
The other half of the story is less encouraging. According to Icomex/FGV, the U.S. market share fell in 25 of the 29 export categories analyzed, but China did not absorb all of that displaced volume: only 5 of the 29 sectors send 20% or more of their exports to China, and in agribusiness, the Chinese share slipped from 52.2% to 49.7%. Diversification is happening, but it does not yet offset the losses elsewhere. As we noted when analyzing the loss of U.S. leadership and its impact on Brazil, this rebalancing is slow. That leaves the question that matters for portfolios: what happens to mining stocks.
What Does This Mean for Mining Stocks and the Ibovespa?
Over the short term, almost nothing. The remarks were made on a Sunday when the market was closed, and they introduced no new measures, taxes, or deadlines. The Ibovespa enters the week coming off 172,457 points, up 0.66% at the site's last reading. The large mining companies on the exchange focus on iron ore, nickel, copper, and aluminum, not rare earths, and September's law provides incentives rather than mandates for current operators. The impact is a long-term question and depends on how the value-added agenda evolves:
The R$ 7 billion moves slowly, projects remain foreign-owned, and listed mining companies see no changes.
Invited partners build plants in the country. Energy, logistics, and basic industries benefit, but the effect on the stock exchange is diluted.
Requiring local processing or taxing raw exports would increase investment costs for pure extractors. None of this has been announced.
The third scenario warrants attention because the law does include control mechanisms. The text prioritizes domestic processing, traceability, and state oversight while limiting exploration authorizations in critical mineral areas to ten years without renewal. For now, however, what drives the Ibovespa is the fiscal outlook—as seen when Lula addressed the nation on fiscal adjustment—rather than industrial policy speeches.
Weighing the Pros and Cons
- There is a law in place, dedicated funding, and reserves among the largest in the world. The ambition rests on a concrete foundation rather than mere rhetoric.
- Buyer diversification reduces reliance on a single country at a time when U.S. tariffs have shifted three times in a single year.
- The rare earth projects that have advanced were acquired or financed by foreign entities, and part of the processing is already planned outside Brazil.
- B3 investors lack a pure-play option in the sector. Investors seeking exposure must look to U.S. or Canadian exchanges, taking on foreign exchange risk.
- If incentives turn into requirements, the cost will fall on mining companies that currently focus solely on extraction. This is the key risk to monitor in upcoming regulations.
