Context: The credit IFI that grew 4.5x in 4 years
O AFHI11 born in 2021 as a fund of CRIs managed by AF Invest Real Estate, subsidiary of the Araújo Fontes group (35 years of financial market). From an initial equity of ~R$ 100 million, the fund climbed to R$ 453 million through 7 emissions — all at zero cost to the unit holder. The wallet started from a few CRIs to ~80 transactions distributed in 13 segments, without ever registering an event of default. On the way, distributed R$ 58,28 per unit — total return of 85% on the price of IPO. But in the last 12 months, the yield equivalent to the CDI has dropped from 157% to 119%, and the 7th emission has brought only 27% from the target. Time to reevaluate?
Current photo: December/2025
80 CRIs in 13 segments — and none delayed. How?
The main flag of the AFHI11 is your credit history. In almost five years of operation, none of the ~80 CRIs of the portfolio registered default. . In a market where credit funds deal routinely with real renegotiations, shortages and losses, this data deserves attention.
The explanation is in the combination of three pillars: selective origination, granular diversification and active portfolio management.
A diversification by segment It's remarkable. The largest sector — Core Retail (21,1%) — brings together debtors such as Muffato, Mateus Group, Assai and OBA, with atypical lease contracts (BTS) and predominantly contractual risk. Incorporation (19,5%) includes Directional, Tent, Tiberius and MRV. Shopping Centers (12,4%) brings senior operations with VISC and Genius Malls. The other 10 segments — Corporate, Logistic, Retail, Allotment, Energy, Home Equity, Agribusiness, Transport, Oil & Gas and Hospital — complete a mosaic of rare diversification in credit FIIs.
O risk profile is balanced: 43,9% contract (predictable flow with ballast in rents), 30,1% corporate and 26% sprayed. In rating, 68,4% is High Grade and 31,6% High Yield — a calibrated mix that allows high average rates without concentrating risk on dubious operations.
♪ The difference that few people perceive ♪
AF Invest practice spread compression: acquires secondary market CRIs at high rates and, when the market reassesss the risk downwards, sells with profit. CRI FGR II, for example, has generated R$ 0,02/ Instant Gain Quota for that strategy. It’s not buying and holding — it’s real active management, with operations that add real return to the unit without increasing the risk of the portfolio.
The CDI dropped from 157% to 119%. Should I be worried?
When AFHI11 delivered 157% from the CDI, SELIC was considerably lower. With the basic rate rising to the range of 13,75%-14,25%, the stable dividend of R$ 1,01/unit came to represent a lower percentage of the CDI. It's an effect. arithmetic, non-operational — the fund has not worsened, the denominator of the division has become larger.
| Metric | Dec/2024 | Dec/2025 | Difference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Dividend/unit | R$ 1,01 | R$ 1,01 | Stable |
| %CDI (gross up) | 157% | 119% | - 24 p.p. |
| DY Annualized | ~13% | 12,67% | ~ Stable |
| Cumulative reserve | — | R$ 0,55/unit | Mattress |
| Failure to comply | 0% | 0% | Zero |
| Quotators | ~40.000 | 37.615 | -6% |
The key is in indexing: Wallet 68% is IPCA+ (average rate of 8,54% a.a.) and 28% is CDI+ (2,85% a.a.). When SELIC was low and IPCA ran high, the yield shone in terms of % CDI. Now, with SELIC high and IPCA more contained, the % CDI drops mechanically — but the absolute yield in real remains consistent.
For the investor assessing nominal return (R$ 1,01/month = R$ 12,04/year = DY 12,67%), the fund is still delivering. For those who compare daily with SELIC, frustration is legitimate. The right question isn't "did the bottom get worse?" but yes: "my goal is to overcome the CDI or to have steady income with inflation protection?"
The invisible risk: deflation
With 68% of the IPCA+ portfolio, deflation months impact revenue directly. In August/2025, the IPCA came from -0,11%, and the result of the fund receded. The accumulated reserve of R$ 0,55/unit absorbed the shock and kept the dividend in R$ 1,01. However, a prolonged scenario of negative IPCA — unlikely but not impossible — would be the largest stress test in this portfolio. And the reserve, today comfortable, is not infinite.
The 7th emission picked up 27% from the target. The market gave up on the fund?
The 7th issue searched for R$ 80 million (more additional batch of 25%) and brought only R$ 22 million — 27% target. . Fifty-three unit holders portrayed their orders, conditioned to total capture. The offer was restricted to existing unit holders via right of preference, leftovers and additional amount.
Two readings coexist:
The negative: with SELIC at a high level, the cost of opportunity has risen. The fall % CDI made the AFHI11 less attractive compared to CBDs and Direct Treasury. The unit base, which shrunk from 40.755 in May to 37.615 in December (-7,7%), reinforces gradual disinterest. The market voted with its feet.
The pragmatics: the fund manager kept the commitment not to issue below the VP (emission price to R$ 94,11/unit) and allocated the R$ 22 Mi captured in CRIs with fees above the existing portfolio — average IPCA+10,30% and CDI+2,68% against IPCA+8,54% and CDI+2,85% of the portfolio. Lower capture with more efficient allocation can generate more value per unit than full emission with median allocations.
The truth is probably in the middle: the appetite for paper FIIs decreased with SELIC high, but the fund manager used well what she captured. The fund does not need to grow to perform — but needs to retain unit holders to maintain the daily liquidity of R$ 660 thousand that still supports it.
The lowest cost between pairs
Few active management credit FIIs offer the cost structure of AFHI11. Total rate of 1,00% per year (administration 0,15%, management 0,80%, custody 0,05%) does not include performance rate — when the fund surpasses benchmarks, 100% of the surplus goes to the unit, without division.
| FII | Total fee | Performance | Cost Emission |
|---|---|---|---|
| AFHI11 | 1,00% | No | Zero (fund manager paid) |
| KNSC11 | 1,05% | 20% s/ CDI+1% | Cotista |
| MCCI11 | 0,80% | 20% s/ IPCA+3% | Cotista |
| RBRR11 | 1,00% | 20% s/ CDI+2% | Cotista |
The MCCI11 has a lower administration rate (0,80%), but it charges performance of 20% over what exceeds IPCA+3%. In practice, in good years, the effective cost of MCCI11 can surpass that of AFHI11. And there's an additional differential: in all 7 emissions, the fund manager fully absorbed the distribution costs. . The unit has never been diluted by capture costs — a rare alignment of interests in the FIIs market.
Price range and time of decision
Rational price range
The AFHI11 negotiates the R$ 95,05, practically pasted on the R$ 94,56 VP (only 1%). For a fund with that background — zero default, competitive rate, emissions payer — the price is fair, not cheap. . Those seeking significant discount will need to wait for moments of market stress, which are usually rare and brief for credit funds with this portfolio quality.
The December/2025 Quarterly Report, delivered to the CVM in February/2026, confirms that the fund distributed 100% of the net financial result of the semester (R$ 24,6 million), without withholding profit beyond the already accumulated reserve. The net worth was in R$ 452,87 million, and the equity share in R$ 94,56 — with no relevant variation compared to the previous semester.
? Verdict
The AFHI11 is one of the most consistent credit FIIs in the Brazilian market: zero default in ~80 CRIs of 13 segments, 1% rate without performance fee, fund manager who pays emissions and commits not to issue below the VP. The 12,67% DY is sustainable by the accumulated reserve of R$ 0,55/unit and by the high average portfolio rates (IPCA+8,54%). The fall in % CDI — from 157% to 119% — is a mechanical effect of SELIC high on a fund mostly indexed to IPCA, not operational deterioration. But it's real, and it reduces relative competitiveness against post-fixed fixed income.
For those who make sense: Moderate investors who prioritize stable monthly income with inflation protection and value low costs without performance fee. · Who should avoid: who seeks % high CDI (prefers post-fixed 100% funds), ultra-conservative profile focused exclusively on Direct Treasury, or anyone who wants exposure to physical properties with rents.
