Yeah, the dividend's been dropping for six consecutive months. — from R$ 0,92 in October to R$ 0,70 in April. But the engine of the fall is the IGP-M locked in +0,61% in 12 months, not portfolio deterioration. The cashier was recomposed for R$ 36,99 millions (~8 months of distribution) and the 0,74 P/VP already priced 26% off balance. The critical point is tomorrow: May 29 wins the 4th and final extension of CRI PESA.
What has changed in the reanalysis
The re-analysis was triggered by two points of attention that entered the radar: the 4th extension of the deadline of sale of the CRI PESA shed with maturity on May 29, 2026, and the fall of the April dividend to R$ 0,70 — the sixth consecutive month of retreat since the peak of R$ 0,92 in October 2025. The general note retreated half a point, from 6,5 to 6,0.
| Reviewed axis | Previous Note | Current Note | What's changed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Quality of portfolio | 6,5 | 6,0 | WAM returned to inaddimplr in Jan/26, post office pending since Jan/26, judicialization of Skanix/Kroton/Casa & Video |
| Distribution | 7,0 | 6,0 | DPS series retreated 24% in 6 months (R$ 0,92 → R$ 0,70), IGP-M locked in +0,61% (12m) against IGP-M+6% benchmark |
| Event risk | 6,5 | 5,5 | CRI PESA has reached the 4th term of non-sale extension completed — 20-30% haircut risk if it is the forced auction |
| Capital solidity | 7,0 | 7,0 | Recomposed box of R$ 22,37 Mi for R$ 36,99 Mi in 1 month (+R$ 14,6 Mi) — ~8 months of distribution |
| Price | 7,5 | 7,5 | P/VP 0,74 continues pricing 26% off balance sheet — security margin intact |
CRI PESA: the shed that needs to be sold tomorrow
CRI PESA represents 3,74% of net worth — R$ 17,5 million — and is the largest default position in the portfolio. The asset given as collateral is a logistical warehouse. For 12 months the management has extended the deadline for the sale of the property to take place without having to trigger judicial auction. This is the fourth extension, due on 29 May 2026.
In parallel, two measures have been adopted that alleviate the short term of the debtor but push the recognition of the problem forward: a 12-month shortfall in interest payments and a 24-month shortfall in amortisation payments. In practice, the unitholder receives nothing of this CRI during the period, but the title remains marked in equity by the original value.
| 29/05/2026 Scenario | Impact on unit | Impact on PSD |
|---|---|---|
| Sales completed by valuation value | Neutral to positive — recomposing box | Without immediate effect (interest already lacking) |
| 5th extension (extraordinary) | Short-term neutral | Without immediate effect, but postpones recognition |
| Judicial auction with 20% haircut | VP backs up ~R$ 0,55 per unit | No direct effect, already recognised loss |
| Judicial auction with 30% haircut | VP backs up ~R$ 0,85 per unit | No direct effect, already recognised loss |
The base scenario worked by management is extrajudicial sale still in 2026, even with new additive. The forced auction scenario withdraws up to R$ 5,25 million from the equity (30% over R$ 17,5 million), the equivalent of approximately 1% of the current PL.
DPS falling: the series in context
The trajectory of the last 12 months shows the direct impact of the stagnation of the IGP-M on the monetary correction of the IRCs:
| Month | DPS | Month | DPS |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mai/25 | R$ 0,88 | Nov/25 | R$ 0,85 |
| Jun/25 | R$ 0,85 | Ten/25 | R$ 0,91 |
| Jul/25 | R$ 0,91 | Jan/26 | R$ 0,75 |
| Aug/25 | R$ 0,83 | Feb/26 | R$ 0,66 |
| Sep/25 | R$ 0,88 | Mar/26 | R$ 0,74 |
| Oct/25 | R$ 0,92 | Apr/26 | R$ 0,70 |
Only 15% of the portfolio is linked to IGP-M, but it is precisely this piece that is catching: the index accumulates +0,61% in 12 months against an IGP-M+6% benchmark, generating negative differential of approximately 5,4 percentage points on this portion. The 85% linked to IPCA continue to correct: consumer inflation has accelerated to +4,14% in 12 months, which tends to recompose the result in the coming quarters.
The IGP-M already presented technical turn in March 2026 (+0,52% in the month), but the accumulated 12 months takes time to adjust. The high-yield paper FIIs market is experiencing the same phenomenon — the recovery of the IGP-M is not specific to the BCRI11.
What holds the verdict of KEEP
Four elements support the recommendation not to undo position, even with the note retreating to 6,0:
1. Recomposing box. In just one month the cash position jumped from R$ 22,37 million to R$ 36,99 million (+R$ 14,6 million), now representing PL 6,96% or about 8 months of guaranteed distribution. The composition is conservative: Sovereign RF Itaú more committed supported in CRI BV.
2. 0,74 P/VP. The equity value per unit is in R$ 85,05 against R$ 63,00. quote The 26% discount already pricing not only the PESA (3,74%) but the entire Distressed block of 14,21%. In other words, the market is already marking these CRIs at zero implicitly — any partial recovery is upside.
3. Selic in fall. With the basic rate in 15% and the Focus projecting 12% by December 2026, discounted paper FIIs tend to re-create upwards as the CDI yields. The unit holder who holds a position captures both the current dividend and the potential appreciation of the unit.
4. Banestes Management DTVM. The state fund manager capixaba accumulates 11 years of track record, delivered 137,41% from the net CDI in 2025, operates without performance fee — something rare in the high-yield segment — and maintains practice of monthly lives with unit holders and detailed management reports on each default CRI.
Full risk map: the 14,21% in waiver or default
In addition to PESA, seven more CRIs are in some degree of stress. Distribution avoids critical concentration in any individual debtor:
| Debtor | % PL | Situation | Status of the unfold |
|---|---|---|---|
| PESA | 3,74% | Inadditional, warranty on sale | 4th deadline expires 29/05/2026 |
| WAM | 2,49% | It's back to default. | Reactivated default in Jan/2026 |
| GVI | 1,92% | Only interest payment | No amortisation since Jul/2025 |
| Post | 1,42% | Pending Installments | 2 open plots since Jan/2026 |
| Skanix | 1,17% | Judicialization | R$ 704 thousand recovered at sea/2026 |
| Kroton | 1,12% | Arbitration | Procedure under way |
| Home & Video | 0,84% | Injunctional guardianship | Probable Judicial Recovery |
| Artenge | 0,79% | Implementation of the guarantee | 55 pawned units |
| BR Distributor | 0,72% | Arbitral decision suspended | Awaiting procedural reopening |
The positive point of this map is that no isolated position — except PESA — goes from 2,5% of the PL. Even an extreme scenario where Home & Video, Skanix and WAM see simultaneous total loss takes about 4,5% from the equity, a value already widely covered by the 26% market discount.
Where BCRI11 is inside the peer group
In the high-yield paper FIIs buffer with the highest risk profile, the BCRI11 occupies the 6th position among 11 comparable funds. Closer pairs:
BCRI11 is not the best segment name, but it's also far from the worst. The vis-à-vis pair differential is in the discipline of Banestes management — lack of performance fee and operational transparency — and in the relatively robust 7% box of the PL.
Verdict: MAINTER · Note 6,0
For whom it is: units that already have a position with an average price close to or above the current one, have a horizon of 24 months or more and manage to live with volatility of DPS between R$ 0,65 and R$ 0,90 per unit while the IGP-M normalizes and the CRI PESA resolves.
For those who are not: investor who depends on the stable monthly dividend for cost of living, or who now enters seeking predictability. The window for the next 6 months has three open triggers — PESA outcome, IGP-M rhythm and WAM/Home & Video evolution — that keep the DPS oscillating.
Next event to monitor: notified by the fund manager after 29 May 2026 confirming sale of the shed, further extension or initiation of judicial execution. The May management report (published in mid-June) should detail the outcome.
