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HOFC11 — Programa de Recompra de 10% das cotas anunciado pela Hedge Investments
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HOFC11: Quotas 10% Repurchase Program — good news or exit play?

The first good news in 23 months has little lyrics: the cashier that supports the buyback is the same as the fund.

Do I buy more using the discount + buyback?

Direct response: no. . The Repo Program is the best news of the HOFC11 In 23 months, but he... do not reverse the thesis — just optimizes the output. Math is favorable (rebuy the R$ 33 unit that is worth R$ 57,42 adds value to the remaining pros), but the program lives on the same portions of sales that already sustain the operation. With free box of R$ 596 thousand and zero dividend since July/2024, buying more is double the bet in an orderly settlement that still depends on a MOU in due diligence. For those who are already inside, the buyback marginally improves the position. For those who are looking from the outside, the P/VP discount of 0,57 is not "bargain" — it is the price of a binary exhibition to the event. Verdict: SALE · note 2,5/10, rising only 0,2 point on the scale as a function of the ad.

The numbers that matter now

377.900
Quotas in the programme — Total 10% (3.779.001)
12 months
Deadline for programme (start 11/jun/2026)
R$ 33
Market share against ZQX0ZX VP
P/VP 0,57
43% discount on equity
R$ 24,41
Discount captured by recompensed unit
R$ 9,22 Mi
Potential value created if program is 100% executed
+ R$ 2,71
Potential increase in VP of each remaining unit
R$ 596 thousand
Free box in Apr/2026 (fall of 46% in month)
23 months
No distribution — last DPS R$ 0,21 in Jun/2024

What Hedge has approved — the programme mechanism

In 27 May 2026, Hedge Investments approved the first HOFC11 Quota Repurchase Program in the last three exercises. . The design is conventional to the CVM standard, but there is one condition that changes everything: B3 purchases can only be executed provided that the price is lower than the balance sheet value of the previous day. . It is not a trigger for variation, neither mobile average nor committee — it is explicit anchoring to the PV.

Parameter Programme definition
Maximum quantity Until 377.900 units (10% of 3.779.001 in circulation)
Start 11 June 2026
Time limit 12 months running
Execution condition Market price lower to the VP of the unit of the previous day
For the purposes of units Cancellation — reduces capital and base
Authorised brokers Active Investments and XP Investments

Three points of the drawing deserve to be highlighted. First: the units are cancelled, not kept in cash — means real reduction of capital, with direct effect on VP by unit and future DPS (when DPS exists again). Second: the anchor to the VP prevents the program from being used to defend price when the market is already above the VP — it only shoots at discount, which is technically correct. Third: 12 months is long enough to coincide with the schedule of entry of the sales plots, signaling that the program has been calibrated to run with the flow that is already mapped, not with new cash.

Math that matters — discount captured by unit

Every buyback analysis in discounted FII is reduced to an account of three variables: repo price, asset value and cancelled amount. In HOFC11 today, these three translate as follows:

The linear account of the program

For recompensed unit: the fund manager pays ? R$ 33,01 (current price), cancels a unit that was worth R$ 57,42 in books. Catched discount: R$ 24,41 per unit.

Program 100% executed: 377.900 units × R$ 24,41 = R$ 9,22 million of value added to the remaining.

Increase by remaining unit: R$ 9,22 Mi ? 3.401.101 remaining units = + R$ 2,71/unit of potential VP.

In relative terms: up the current VP from R$ 57,42 to R$ 60,13 — potential gain of 4,7% in the net worth by unit, before any operational change.

That's the ceiling case. The actual case depends on how effectively it is executed within 12 months. Repurchase programs in Brazilian FII usually run between 30% and 70% of the authorized, rarely 100% — because (i) price can go up and pull trigger, (ii) unit liquidity limits daily volume without distorting price, and (iii) the cash available for repurchase imposes practical limit. In a realistic execution of 50%, the gain drops to ~R$ 1,35/unit; in 30%, to ~R$ 0,81/unit. It is not a number that changes the lives of those who bought the R$ 50, but it is different from zero — and, above all, it is the first concrete action of value creation since the sale of Saliba in July/2025.

The bottleneck is the same as always — the cashier

Here the program finds the structural limit of the fund. To execute 100% of the authorized current price, the fund manager needs to disburse 377.900 × R$ 33 R$ 12,5 million. . The free cash available in April/2026 was from R$ 596 thousand — does not cover the programme's 5%. That means the buyback only runs to the extent that the portions of sales enter the flow:

R$ 25,6 Mi
Total receivable from Saliba — 36 instalments up to Jun/2028
R$ 7,2 Mi
In view of MOU Birmann 20 — if the coach closes
42 × R$ 1,54 Mi
Birmann 20 monthly fractions corrected by IPCA
R$ 711 thousand/month
Average monthly share Saliba (part of the flow already underway)
R$ 1 Mi/month
Estimated real monthly repo capacity post-Birmann
~378 units/day
Average volume required to complete 100% in 12 months

The critical point: the current box is already insufficient for current operation. . The portions of the Saliba that are entering are being consumed by administration fee (?ZQX0ZX thousand/month), CRI Series 288 ( The buyback program only takes off if you see Birmann 20 coming in. If the MOU's diligence does not close — and the sale has been priced 25% below the report, which indicates that the buyer has already left pressing — the buyback stays on paper.

Buyback depends on the same money that supports the fund

The free box of R$ 596 thousand covers less than 2 months of operational burn. Without the view of the Birmann 20's R$ 7,2 Mi, the fund manager has no way of buying either the historic execution floor (30% of the authorized). Each unit recompensed directly disputes with administration fee, CRI and property maintenance expense — the program is in practice, a third mouth consuming the same output flow from the portfolio. . The good news: Hedge flagged prioritizing value creation by discount. The bad news: the signage is worth as much as the sales calendar is worth.

What the program does not correct

For the full context of the unit holder who is weighing on another quarter versus leaving now, it's worth listing what the buyback does not change:

  1. 23 months without distribution. The last DPS was R$ 0,21/unit in June/2024. Repo program does not unlock DPS — unlock future VP. Those who need monthly income have no return here.
  2. Structurally negative monthly result. Cumulative of 12 months per unit: - R$ 12,53. . The operation does not cover its own expenses — the support of the fund already depends on the portions of the properties sold, and the program adds a new demand on the same flow.
  3. Birmann 20 with ZQX0ZX occupancy. Weak demand in Santo Amaro, MOU already closed 25% below report, ongoing diligence. Buyback cannot speed up leases or ensure that the MOU closes under signed conditions.
  4. CRI Series 288 by 2032. Balance from R$ 23,06 Mi to IPCA+7,70% per year. Debt cost that continues to charge regardless of buyback, dividend or new communiqué. It wins after the plots of the Birmann 20 (2030), creating duration of marriage in the liability.
  5. Exodus from the unit base. 355 since February 2026, 82 only in April. Program does not reverse output — it may even speed it up if the unitholder interprets the ad as "fund manager confessing that he will not pay again so soon".
  6. Free box R$ 596 thousand. It's not the program that solves it. It's the one in sight of Birmann 20 or nothing.

The article of analysis of May 19 on the cashier detailed this same picture with a difference: on that date, there was still no announcement of the program. Now there is — and the announcement is consistent with the ordered settlement thesis that Hedge has been running: sold Saliba with loss, sold Birmann 20 25% below the report, and now uses the discount of the unit itself to create marginal value in the remaining ones. It is not a change of course — it is the continuation of the plan in another step.

For Those In — Weighing the Balance

Cotista who already carries HOFC11 Today there are two arguments on each side:

Argument to hold Argument to sell
Buyback adds R$ 2,71/unit to VP in ceiling case (4,7% of equity gain) Buyback is theoretical ceiling — real execution is between 30% and 70%, and unit does not respond to VP until DPS returns
Announcement signals that the fund manager is prioritizing value creation (instead of liquidating only) Announcement signals that the fund manager accepted that the market will not again price P/VP near 1,0
Discount of 43% on VP is large mattress for settlement trajectory until 2032 Without DPS for another 12-24 months, the opportunity cost against a good IPCA+ or CRI is high
12-month programme coincides with Saliba + Birmann plot window — predictable calendar If MOU Birmann 20 doesn't close on the stage, the program won't fire and the unit will be held hostage only from the cashier.

The practical balance: who bought above R$ 50 — the case of most of the historical base — goes on with great damage and now with the first concrete action of value creation since the sale of Saliba. It makes sense to hold out another 60–120 days to see if Birmann's MOU closes — if it closes, the program takes off and the thesis of the orderly liquidation stands. If it doesn't close, it's time to leave, and the program becomes a footnote. Who bought below R$ 35 is in speculative trade: Buyback announcement is positive short-term trigger, but structurally nothing has changed.

What to watch for the next 60 days

  1. Conclusion of MOU Birmann 20's diligence. Typical deadline of 60–120 days after signature (16/04/2026) — i.e. window between mid-June and mid-August. It is the event that decides whether the repo program becomes real execution or accounting fiction.
  2. Next Structured Monthly Report (May/2026). He leaves in mid-June. The key number is Item 9 (liquid box): if you fall below R$ 400 thousand, repo program is academically valid and operationally unviable.
  3. First 30 days of the program (11/jun to 11/jul). Daily volume of repo reported monthly. Low execution in the first few weeks means the cashier is not banking — that is, MOU has not yet entered. Steady execution means that the one in sight of Birmann 20 fell into account.
  4. Monthly Outcome of the Fund. Today on -0,12% over PL. If it comes more negative, the program needs to absorb more expense before buying unit — direct pressure on the execution of buyback.
  5. Peer-a-peer comparison. Follow the relative note in relation to XPCM11, PATC11 and FAMB11. . The marginal rise of the HOFC11 from 10th to 9th in the bucket reflects the ad, but the relative position only consolidates if the program actually executes.

Analytical Verdict

The 10% buyback program for units is the first good news of HOFC11 in 23 months. . Technically well designed: explicit anchor to the VP, time frame consistent with the sales schedule, cancellation (not treasury), professional brokers. Creates potential value of up to R$ 2,71/unit the remaining ones, or 4,7% of asset gain in the ceiling case. But is not operational reversal — is output optimization. The free cashier of R$ 596 thousand makes the program conditional on the same flow as the Saliba plots and the MOU Birmann 20 which already supports the current operation. Without Birmann getting in, the buyback is on paper. Note up from 2,3 to 2,5/10 — verdict follows SALE. . Do not turn the key: the ad marginally improves the position of those who are already inside, but does not change the central problem — brick bottom in structurally compressed segment, in orderly settlement process with 6 years of schedule and three large uncertainties (MOU close, Morumbi 8200 hold tenant, IPCA do not inflate the CRI debt). Repurchase program is Hedge signaling discipline and alignment — it is worth recognizing. But the unitholder who needs income remains without income, and the unitholder who needs symmetry remains exposed to the binary event.