What changed: the document that zeroed the rate
The trigger of this reanalysis is the Monthly Information of May/2026 Do not SPXS11. . He brought the information that was missing to close a story that had been bothering the unit officer since the beginning of the year: the performance fee to pay is R$ 0,00. . The collection cycle that ran in January, February and (residually) April 2026 ended after April. In May, no penny of the proceeds was diverted to the fund manager as a performance.
Before moving on, it is worth explaining the concept to those who do not follow paper funds closely.
To understand why it matters, it is necessary to look at the damage that this rate has done in the previous months. The DPS did not fall for one reason only — it fell by an overlap of two factors worth separating.
| Competence | DPS (R$) | What did you weigh? |
|---|---|---|
| set–nov/2025 | 0,109 | peak — CRIs yielding at the peak of Selic, with no rate |
| Dec/2025 | 0,104 | start of accommodation |
| Jan/2026 | 0,092 | ← performance fee charged |
| Feb/2026 | 0,092 | ← performance fee charged |
| Mar/2026 | 0,095 | no rate, mild recovery |
| Apr/2026 | 0,097 | ← last charge (residual, smaller than expected) |
| May/2026 | 0,097 | rate = confirmed R$ 0 · stabilized |
Reading this table is the heart of the article. Note: DPS has quit R$ 0,109 (peak) and is today on R$ 0,097. The difference is about 11%. How much of this was a fee and how much was a real fall in revenue? The fact that the proceeds have stabilised R$ 0,097 even later of the zero rate is proof: if it was just the fee, April and May (without full charge) would have jumped back to near R$ 0,109. They didn't. Locked in R$ 0,097. This indicates that much of the drop of the peak It wasn't fee. — was the profitability of the backing portfolio.
The cashier's dilemma: why did you go up to R$ 23,7 Mi?
The second new data from the report is the cashier. The position in fixed income funds jumped from R$ 18,7 Mi at Mar/26 for R$ 23,7 Mi at May/26 — now 12,5% of equity. At the same time, the CRI portfolio shrunk from R$ 142,6 Mi (mar/26) to R$ 138,1 Mi (may/26). The money came out of the credit book and went to the cashier.
The explanation lies in the Exceptional depreciation of CRIs: some debtors anticipated payment of principal. When a developer sells faster or refinances, she dumps the CRI before the deadline. The fund gets the money back — and until it reinvests, it stays in the cashier. There are two ways to read this, and they have opposite signs.
- Positive reading (credit quality): Debtor who amortizes in advance is a healthy debtor. The depreciations came from incorporation CRIs that are performing — sales of the ventures walking, box entering. This reduces the risk of the wallet and shows that the ballast is alive, not default.
- Negative reading (reinvestment in worse environment): the problem is the timing. . The fund received the main one back just when it needs to be put back on the market. And today's CRI market, with Selic already starting to crack, offers less generous spreads than old contracts. Each CRI that amortizes the CDI+5,5% and is replaced by a new CDI+4,0% is a down swap in future revenue.
R$ 0,097 DPS: stable or flattened?
Two consecutive months in the same number (apr and mai = R$ 0,097) is the type of stability that looks good at first sight. But stability can be of two types: the healthy one (the bottom found a sustainable level of cash generation) or the flattened one (the yield stopped falling just because the rate came out of the picture, masking a recipe that is still in slow fall). What's the case with SPXS11?
The evidence points to a hybrid with ceiling bias. . The current R$ 0,097 is real, supported by the cash generation of the CDI+ CRIs while Selic is high — there is no artificial "market marking" inflating that number. But the way back to R$ 0,100+ depends on the fund reinvesting the cash in spreads as good as the old ones, and this gets harder with each interest cut. In other words: R$ 0,097 is probably the realistic roof of the second half of 2026, not the floor of a climb.
Why doesn't the R$ 0,109 peak come back so soon? Because it was built on a combination that is not repeated: Selic at peak (CDI yielding maximum), portfolio still filled from old CRIs to fat spreads and absence of performance rate. Today we have no return rate, but the other two ingredients are deteriorating at the same time.
CDI+ math with Selic falling
Here's the number one risk of the thesis, and it deserves a specific number. First, the concept.
The Focus bulletin projects Selic retreating from 14,5% today for ~11% in 12 months. . Let's scale the impact on a medium portfolio CRI (say CDI+5,0%):
| Scene | CDI (?Selic) | Spread | Gross income from the CRI |
|---|---|---|---|
| Today | 14,5% | +5,0% | 19,5% a.a. |
| Focus 12m | 11,0% | +5,0% | 16,0% a.a. |
| Difference | −3,5 p.p. | — | ? −18% in paper recipe |
At the tip of the CRIs gross revenue, the projected Selic drop compresses the yield around 18% to 24% over the cycle. As CRI revenue dominates the distributable result, it is reasonable to expect that, after the effective start of the cuts, DPS migrates from the current range of R$ 0,097 to something between R$ 0,085 and R$ 0,095. . It's not a collapse -- it's a gradual compression, aligned with what happens to every bottom of post-fixed paper in a monetary slackening cycle. But that's why counting on DPS returning to R$ 0,109 would be a read error.
The portfolio inside: 28 CRIs and the incorporation ballast
The portfolio of May/26 is distributed as follows:
- 72,7% — CDI+ incorporation CRIs (R$ 138,1 Mi): the core of the bottom. 28 operations, with names like Zarin (CDI+5,5%), Triple (CDI+ZX1ZQX), Caprem (CDI+5,0%), Blend (CDI+5,0%) and BLVD. Alti (CDI+4,0%). Debtors include Helbor, MRV, You Inc, CashMe, Convisa and Franco Ribeiro.
- 13,3% — Quotas of other FIIs (R$ 25,3 Mi): a pocket of "Tactical FoF", to capture opportunities in discounted units from other funds.
- 12,5% — RF fund box (R$ 23,7 Mi): the position that rose, discussed above.
- 1,7% — Real estate shares (R$ 3,3 Mi): residual position (MRV), which fell ~22% at mar/26 — too small to move the thesis, but is the most volatile source of the result.
There's a useful irony here: the fall of Selic that It hurts. the CDI+ recipe of the background is the same as help the ballast — lower interest heats the sales of the developers and reduces the risk of default of CRIs. That is, the cutting cycle tightens nominal revenue, but improves credit quality. It's a trade-off, not a one-sided disaster.
Who should come in now — and who should wait
With the unit R$ 8,21 and R$ 9,42, VPA the SPXS11 negotiates the P/VP 0,87 — 13% discount on equity.
Who can come in now: the income investor who understands that he is buying a payer of ~14% a.a. with 13% off balance sheet and accepts that this DPS will compress gradually for the range of R$ 0,085–0,095 as Selic falls. For those who want to stop a high yield in the next 6–9 months (before the bulk of the cuts) and have horizons for the convergence of P/VP to VP, the current price offers margin.
Who should have waited: who seeks growing or predictable DPS to the penny. The SPXS11 will not deliver this in the current cycle — the direction of the proceeds is of slight fall, not of ascent. You should also expect those who do not tolerate the two structural risks: 100% of CID+ exposure (without the IPCA+ mattress) and 70% of concentration in residential incorporation. And it's worth the heads-up: performance fee You can come back.. . If the portfolio again surpasses the IPCA + IMA-B benchmark in some positive quarter, the rate reappears and bites the DPS again. Zero today is not zero forever.
Verdict
Comparative note: 5,4/10 → NEUTRO WITH HIGH RISK / KEEP (10th of 12th in the paper bucket · multicategory · medium risk)
Absolute note: 6,4/10
Bucket Peers: JSAF11 (5,6), ARXD11 (4,9), EIRA11 (4,7).
Estimated fair price: R$ 8,70 (upside ~4,6% over R$ 8,21), track R$ 8,00–9,40. Confirmation of zero fee performance is news Good. — removes the factor that most bothered the unit holder in the first quarter. But it comes along with the beginning of Selic's fall cycle, which tightens the CDI+ recipe of the wallet. The liquid is a cheap background (P/VP 0,87), robust payer (14,2% a.a.), but with the output closer to the ceiling than to the floor of your track. Maintaining makes sense for those who already have; new entry only with the correct expectation of stable-to-decreasing, non-growing PSD.
Conclusion — What to Monitor
The SPXS11 closed the performance fee chapter at the exact moment when it opens the Selic chapter in fall. One relief partially cancels the other. The R$ 0,097 DPS is real and sustainable in the short term, but the two-month stability is not the prelude to a spin to R$ 0,109 — it is most likely the ceiling before a gradual compression towards R$ 0,085–0,095 as interest cuts materialize.
What to follow in the following reports:
- Is the cashier falling again? If R$ 23,7 Mi are reinvested in CRIs with decent spread in the coming months, the revenue generation thesis remains. If the cashier stands above 12% of the PL, it is a sign that the fund manager does not find spread good — idle capital yielding only the CDI.
- The performance fee reappears? In wallet quarters hitting the IPCA + IMA-B benchmark, the rate of 20% returns and bites the DPS. The "zero" of May is no future guarantee.
- The rhythm of Selic's cuts: every 1 p.p. of drop in Selic compresses ~5% of the CDI+ CRIs gross revenue. Follow the Focus — if the cut comes faster than the designed one, the DPS goes down early.
- Incorporation ballast quality: early depreciation is a good sign of health of debtors. But be aware of any CRI of the portfolio (Helbor, MRV, You Inc, etc.) entering renegotiation — 70% in residential incorporation does not forgive a relevant cap.
In short: good news (zero rate), in context asking for prudence (Selic turning). The 13% discount on VP is what pays for entry for that risk — and that is why the verdict is to keep your eyes open, not buy with euphoria.
