The unit of the TVRI11 received, in the same month, two news that seem disconnected but tell the same story: Tivio management sold his 9th agency (Florianópolis, R$ 37,8 million) and re-located the CACEX — a property that Banco do Brasil had returned in January — in just 5 months. The two things together answer the question that haunts this fund since it became active management: will Tivio be able to recycle the portfolio before November 2027, when does 90% of the BB contracts win at once?
Direct response, before analysis: the two news are genuinely good and show a competent fund manager operating fast — but recycling mathematics still does not close in time. The recommendation follows Maintain, note 6,2, and the P/VP of 0,85 is what makes the story interesting for those who understand the risk. The rest of the text explains each number.
What has changed in this review
Before you dive into the numbers, it's worth setting the bottom. The TVRI11 — Tivio Income Real Estate — is the old BBPO11, BB Progressive II, created in 2012 with 64 Banco do Brasil agencies under an atypical 10-year contract. In August 2023, the unit holders approved the transition to active management and Tivio Capital assumed, with a clear mandate: sell expensive agencies, buy better assets and reduce dependence on a single tenant before the contracts with BB win. Today there are 58 real estate, 290 thousand square meters of ABL and 59,000 unit holders.
Two recent events move the pointer of this reanalysis:
- 9th sale (17/jun): Ag. Florianópolis (Praça XV de Novembro, 5.722 m2) was sold by R$ 37.822.220, with R$ 7,2 million already received in the subscription and four half-yearly plots of R$ 7,65 million until Jun/2028.
- CACEX re-located (May/2026): the property of Rua São Bento, in São Paulo (7.106 m2), which the BB returned in January making the physical vacancy jump from 3,6% to 5,7%, was re-located in just 5 months — overthrowing the vacancy back to 3,2%.
They are two parts of the same gear: one is disinvestment (sell well), the other is vacance management (relocate fast). Together, they test Tivio's operational competence. Let's dissect each one.
Section 1 — Dissecting the 9th sale: Ag. Was Florianópolis a good deal?
The cover number is showy: R$ 37,8 million by an agency of 5.722 m2. But the nominal price doesn't say anything by itself. To see if the sale was good, we need the cap-rate — the capitalisation rate, which is the annual rent divided by the price of the property. It is the "yield" of the brick: the bigger, the cheaper the asset is being sold; the smaller, the more expensive (and the better for those who sell).
The relevant fact informs that Ag. Florianopolis represented Revenue 1,57% from the bottom. With the total revenue running close to R$ 16,7 million per month — about R$ 200,4 million per year — this agency's annual rent was approximately R$ 3,1 million. Dividing by selling price:
| Cap-rate account | Value |
|---|---|
| Annual revenue of the Fund (estimated) | ZQX0ZX mi |
| Participation of Ag. Florianópolis | 1,57% |
| Annual rent of the agency | ~ZQX0ZX mi |
| Sales price | ZQX0ZX mi |
| Implicit cap-rate | ~8,2% a.a. |
Selling a banking agency to a cap-rate of ~8,2% is a business reasonable to good, not exceptional. To put into perspective: medium quality urban income properties tend to trade between 8% and 10% of cap-rate in Brazil of 2026; premium assets (AAA logistics platforms like those of BRCO11, or top corporate slabs like those of HGPO11) exit below 8%. A 8,2% cap-rate for an agency in Florianópolis — solid tenant (BB, contract up to Oct/2032), but specific use asset — indicates that Tivio has achieved a fair market price without burning the asset.
The context reinforces the point: the 8 previous sales of management came out, on average, 42% above evaluation report, adding R$ 162,7 million. With Ag. Florianópolis, the total disinvested rises to about R$ 200 million in 9 properties. Tivio is not liquidating the portfolio at any price — it is selling above book value and recycling capital. That's exactly what the active management mandate promised.
How much does the unitholder lose in rent a month with this sale?
This is the counterpart that no one discloses in the relevant fact. If the annual rent was ~R$ 3,1 million, that equals about R$ 260 thousand per month Recipe coming out of the box from the bottom. Divided by 15.919.690 units:
- R$ 260 thousand 15,92 million units = ~R$ 0,0163 per unit per month.
That is: the fund loses about 1,6 penny per share of monthly rent revenue. Against a R$ 1,05, DPS is a drop marginal — less than 1,6% distribution. And it is not even a real net loss: the cash received on sale can be reapplied, and meanwhile the money from the installments yields. The impact on distribution is virtually imperceptible, and that is precisely the advantage of selling small, pulverized assets instead of a single heavy property.
The cashier dilemma: what does Tivio do with R$ 37,8 million dripping?
Here's the most interesting and less obvious point. The sale does not enter at once: R$ 7,2 million in subscription and four half-yearly tranches of R$ 7,65 million (Dec/26, Jun/27, Dec/27, Jun/28). In addition to what is still to be received from other operations, the fund has about R$ 53,6 million receivable Sales on the horizon. What to do with this flow? There are three paths, and the choice defines the thesis:
- Acquisition pipeline: buy assets with cap-rate larger than sold (8,2%) generates positive spread and helps dilute BB dependency. It is the path that the mandate of active management calls for.
- Reinforce reserve / amortize debt: the profit reserve is in R$ 0,56/unit (~3,7 months of DPS) and the fund carries a CRI of R$ 35 million (IPCA+ZX3ZQX, inherited from the acquisition of Day Hospital). Using the cashier to take that leverage would reduce the financial cost.
- Distribute as extraordinary income: It would please the unitholder in the short term, but it would waste the chance to reposition the portfolio before 2027.
The staggered flow of half-yearly instalments to Jun/2028 suggests that Tivio has cash ammunition exactly during the period in which it will need to face the 2027 salaries. It's no coincidence: selling with parceled receipt gives the dry gunpowder fund manager for the most delicate moment. That's the kind of detail that distinguishes an opportunistic sale from a planned recycling.
Section 2 — CACEX in 5 months: what does this say about the properties of TVRI11
If the sale shows price discipline, the re-location of CACEX shows operating speed — and it is perhaps the most underrated news of the month. Recap: In January the BB returned the property of Rua São Bento (7.106 m2, 3% of the total ABL), and the physical vacancy of the fund fired from 3,6% to 5,7%. Five months later, in May, the property was already re-located, and the vacancy fell to 3,2% — a 44% drop in a single month.
Three details of the new contract matter more than the speed itself:
- Typical contract of 120 months (60 + 60 automatic renewal). Here is the distinction: a contract atypical (as the original BB) has a heavy fine for termination and gives maximum security to the fund; a contract typical follows the law of common tenant, with more flexibility for the tenant to leave. Getting 120 months in a typical contract is a long and positive term.
- No permission (no works). The new tenant accepted the property as it is, without requiring the fund to be reformed. This only happens when the asset is good enough to be occupied "as it is" — a certificate of quality of the property.
- Only three months' rent shortage. Minimal grace, that is, the recipe comes back fast.
Relocating a property of 7,000 m2 in São Paulo in 5 months, without having to pay works and with a period of 10 years, says two things: the properties of TVRI11 have quality and location that the market wants (Street São Bento is a historical financial center of SP), and Tivio has marketing capacity. It is evidence that when the BB returns more real estate — and it goes — management has a way of relocating them. The tenant was not disclosed, but the typical contract suggests a private company, not another banking body.
Why does that change the risk reading? The great fear of the TVRI11 has always been: "What if the BB returns everything at once in 2027, the bottom gets empty sheds?". The CACEX case is the first real test of this scenario on a scale — a large property, returned, amid uncertainty — and Tivio passed. It does not prove that she will be able to repeat this 49 times in a row, but proves that the panic of "permanent vaccination" is exaggerated for well-located assets.
Section 3 — The Race Against Nov/2027: What These Two News Really Change
Now for the background question. TVRI11 has a structural schedule problem: 90% of BB contracts (56 contracts) expire in November 2027, on the same basis date. . It's a cliff. Add to this that Building Headquarters III, in Brasilia, alone represents 21,09% of the fund's revenue (typical contract, also until Nov/2027), and that BB has already notified the early termination of 7 agencies — which projects the vacancy to about 19% in February 2027.
The active management thesis is a race: selling and relocating agencies faster than the BB returns them, so that, when November 2027 arrives, the portfolio is diverse enough to absorb the shock. This month's two news reports are wins in that race. But wins are enough? Let's go to raw math:
| The recycling account | Value |
|---|---|
| BB agencies still in the portfolio | ~49 |
| Tivio's average divestment rate | ~4,5 real estate/year |
| Months up to Nov/2027 | ~17 months |
| Sales designed up to there (4,5/year × ZQX1ZX year) | ~6 real estate |
| BB agencies still in the portfolio in Nov/2027 | ~43 |
The conclusion is uncomfortable but honest: At the current pace, Tivio won't sell everything before the cliff. . About 49 BB agencies remain; the 4,5 sales per year, she takes 6 more off the board by November 2027, leaving ~43 still dependent on the bank contract. The race against the clock, measured only by sales, is being lost in absolute terms.
But there's a nuance that changes the interpretation. Recycling depends not only on sell — it also depends on re-locateAnd that's where CACEX matters. The real scenario of Nov/2027 is not "BB comes out and the bottom is empty". It's "BB renegotiates part, returns another part, and Tivio resets the returned real estate." The CACEX case (5 months without permission, 120 months) is proof of the concept that this relocation works. The question ceases to be "does it sell all in time?" (does it not sell) and becomes "can it relocate at the speed at which the BB returns?"—and for this, the evidence of June is encouraging.
The risk that follows standing. The Building Headquarters III of Brasilia (21,09% of the recipe, typical contract until Nov/2027) is the true point of fragility. A single property returned here takes more than a fifth of the revenue from the fund — and it is too big to be re-located as fast as the CACEX. There's still the failure of the Ag. Bras (fev–mai/2026 plots, of which more than 75% has already been settled, with the bottom in force position) and the concentration of 99% of revenue in BB as tenant. None of these are missing because of this month's news.
The fundamentals behind the thesis
It is worth remembering what supports the TVRI11 even with the cliff of 2027 on the horizon:
- Total rate of 0,28% a.a. (0,10% adm + 0,18% management without performance) — among the lowest in the brick market. A cheap background leaves more return in the unit pocket, year after year.
- 0,85 P/VP — the unit negotiates R$ 88,95 against a VP of R$ 104,19, a discount of 15% on equity. As the previous 8 sales came out 42% above the report, the equity value is probably conservative, and the actual discount can be higher.
- 100% of IPCA indexed contracts — full inflationary income protection.
- Profit reserve of R$ 0,56/unit (~3,7 months of DPS) and R$ 53,6 million to be sold give cash breath to cross 2027.
- Low leverage: the R$ 35 million CRI (IPCA+8,75%) is only PL 2,1% — small, but it is the first implicit debt of the fund and deserves monitoring.
The fund also took the 3rd place in Brick at InfoMoney Outliers in 2026 — recognition that the transition BBPO11 → TVRI11 has been well performed. Compared to pairs of urban income and logistics such as the ALZR11, the TVRI11 exchanges the diversification of tenants (which the ALZR11 has) for a higher equity discount and a lower rate — is a bet on the execution of Tivio.
Verdict: Is it MANTER or is it time to buy at P/VP 0,85?
The two June news confirm the competence of management: the sale of Ag. Florianópolis left to a fair cap-rate of ~8,2% with derisory impact on the DPS (~ZQX1ZX centa/unit), and CACEX was re-located in 5 months with a 10-year contract without permission. The race against Nov/2027 is not being expired in terms of sales — there will be ~43 BB agencies left in the portfolio — but the CACEX case shows that the catastrophic scenario of "permanent vacuum" is unlikely for the well-located properties of the fund.
Verdict: KEEP — note 6,2
TVRI11 to R$ 88,95 (P/VP 0,85) is a bet on Tivio's execution against the November 2027 cliff, when 90% of the BB contracts win together. The June news — 9th sale to cap-rate of ~8,2% and CACEX re-located in 5 months — are real victories and lower the temperature of the risk of vacancy. For those who already have: Hold on. The discount of 15% on VP, the DY of 13,56%, the rate of 0,28% and the reserve of R$ 0,56/unit support the position. For those who are thinking of buying: The 0,85 P/VP is inviting, but it only makes sense to the investor who understands and tolerates the risk of concentration of 99% in BB and the 2027 schedule. It is not a "buy and forget" FII; it is an FII to closely monitor each relevant fact until the 2027 frame becomes clearer. The Building Headquarters III of Brasilia (21% of the recipe) is the number to be watched in the next reports.
This content is informative and does not constitute a recommendation for purchase or sale. Investment decisions should consider their profile, objectives and, ideally, the follow-up of an accredited professional.
