"If the numbers of mar/26 are equal to those of feb/26, why write another article?" It's the fair question of the unitholder who's already read ours analysis of RG Feb/26. . The answer fits in a sentence: because a number that no one looks at has changed place. O WAM Holding has gone from 19,1% to 22,1% of net worth and overcame Hope as the biggest debtor in the fund. And he did it. without paying anything — is 100% short of interest. A debtor who does not pay and yet grows is not stability: it is the symptom of a debt that is inflating inside.
The RG mar/26 (FNet 1222907) came out on 16/06/2026, with 2,5 months late — a marginal improvement on RG Feb/26, which took 3,5 months. Surface data is a photocopy of the previous month. What changes is the reading underneath it.
The wallet did not move — and that is the problem
On the Day 16% / Charity 46% / Inadditional 38%. . They are exactly the same percentages as the RG Feb/26. For a high-yield real estate credit fund, repeating the same stress portrait for two months is not "stabilization" — it is confirmation that no trading has advanced, no collateral has been executed and no debtor has paid back. His wallet's frozen at a bad spot.
The net worth follows in R$ 2,21 billions, with VP/QX0ZQX unit Against this, the unit negotiates the R$ 15,70 — a P/VP of 0,16, or 84% discount on the equity value. The market no longer believes in the reported portfolio value, and the numbers below explain why.
The silent detail: why WAM growing in want is dangerous
First, the concept for who's coming now. Interest shortfall means that the fund lent money, the debtor stopped paying interest, but the balance of debt no disappear — it accumulates. It's like a credit card bill you don't pay: what isn't paid is incorporated into the balance, and the balance grows month by month. The debtor does not stay up to date; he gets an ever-increasing bill hung.
Now apply this to WAM. In Feb/26 he represented 19,1% of the PL. At sea/26, 22,1% — R$ 254,3 million in the Senior tranche (11,5%) and R$ 233,8 million in the Subordinate (10,6%). This growth of three percentage points did not come from new contribution or the fund to like WAM more. . It came from the capitalization of the interest he was supposed to be paying and didn't pay. The debtor swelled up without disbursing a penny.
Because this is technically alarming: WAM wins in Dec/2027 — about 18 months. The longer he spends in grace, the greater the balance to be charged at maturity. That is, when the account wins, it will be largest than it was when WAM went into want, not smaller. Endless grace is no relief — it is a snowball with a date set to explode.
Hope, which was the highest position, retreated from 21,6% to PL 19,6% (Senior R$ 292,9 mi + Subordinate R$ 138,1 mi) and wins only in Feb/2034, with 92-94% in interest shortage. The exchange of leadership in the ranking of debtors seems cosmetic, but it is not: the new number 1 wins six years earlier Hope's. The risk of the fund has migrated to a debtor with much shorter deadline and zero recent payment history.
The box that shrinks: -22% in six months
As the wallet stands still, the box generation engine loses power every month. The cash result — the money that effectively enters and backs distribution — fell consistently:
| Month | Result box | Cumulative change |
|---|---|---|
| Oct/25 | R$ 6,84M | — |
| Nov/25 | R$ 7,52M | +10% |
| ten/25 | R$ 6,88M | +0,6% |
| Jan/26 | R$ 6,56M | -4% |
| Feb/26 | R$ 5,47M | -20% |
| Mar/26 | R$ 5,34M | -22% |
From Oct/25 to Mar/26, the result box fell -22%. . The trend is not an isolated hiccup: it is four months in a row of falls. And there is a direct cause and effect relationship with the previous section — when more of the wallet goes into want (debtors who do not pay interest), less money actually enters the cashier. The cashier dwindling Yeah. the default is materialized in the pocket of the unitholder.
Coverage of 1.05x: the line where the dividend turns back capital
In Mar/26 the fund distributed R$ 0,23/unit against a result box of R$ 0,24/unit. . That gives a cover of just 1.05x. . Translating: for each distributed R$ 1,00, the background generated R$ 1,05. The margin is five cents for real — practically nothing.
Why does it matter? Because coverage is the line that separates "paying real dividends" from "returning your own money disguised as dividends." If the result box falls more R$ 0,01/unit, the cover is below 1.0x — and the bottom goes to distribute more than generates. . When this happens, the "dividend" ceases to be the result of the operation and becomes capital being returned. The unitholder thinks he's getting income, but he's getting back a piece of his own investment, with equity shrinking from behind.
The mathematics of the base scenario (it is not forecast, it is arithmetic): If the result keeps the pace of -22% every six months, in six months it would be around R$ 4,16M — something like R$ 0,19/unit of real distribution capacity. The DPS, which has already fallen from R$ 0,40 (ten/25) to ZQX1ZX-0,26 in recent months, would have to go down further to follow — or the fund enters the capital return field. There's no magic third path until the wallet pays back.
Concentration: four groups, ~59% of equity
O HCTR11 There's no point problem; there's a structure problem. The four largest debtors add up about PL 59,1%And everyone's stressed out:
| Debtor | % of PL | Situation | Profit |
|---|---|---|---|
| WAM Holding | 22,1% | 100% deficiency | Dec/2027 |
| Hope | 19,6% | 92-ZQX0ZX deficiency | Feb/2034 |
| GPK | 10,4% | 100% deficiency | — |
| Brazil Parks | 7,0% | 100% deficiency | — |
| Total | ~59,1% | almost 6 out of 10 PL reais in stressed debtors | |
There is no diversification that dilutes this risk: the fate of the fund is tied to a handful of debtors who today simply do not pay. There is also a sign of cross-drainage — HCST11 received a contribution of R$ 0,75M to H.I. expenses. Pines, an indication that the wallet is subsidizing a connected IFI instead of receiving it.
What happens if WAM doesn't pay in ten/2027
Here's the knot that defines the investment. If WAM does not honour the debt at maturity, the path is to execution of the security. . And the guarantees of these CRIs are backed up in multi-property fractions (the "vacation property unit" of each buyer). Executing this means a slow lawsuit, with partial recovery and years of waiting until any money goes back to the fund. It is not a button that is pressed — it is a court line measured in years, on a very low liquidity asset.
It's the same kind of risk that sank other high-yield market troublesomes like DEVA11, URPR11, TORD11 and CACR11: when the ballast is difficult to liquidate and the debtor stops paying, the unit discount is not "opportunity" — it is the market precluding the uncertainty of how much, and when, will remain.
Opacity and flight of unit holders
Two qualitative signs close the picture. The first is the systemic opacity: the RG Feb/26 came out with 3,5 months late and the sea/26 with 2,5 — chronic delays that prevent the unit holder from monitoring the deterioration in real time. The second is the flight of unit holders: from 130.295 (jan) to 128.064 (mar) and 123.678 (may) — 6.617 unit short in four months. . There is even a formal complaint of unit holders to Vórtx, citing CVM, ANBIMA and B3, with an organized group pleading the management exchange. Whoever's inside is leaving, and who's complaining.
Verdict: SALE / AVOIDING — Note 2,0/10
The RG Mar/26 does not bring a single piece of news that justifies maintaining the position. The default continues on 38%, the cash result dropped -22% in six months, the coverage of the DPS is at 1.05x (to a penny of turning capital) and the WAM — now the largest debtor, in total want — grew to 22,1% of the PL inflating an account that wins by 10/2027.
The 84% discount on VP is not a safety margin: is the market, with reason, precluding the probability that the reported portfolio value does not convert to cash. The DY of ~21% gross (and ~13% recurring) is unsustainable if the cashier follows the current rhythm. As long as the wallet does not pay again — and nothing in the RG Mar/26 indicates that it will come back — each month adds risk without adding value. It is not time to buy downtown; it is time not to be exposed.
