The Management Report of May/26 of the May/26 ALMI11, o Torre Almirante FII — dono de 40% do Edifício Torre Almirante, na Av. Admiral Barroso, Rio Center — brings one of those scenarios in which the positive headline hides an intact structural problem. Occupancy rose to 59.56%, which means that the vacancy retreated to 40.44%, confirming the improvement trend seen since April (when it was at 46.8%). It is the first consistent good news in months.
The problem is what came together. Expenses, which had declined in April, grew again in May, and the unit-adjusted result fell from R$ 2.80 to R$ 2.56 — 8.6% drop. The distribution parked at R$ 2.52, the fifth month in a row below R$ 3.00 in a fund that, a year ago, paid more than R$ 5.00. And the quotes keep coming out: they are 1,843, the fourth consecutive month of fall.
The genuine novelty is buried in the report: the administration hired a consultant to try to reduce the IPTU and the garbage rate with public bodies. It is the first concrete movement of active cost management in a historically passive fund. But, like almost everything in the ALMI11, the impact comes — if it comes — in the medium term.
What has improved?
The occupation of 59.56% is the most encouraging data of the report. The floor-to-floor table shows the occupied floors 22 to 36, with weight names in the tenants base: WeWork, Federal Economic Box, Marsh, DSV, Kuehne+Nagel, Siqueira Castro, Gaia Silva Gaede, MDS Seguros and Wilson Sons, among others. Wilson Sons signed three floors (about 3,800 m2) in March, and Siqueira Castro entered as a new tenant — it was these moves that pulled the occupation upwards.
The context of the co-owner reinforces reading. O O O BRCR11, which owns the other 60% of the Admiralty Tower, confirmed in June the vacancy of 40.8% in the asset — practically identical — and, more importantly, average rent rising from R$ 104 to R$ 112/m2. In other words: the same tower is renting more expensive. The administrator of ALMI11 admits that "corporate lajes are the most discounted segment" of the market, but says it is "working the vacancy with tenants and brokers". For the first time in months, there is evidence that this is working.
What concerns you?
Relief in occupation did not translate into relief in the pocket of the cotist, and the reason is the cost base. It is worth remembering the trajectory of monthly expenses:
| Mês Meses | Dispensational expenses | Distribution/cotata/distribution |
|---|---|---|
| dez/25 | ~R$ 122 mil | R$ 4,17 |
| jan/26 | R$ 402 mil | R$ 3,93 |
| fev/26 | R$ 540 mil | R$ 3,04 |
| mar/26 | R$ 853 mil | R$ 0,30 |
| abr/26 | R$ 491 mil | R$ 2,51 |
| mai/26 | R$ 511 mil | R$ 2,52 |
In March, expenses exploded to R$ 853 thousand and almost zeroed the distribution (R$ 0.296) — episode detailed in the episode 853. análise do ITBI de maio. Since then they have retreated, but they have settled into a platform of R$ 500 thousand/month, well above the floor of R$ 122 thousand of December. In practice, this new level of cost is what locks the dividend.
The May DRE is revealing: property revenue of R$ 757,852, plus R$ 35,511 of financial result, totaling R$ 793,363; against R$ 510,681 of expenses, a result of R$ 317,060 remains. It is positive, but lean — when nearly half of gross revenue goes to expenses, every real avoided cost matters very much.
Cotistas fugindo:: the base fell from 1,910 to 1,886, 1,852 and now 1,843 in four months. 67 quotes are the lowest since the start of the year. In a fund with only 111,177 units and a majority of individuals, this evasion is a symptom of loss of confidence — and reduces the liquidity of those who stay: in May only 503 units (R$ 326 thousand in the month).
The equity value also continues to slip, albeit slowly: the VP per share is at R$ 2,044.19 (PL of R$ 227.27 millions). The fund trades at R$ 629.99 — a P/VP of approximately 0.31, that is, the market prices the quote at less than a third of the book value. This brutal discount is not generosity: it is the price that the market attributes to vacancy, to the costs and to the risk that the patrimonial value has not yet captured all the devaluation of the corporate slabs.
The novelty: IPTUX consultant IPTU consultant
For the first time, the administration made a concrete move to attack fixed costs: it hired a consultant to seek the reduction of the IPTU and the waste rate from public bodies. There is no deadline or estimate of savings disclosed, but the gesture deserves attention because it breaks the passive management standard that has always characterized the fund.
To scale the potential: from the expenses of R$ 511 thousand in May, the administration fee accounts for about R$ 100 thousand/month. The rest — something close to R$ 400 thousand/month — are building costs: condominium, maintenance, IPTU and garbage rate. IPTU and garbage are precisely the items that a tax consultant usually manages to reduce through revision of the calculation base or reframe. If the economy stays in the range of 10% to 20% of fixed expenses, this would release something between R$ 40 thousand and R$ 100 thousand per month.
Translating into English to translate into English: savings of R$ 50 thousand/month in expenses, divided by 111,177 units, would add about R$ 0.45 per unit to the result — almost 18% more over the current distribution of R$ 2.52. It does not solve the thesis, but it is not despicable. The problem is that tax consultancies against the public power rarely deliver in months; the benefit, if it comes, is long horizon.
What's at stake in 2026X
Here's the real knot of the thesis, and he lives in contracts. The distribution of the maturity schedule per leased area is as follows: 45% of the contracts expire in 2025, 34% of the contracts expire in 2026, 10% of the contracts expire in 2027 and 11% of 2028 onward. And the revision clauses (value renegotiation) concentrate almost all on 2025 (95%), with only 5% on 2026.
The sensitive point is the block of blocks. 34% area with contracts maturing in 2026X% area with contracts maturing in 2026. Each contract that is not renewed returns slab to the bottom — and in a building where floors 3 to 19 are already entirely vacant, more returns would push the vacancy back up, undoing recent progress. The central question for the quotationist is straightforward: if a relevant part of these 34% does not renew, does the dividend stand?
On the positive side, there is the empty space as opportunity. The 17 vacant floors (3 to 19) equal approximately 40.44% of a total ABL asset around 41,811 m2 — something like 18,000 m2 vacant in the entire building. With the average rental of R$ 112/m2 informed by the owner. BRCR11, filling everything would generate about R$ 2 million/month of income in the asset, of which the 40% of ALMI11 would correspond to approximately R$ 800 thousand/month of additional revenue. It is almost double the revenue of current properties. The upside exists and it's big — but it depends on absorbing half of a building in the country's most punished office segment.
The extreme risk: BTG proposed for the FPAB11, similar profile background, asset sale with 38% offset. The ALMI11 shares the characteristics that make this outcome plausible: small base of quotes, majority natural person, passive management and single asset of low liquidity. A forced sale at an occasional price is a scenario that the quotationist needs to have on the radar.
What does the current dividend mean?
At the quote of R$ 630, a monthly dividend of R$ 2.52 equals one. The dividend yield yields. Annualized approximately 4.8%. When the fund paid R$ 4 to R$ 5 per share (half of 2025), this income was around the 8% per year. The fall of the proceeds ate up almost half of the current return — and it is this, more than the isolated vacancy, that explains the flight of the quotationists. One FII brick DY with single active, high vacuum and 4.8% DY badly competes with exempt fixed income or with paper FIIs paying much more.
Veredicto: VENDA — Nota 3.4/10
The occupation improvement for 59.56% is real and welcomed, and IPTU consultant signals a rare active management effort. Mas nenhum desses dois pontos altera a fotografia estrutural: despesas ancoradas em R$ 500 mil/mês, dividendo estacionado em R$ 2,52 (DY de ~4,8%), inadimplência 90+ de 42,35%, contas a receber de R$ 5,08 milhões e 34% dos contratos vencendo em 2026. Add up the reserve of minuscule contingency (R$ 37 thousand, ~R$ 0.33 / unit), the evasion of units and the risk of forced sale in the molds of the 37 thousand, ~R$ 0.33 / unit, the evasion of units and the risk of forced sale in the molds of the forced sale. FPAB11, and the risk-return profile remains unfavorable. The operational improvement is still not enough to reverse the thesis.
The path to the thesis turns around
For the ALMI11 to leave the sales zone, three things have to happen, in order: first, the 34% of contracts that expire in 2026 need to renew for the most part — without that, everything else is irrelevant. Second, the consultant of IPTU has to deliver a concrete and measurable reduction in fixed costs, proving that the gesture was more than symbolic. Third, the occupation needs to continue rising, starting to attack the totally vacant 17 floors, so that the potential of R$ 800 thousand/month of additional income ceases to be hypothesis and becomes cash.
As long as these three milestones do not materialize, the 69% discount on the equity value is a true mirror of risk, not a bargain. The May report shows a fund that has stopped worsening in occupation — but has not yet begun to improve for those who receive the dividend. The next reports, especially those that bring the balance of the renovations of 2026, is that they will tell if this stabilization is a bottom of well or just a pause in the descent.
