I'm a unit. Am I gonna win or lose? Should I sell or hold?
Who bought the R$ 650 (19/05/2026 quotation) is with -68% of the accountancy: The VP/unit is R$ 2.048,45, but the market pays R$ 650 — P/VP of 0,33.
Selling is expensive: the daily liquidity of ALMI11 It's about R$ 11 thousand. Leaving a relevant position requires weeks and additional discount on the screen price.
Hanging on also costs: the april/2026 dividend was R$ 0,00, breaking a 22-month sequence. With 90+ default on 42,35% and 57% of contracts winning by 2025, additional months of zero yield are the base scenario, not the exception.
Verdict: ALMI11 is not a discount-disguised value thesis. It is a fund where the disengagement of the unit holders has become material proof — and low liquidity prevents the market from making the adjustment it would make on any other asset.
The portrait of the background in May/2026
What the quorum of 0,14% reveals
In 13/05/2026, the AGO of ALMI11 approved the financial statements of 2025 — without any structural deliberation: no management adjustment, no vacancy or default plan, no proposal for repositioning. Six days later, the BTG Pactual released the result of an AGE via Formal Consultation (doc 1199416), open between 17/04/04 and 18/05/2026, on the same schedule of annual accounts.
The result is the most uncomfortable data of the year for the fund:
| AGE via Formal Consultation — DFs 2025 | Result |
|---|---|
| Favourable | 84,34% |
| Against | 9,04% |
| Abstentions | 6,63% |
| Total quorum (on 111.177 units issued) | 0,14% |
| Quotas that actually voted | ~155 units |
The Favourable 84,34% focus on a base of about 155 units. It's not a majority of the fund — it's a majority of those who still have an interest in opinion. This group is numerically tiny: the 155 units × R$ 650 = about R$ 100 thousand in market value. In a fund of R$ 227,7 million PL.
The lethal combination: does not vote, does not leave
The 99,86% that did not vote in the accounts fall into one of two categories:
- Resignees: They've already taken the loss emotionally and no longer follow the fund. For them, ALMI11 has become a red number in the extract that doesn't pay to open.
- Liquidity arrested: with about R$ 11 thousand daily spin, positions above R$ 50 thousand require weeks to be dismantled — and any selling pressure drops the price immediately.
Not voting is the symptom. Liquidity is the disease.
The need for an AGE via Formal Consultation to deliberate the same theme of the face-to-face OGA is another sign: the ordinary assembly of 13/05 may have been inconclusive due to lack of quorum — and the digital alternative, with a month of voting window (17/04/18/05), managed to gather only 0,14%. An average unit of this fund that participated in the AGE had about R$ 648 invested (155 units ? 1.852 total unit × R$ 650 — rough estimate). But the point is not the size of the position: it is that the overwhelming majority of the 1.852 quotaists did not feel that it was worth it or click "yes" on the platform.
Why Dividend Zerou in April
The monthly report of Apr/2026 (doc 1187612, released on 12/05) brought effective profitability of -0,0009% and provent of R$ 0,00 by unit. There was no strategic retention — there was no result to distribute.
| Operational metric | Value | Background |
|---|---|---|
| Accounts receivable (Apr/26) | R$ 5,08 Mi | +44% vs 4T25 (R$ 3,53 Mi) |
| Non-compliance 90+ days (4Q25) | 42,35% | Almost half of the contracted billing |
| Other obligations to be paid (Apr/26) | R$ 4,75 Mi | Drenam box before distributable |
| Contingency reserve | R$ 48 thousand | Symbolic — constituted Sep/2025 |
| Box in RF funds (Apr/26) | R$ 9,67 Mi | Operational liquidity — does not automatically distribute |
The judicial deposit of ITBI of R$ 2,47 millions (tax executions Apr/2022) remains pending. When receivable accounts rise 44% in four months while chronic default exceeds 40%, the monthly result enters negative ground — and the 95% distribution rule on profit simply has no profit to apply.
DPS history: the drop in a table
| Month | Dividend/unit | Difference |
|---|---|---|
| Mai/2025 | R$ 3,40 | — |
| Jun/2025 | R$ 5,26 | +55% |
| Jul/2025 | R$ 3,93 | -25% |
| Aug/2025 | R$ 4,23 | +8% |
| Sep/2025 | R$ 4,17 | -1% |
| Oct/2025 | R$ 3,04 | -27% |
| Nov/2025 | R$ 4,82 | +59% |
| Dec/2025 | R$ 5,04 | +5% |
| Jan/2026 | R$ 4,53 | -10% |
| Feb/2026 | R$ 3,85 | -15% |
| Mar/2026 | R$ 3,20 | -17% |
| Apr/2026 | R$ 0,00 | -100% |
The 12-month moving average is R$ 3,46/unit — a number that still supports the 6,1% training, but looks back. The last four months already showed the trend: R$ 4,53 → R$ 3,85 → R$ 3,20 → R$ 0,00. It wasn't a surprise; it was confirmation.
Timeline: 7 years without dividend, 22 months of recovery, now another break
Contract maturity: 57% already expired in 2025
The Almirante Tower building has relevant tenants (WeWork, Caixa Econômica Federal, Marsh Brokera, Kuehne+Nagel, DSV Air Sea, Altera Piranema, EDF EN do Brasil), but the structure of the contracts is the problem:
| Profit | % of contracts | Implication |
|---|---|---|
| 2025 (Wind/Maturity) | 57% | Most of the revenue in immediate renegotiation |
| 2026 | 21% | Additional pressure in the next 12 months |
| 2027 | 14% | Short stability window |
| 2028+ | 7% | Minimum long-term contractual basis |
With 46,80% for vacancy (ranges 3-18 empty for more than two years) and 57% for live contracts in renegotiation in the same period, the fund manager — BTG Actual in passive management, with Cushman & Wakefield in ownership — has no price lever. The remaining tenants have leverage; the bottom does not.
VP/continuous fall
| Period | VP/unit | Difference |
|---|---|---|
| Nov/2025 | R$ 2.105 | — |
| Dec/2025 | R$ 2.062 | - R$ 43 |
| Apr/2026 | R$ 2.048,45 | -Additional ZQX0ZX |
Fall of 2,7% in 5 months in mono-active fund indicates negative adjustment of the fair value of the property — consistent with structural vacancy and increasing default. The P/VP of 0,33 is not an opportunity: it is the price that the market charges to keep an asset of Rio Center with uncertain turnaround thesis.
Comparative with peer: position 9/13 in the bucket
| FII | Note | Verdict | Remarks |
|---|---|---|---|
| HGPO11 | 5,2 | Bucket top | Prime offices SP — another league |
| EDGA11 | 3,7 | High risk | Mono-active Center/RJ, similar pain, but still distributes |
| HBRH11 | 3,6 | High risk | Hybrid with office component |
| ALMI11 | 3,5 | VENDA | Position 9/13 — quorum zero + DPS zero |
Inside the "Tijolo · Offices · Low quality" bucket, ALMI11 It's not the most risky option by accident. It is the only one in which the disengagement of the unit holders materialized in formal act (AGE of 0,14%) and in which the profit has already zeroed. EDGA11 He has similar structural pain in the center of Rio, but still distributes. HGPO11 it is in another category of quality and governance.
Three scenarios for the next 12 months
| Scene | Assumed | Expected average DPS | Implicit unit |
|---|---|---|---|
| Pessimistic | Non-compliance above 40%, stationary vacancy, plus 1-2 months of zero DPS | R$ 1,50/month | R$ 480-550 |
| Base | Partial renegotiation of expired contracts, default drops to 30-35%, DPS returns to R$ 2-3 irregularly | R$ 2,50/month | R$ 560-620 |
| Optimist | Recovery of defaults + relevant new leases on empty floors (ranges 3-18) | R$ 4,00/month | R$ 700-800 |
The estimated DCF (CDI + 7% discount, reflecting mono-active risk + chronic default + emptied governance) points to Fair price of R$ 560 (R$ 480-620). . The current unit for R$ 650 carries a premium on this calculation — the market still pays something for the implicit hope of the asset discount, but the real cash flow does not sustain.
. Verdict — ALMI11 · Note 3,5/10 · SALE
- Do not buy: P/VP 0,33 is accounting discount, not cash flow discount. Without distribution, the discount is eternal — it does not necessarily close.
- Current unit: evaluate partial output in available liquidity windows, accepting additional discount on screen price. Maintaining the entire position is betting on recovery that depends on active management — and AGO + AGE of 0,14% has shown that there is no political mandate for this.
- Substitutes for those who want corporate slab: HGRE11, PVBI11, BRCR11 or RCRB11 — asset diversification, active management and living governance.
Estimated fair price: R$ 560 (QQX0ZQX-620). Current quote: R$ 650.
The fund that no one wants to govern
The story of ALMI11 had an arc until May: 7 years without dividing, 22 months of resumption, gradual fall in the DPS. In two weeks, that bow closed. AGO approved the accounts without structural deliberation; AGE confirmed that only 0,14% of the units cared to participate; the April report arrived with R$ 0,00 in the field of income.
It's no coincidence that everything came together. The governance of the FIIs depends on units that appear — and units that continue to appear are, in general, those who still believe that the fund can change. The 0,14% quorum is the cleanest sign that this belief has evaporated.
The paradox is that very low liquidity (~R$ 11 thousand/day) does not let the disenchanted out. The fund that 99,86% of the unit holders ignored in the polls in May is the same that will hold them for the next few years without dividing — and the discount of 68% on the VP is not an opportunity: it is the price that the market charges to keep an asset that no one else wants to govern.
