HSAF11: 17 Months of R$ 0,95 — and the Manager is already Armoring the Next Cycle

What has changed since the last analysis

This re-analysis of HSAF11 (SI Financial Assets) captures a clear transition: the fund has gone beyond 13 to 17 consecutive months of DPS R$ 0,95 without oscillating a penny — a sequence that began in April/2025 and remains intact in June/2026 — while the fund manager began repositioning the portfolio to the new interest regime. There was no number shock: there was a change of posture. HSI is anticipating what the market is still discussing.

Four axes sum up what's moved. First, the rotation of R$ 14,5 million in share of IFIs of own origin, taking down the share of 23,9% FIIs to 17,3% of the asset. Second, the May result on R$ 1,10/unit, above the distributed dividend. Third, the spread improvement: the IPCA+ plot rose from 8,64% to 8,73% and the CDI+ from 4,66% to 4,74%. Fourth, the interest cycle finally turned — two cuts of 0,25 pp led Selic to 14,50%, and HSI itself designs 13,25% terminal at the end of the year.

The FIIs→CRIS rotation: what it really means

To understand the movement, you need to know what a CRI. . CRI is a Certificate of Real Estate Receivables — in practice, a loan given to a company or real estate undertaking, with real guarantees (real estate), which pays interest to the fund. When HSAF11 buys a direct CRI at source, it gets a full rate: "IPCA + 8,73%", for example. ♪ When he buys ♪ shares of other receivable funds (KNIP11, KNCR11, MCCI11), he receives the dividend of those funds — good, liquid, but with a layer of administration rate in the middle and with more return attached to the floating CDI.

Here's the logic of the exchange. FIIs shares deal in stock exchange, are easy to sell and function as cash parking while the fund manager looks for good operations. But they have two problems in the current scenario: (1) their indirect return is closer to the CDI, which It's falling.; and (2) there is the target fund rate corroding the spread. By selling R$ 14,5 million of these FIIs and allocate to "Advanced trading" own CRIs, HSI does two things at the same time: locks longer spreads before the interest drops more, and eliminates the intermediate rate layer. It's exactly what you'd expect from a fund manager who's "shrouding the next cycle."

How much income the fund lost — and how much it recovers

The sold receiver FIIs yielded, on average, close to the CDI plus a modest prize — call something in the 100% range to the net CDI 110%, already discounted the target fund rate. The own CRIs that enter the place carry spreads of IPCA + 8% to 10% or CDI + 4,5% to 6% in origin, without the intermediate layer. The math is favorable: the background gives up instant liquidity (which it does not need, since it has R$ 31,4 million in cash, 10,8% of PL) and captures, in return, some additional spread-base points over R$ 14,5 million. The effect is not a leap in the dividend — it is the R$ 0,95 defense against the erosion that Selic in the fall would cause if the wallet stayed in the FIIs.

Result R$ 1,10 vs DPS R$ 0,95: the mattress that protects your dividend

That's the point that separates a fund that can withstand Selic's fall from one that can't handle. When an IFI generates more cash than it pays, it builds a accumulated result mattress. . HSAF11 has been doing this for months, and the balance of R$ 0,64/unit equals about two thirds of an entire monthly dividend in reserve.

Why does that protect you? Imagine that in a few months the CDI+ portion of the income portfolio less (because the CDI fell) and the monthly result back to, say, R$ 0,90/unit. Without mattress, the bottom would be forced to cut the dividend to R$ 0,90 in the same month — and the unitholder would feel the blow to the rent. With R$ 0,64/unit saved, management can complement the distribution and hold the R$ 0,95 for several months, smoothing the transition instead of going through the shock at once. It is a bumper, not an eternal guarantee: the mattress runs out if the generation gets chronically below the dividend. But it buys time — and time, in a cycle of gradual cuts, is what matters.

The Emiliano Hotel is 13,7% of the PL — is that dangerous?

Yes, 13,7% of equity in a single operation is a concentration that deserves attention — and that is why we classify this point as mean severity. . If the Emiliano Hotel stopped paying, the impact on the fund would be disproportionate. But what makes that risk acceptable It is an acronym that every paper fund investor needs to understand: LTV.

LTV is Loan-to-Value — in Portuguese, the ratio between the amount borrowed and the value of the guarantee. The CRI of the Emiliano Hotel has 34% LTV. . Translating to the reader who has an account in the realtor but does not live from it: the fund lent a value that corresponds only to 34% than the property-guarantee applies. . If the debtor stops paying and the guarantee needs to be executed, the property could lose even 66% of its value which would still pay off the entire debt. It's a huge security margin. For comparison, a common real estate loan comes with LTV from 70% to 80% — the bank lends almost full value of the property. An LTV of 34% is conservative to the extreme.

That is why the concentration on Emiliano is not the same as high risk: the operation has more than twice as much collateral covering the debt. The real risk would be a combination of default of debtor with severe devaluation of luxury hotel property in São Paulo — a possible scenario, but which would require a destruction of value that the LTV of 34% was designed to absorb. The top-4 (Emiliano, Heritage, Itapê and IPCA Heritage) adds 40,7% of the PL, and that is the most relevant structural weakness of the portfolio — not an imminent problem, but the place where a scare would have more strength.

Can the performance rate bite again in 2026?

That's the silent counterpart of Selic's fall. Today the total actual expenditure of the fund revolves around 0,75% a.a., below the pairs, precisely because the wallet has delivered near return (not far above) of the performance benchmark. But the benchmark is mobile: when Selic falls, CDI 110% falls together, downloading the "waterline" that the bottom needs to overcome to charge performance.

The effect is double-handed and deserves cold thinking. On the one hand, the HSAF11 portfolio is mostly IPCA+ with spreads locked in 8,73% — these CRIs continue to yield the same regardless of Selic. As the CDI benchmark goes down, it stays easier the IPCA+ portfolio surpasses CDI's 110%, and then the performance will be charged again more often. On the other hand, this only happens if the wallet actually delivers above the new floor — and the very fall of the CDI+ portion of the wallet (which accompanies Selic) pulls the total return down. The net result is uncertain, but the direction is clear: the more Selic falls, the greater the chance of the performance reappearing in 2026/2027, eating a slice of the prize that today goes whole to the unit. It is not a serious problem — the rate is reasonable and aligned — but it is a wind against having on the radar.

The portfolio today: 62,5% in own CRIs, 100% of default

After rotation, the allocation of HSAF11 was like this:

Adding the two lines of own CRIs, are PL 71,9% in own-source operations, with FIIs dropping to 14,4% after sale. Background loads 21 CRIs distributed by hotel, residential, shopping, education, tourism and home equity, with 100% default in more than five years of operation. . The spreads are robust: some CRIs pay IPCA+ in the range of 9% to 10,85% (Creditas, Ibaia, Patrimony Education), which sustains income even if the CDI+ portion shrinks with interest.

It is worth noting the only sensitive point in the portfolio: exposure to GPA, today in extrajudicial recovery. . It's just a CRI. PL 0,4%, with fiduciary disposal of 13 properties (R$ 254 million in guarantees), immediate debtor being another fund, and leases being honored. The material risk is minimal — we classify it as low severity — but it is honest to signal it.

The risk that no one can ignore: Selic will compress the DPS

Here's the knot of the thesis, and why we answer "yes, but managed" at the top. About 31,7% of the portfolio is CDI+, and this portion It yields less as Selic fallsBecause the CDI follows Selic closely. The two cuts already executed (from 14,75% to 14,50%) have not yet bit the dividend — hence the 17 months intact of R$ 0,95. But if Selic is really 13,25%, they're more 1,25 pp of falling ahead, and the arithmetic of the CDI+ plot doesn't forgive.

This is exactly what HSI is defending itself with three combined tools: (1) the R$ 0,64/unit mattress, which softens the transition; rotation for IPCA+ own CRIs, which replaces income linked to the CDI by income linked to inflation, more predictable and waged; and (3) the maintenance of High spreads (8,73% IPCA+) that give margin of fat. The base scenario is DPS in the range R$ 0,90–0,95 in the next 12 months, not a collapse. But the investor who buys HSAF11 today thinking R$ 0,95 is permanent is reading the past, not the future.

Scenes for the next 12 months

Notice the asymmetries favorable to the buyer in the bull scenario: if Selic falls faster than HSI designs (sumo to Focus 11%), unit is valued even if the dividend backs a bit — because the P/VP discount 0,89 closes and paper funds reprecise upwards when long interest falls. That is, part of what you lose in current income can come back as a capital gain. In bear, the punishment combines unit drop and dividend cut, but requires the confluence of several negative events at the same time.

Macro environment: the tail wind has become ambiguous

A detail of May/2026 that was not in the previous analysis: the macro background was less benign. . Brent pierced the US$ 100/barrel (tension with Iran), the IPA (producer price index) accelerated and HSI itself raised its IPCA projection from 5,20% to 5,40%. . For a paper fund, the effect is ambiguous, not unidirectional: the portion IPCA+ gains more correction (larger inflation = more interest passed on to the unit holder), while the convergence of the CDI+ portion becomes slower. We classify it as low severity because the wallet has both legs — one benefits exactly from what harms the other, which dilutes the impact.

Bucket position and P/VP: paying 0,89 for R$ 1,00 equity

O 0,89 P/VP It's the second argument of purchase. P/VP is the price of the share divided by her equity value. The VP/unit of HSAF11 is R$ 89,25, and the unit negotiates the R$ 79,80 — you are paying R$ 0,89 for each equity R$ 1,00, a discount of 10,6%. In paper funds with 100% of adplicity and market marked portfolio, this discount is unusual and works as a security margin: if the portfolio were settled today by the marking values, the unit holder would receive more than he paid for the unit.

In the bucket Paper · Multicategory · medium risk, the HSAF11 occupies the 1st position between 12 compared funds, with note 8,0. The combination that puts it at the top: own portfolio of quality (62,5%+ in CRIs originated by the house), history of impeccable adimence, management that anticipates the cycle instead of reacting to it, and a two-digit asset discount. For the investor who already has pure CDI+ via KNCR11 or similar, the HSAF11 enters as the multi-category IPCA+ component of the biggest prize of the bucket.

Verdict: Buy now or wait?

About the author

Article Author Edinei Bauer

Investor and founder of Rico to the Few.

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